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As science does not, who is to answer the question:
"What shall we do, and how shall we arrange our
lives?".. .. Which of the warring gods should we serve?
Or should we serve perhaps an entirely different god,
and who is he?"
—Max Weber
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
On April 23, 1986, the Irish prime minister, Garret FitzGerald,
called a press conference at which he announced his government's
intention to hold a referendum on divorce. The Irish electorate was
being offered the opportunity to acknowledge formally the individ-
ual's legislative right to divorce, an established right in all other
Western democratic societies.1 The constitutional article prohibit-
ing divorce legislation—"No law shall be enacted providing for the
grant of a dissolution of marriage"—would be deleted and replaced
with the following four-point amendment:
Where, and only where, such court established under this Constitution as
may be prescribed by law is satisfied that: (i) the marriage has failed; (ii)
the failure has continued for a period of, or periods amounting to at least
five years; (iii) no possibility of reconciliation exists between the two par-
ties to the marriage, and (iv) any other condition prescribed by law has
been complied with, the court may in accordance with law grant a disso-
lution of the marriage provided that the court is satisfied that adequate
and proper provision having regard to the circumstances will be made for
any dependent spouse and for any child of, or any child who is dependent
on, either spouse.
The form of divorce proposed was non-fault based and similar
to that available in the United States, Great Britain, and other
Western societies. In its other conditions, however, the Irish pro-
posal was relatively restrictive. By American standards, the impo-
sition of a five-year-failure clause appears excessively so, given that
most states in the U.S. either prohibit judicial discretion to deny a
divorce, or, in the case of a contested unilateral non-fault divorce,
require a period of one year or less of separation. Viewed from a
European perspective, the Irish five-year failure requirement ap-
pears less extraordinary. With the exception of Sweden and the
Netherlands, which come closest to granting divorce on demand,
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other European societies take a much stricter view of marriage and
its dissolution than does the United States.2
In announcing the divorce referendum, Garret FitzGerald also
declared the government's intention of introducing new family law
measures to accompany the amendment. This proposed legislation
would set down guidelines regarding, among other points, age of
marriage, a new family court system, and mediation, reconcilia-
tion, and separation procedures to be followed in the case of mar-
ital breakdown.
Following the announcement of the government's proposals, a
national opinion poll found that over half of the electorate, 61 per-
cent, expressed their intention to vote in favor of the amendment.3
This level of support was consistent with previous surveys that
sought to measure the public's attitude toward the removal of the
divorce ban. Since 1971, when the question was first asked in opin-
ion polls, the number in favor of removal of the ban has increased
from a minority of 21 percent to a peak of 53 percent in 1983, with
77 percent expressing support for the introduction of divorce in
certain circumstances.4
The government, therefore, in deciding to hold a referendum to
establish whether the Irish people wanted to introduce divorce, had
strong indicators that there was significant support, at least in prin-
ciple, for divorce, and they had evidence of marital breakdown.5
The initial poll published following the announcement of the gov-
ernment's proposals bore witness to pro-divorce sentiment. As the
campaign progressed, however, subsequent polls indicated that the
level of support for the introduction of divorce was dropping. And
after nine weeks of a vigorous campaign during which pro-divorce
and anti-divorce forces presented their respective cases to the pub-
lic, the amendment was defeated, with two-thirds, 64 percent, of
the electorate voting against it.6
The defeat of the divorce amendment can be seen on many levels
and interpreted from many angles. It certainly presents as a curi-
osity. It seems anomalous that Ireland, a well-educated, urban, con-
sumer society and a full member of the European Economic
Community since 1973, differs so sharply from its fellow Europe-
ans in its prohibition of divorce. Ireland's reaffirmation of the ban
in the late 1980s presents as an oddity in much the same way, for
example, that Switzerland's exclusion of the franchise to women in
the 1970s presented.
Introduction
Table 1. Irish pre-voting attitudes and intentions
Gender
Male
Female
Region
Urban
Rural
Province
Dublin
Leinster*
Munster
Connacht/Ulster
Social class
Middle class
Working class
Large farmers
Small farmers
Total
(N)
°/<
Nov.
1985
55
50
62
40
66
55
47
38
63
52
42
32
52
(490)
> in favor
Apr.
1986
61
62
69
52
72
56
60
55
66
63
45
54
61
(570)
June
1986
54
36
47
42
50
49
36
45
49
45
37
36
45
(403)
%
Nov.
1985
45
50
35
60
34
45
53
62
37
48
58
68
48
(450)
i opposed
Apr.
1986
39
38
29
48
28
44
40
45
34
37
55
46
39
(360)
June
1986
46
64
53
58
50
51
64
55
51
55
63
64
55
(492)
SOURCES: Market Research Bureau of Ireland/Jrofc Times, Nov. 1985; April
1986; June 1986.
* Leinster excluding Dublin.
But anomalies are usually more than just that. Frequently they
provide markers or keys to understanding the culture and the sa-
lient questions at issue in a society. The fact, therefore, that in Ire-
land a divorce amendment was introduced, and yet defeated, may
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provide insight into how a society grapples with issues of tradition
and modernity. From this perspective, it says something about cul-
tural tensions in Ireland, but it has also more general application to
other societies dealing with related questions.
Another reading is to see the debate and the whole issue of di-
vorce as one dealing with values and the way in which people try to
reason about values. This is a complex question and has been the
object of study and theorizing for a long time. It was Max Weber
in particular who focused sociological thought on the place of val-
ues in social action,7 and his discussion of the relationship between
values and rationality continues to stimulate analytical debate
among contemporary sociologists.8 From this perspective, the Irish
divorce debate gains universality by virtue of the fact that it dealt
with perennial questions of human values: What shall we do and
how shall we live? These are questions every society confronts. The
issues raised by the Irish debate on divorce are in many ways no
different from those debated currently in the United States and Eu-
rope concerning abortion and other moral issues such as AIDS pre-
vention and genetic engineering. At the core of these questions is
the issue of how we deal with values, morality, and religion in a
modern, increasingly secular society that pushes for a stricter sep-
aration between state and church, but frequently at the price of
anomie and alienation.9
The primary aim of this book is to understand the arguments
articulated during the divorce debate, and through the discourse to
shed light on why the amendment failed. In seeking understanding
of how the Irish argued about the moral issue of divorce, I speak
to the broader subject of Irish cultural values as well as to the
question of values in general. In my research I apply a sociological
perspective. I focus on the discourse of the divorce debate and an-
alyze the arguments articulated to discover what they say about
Ireland and about the values of the Irish, and to address the more
universal question of how people reason about moral values in the
Western world.
Just as the norms and rules regulating marriage and divorce in a
given society are "major repositories of social values" and provide
"symbolic expression of certain cultural ideals,"10 how people ar-
gue about these fundamental questions equally signifies key
cultural values and aspirations. Therefore, I treat the dialogue of
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the debate as being significant in and of itself. How does Irish so-
ciety argue for or against divorce in the late 1980s? I examine
the arguments put forward by the various players involved, the ad-
vocates and opponents of divorce, and the way in which the Cath-
olic hierarchy and the mass media negotiated the questions raised
by the amendment as indicated by the nature of their respective dis-
courses.
I begin chapter 2 by reviewing the salience of major themes in
Irish history and their impact on issues of marriage and divorce.
This chapter thus contextualizes the divorce referendum and the
complex questions it raised for the Irish. Chapter 3 introduces the
protagonists in the debate. I analyze the arguments put forward by
Garret FitzGerald in announcing the proposals and the arguments
articulated by him and other members of the government as the de-
bate got underway. I also discuss the campaign arguments of the
Divorce Action Group. Founded in 1980 to lobby for the introduc-
tion of divorce, this group was the other primary pro-divorce player
in the debate. In particular, I address the questions: What are the
conditions necessary for introducing changes in values? How does
FitzGerald establish legitimation for his stance, and how does he
argue in favor of divorce? In other words, how do you introduce
revolutionary legislation in nonrevolutionary times, and how do
you argue for its acceptance?
Regarding the anti-divorce players, I analyze the arguments and
campaign themes of the one official anti-divorce group, the Anti-
Divorce Campaign (ADC), and the anti-divorce arguments ex-
pressed by individual members of Fianna Fail, the main political
party in Ireland, then in opposition. In discussing these arguments,
I take account of content, timing, sequence, and the fora in which
they were articulated. Just as advocates of divorce encountered
problems of legitimation, the same applies to the Anti-Divorce
Campaign. It was a different problem, however. In years past,
groups such as the ADC could appeal directly to religious teachings
in support of their cause, but now, in a changed society, one that
has become more modernized, this is not so easy. In chapter 3,
therefore, I probe the way in which the arguments invoked by the
ADC surmounted this dilemma.
The claim is often made that the right to initiate divorce pro-
ceedings is central to the independence and power of women in
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society. It was not surprising, therefore, that both the pro- and anti-
divorce groups singled out women as a focus to their respective ar-
guments. In the Irish case, however, women overwhelmingly
opposed the divorce proposals. In chapter 4, I explore the argu-
ments that were directed toward women and articulated on their
behalf, and relate these to the economic and social experience of
women in Irish society. In doing so, I try to evaluate which argu-
ments were likely to be more appealing to women. Here I argue
that although similar themes to those invoked in the divorce cam-
paign are typically used in debates in America on women's issues,
the structural and cultural environments differentiate the appeal of
comparable arguments.
In chapter 5,1 consider the discourse of the Catholic church re-
garding the divorce proposal. It could be argued that the Church
was key to the failure of the amendment. The argument that Ire-
land is a strongly Catholic society and that divorce is opposed by
the Church, therefore the Irish people reject divorce, is understand-
ably a tempting one. But things are not as simple as that. In looking
at the disposition of the Church toward the divorce amendment, it
is significant that the hierarchy itself did not officially participate
in the campaign. Nevertheless, its pastoral document on marriage
and divorce issued in 1985 and various statements by the hierarchy
and by individual bishops during the debate provide evidence of a
more complicated stance. Importantly, the Church's arguments em-
braced not just theological but sociological reasons.
In today's world, the mass media have become increasingly sig-
nificant as they impose interpretive frames on a wide-ranging set of
issues and events. In times of confusion or controversy, often it is to
the media that the public looks for pointers in its search for clarity
and understanding. The importance of the media in articulating
cultural meanings is even more enhanced in Irish society. The ho-
mogeneity, smallness of scale, and paucity of elite groups in Ireland
has enabled the media to secure for itself a position of legitimacy
and credibility. Television, in particular, serves as a prime public
forum for the articulation of competing arguments.
In this study, I treat newspapers and television separately since,
as in most other societies, television is a significantly more regu-
lated medium than print. Chapter 6 is an analysis of the arguments
articulated in the editorial and regular feature columns of the three
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national daily newspapers. The editorial line in all of the newspa-
pers, despite the sociodemographic and nuanced ideological differ-
ences in their respective readerships, was unequivocally supportive
of the amendment. This unprecedented support for a cause, how-
ever, did not succeed in holding majority support among the public
for divorce. This inevitably raises the question of the power of the
print media to shape attitudes on fundamental questions. While
this study is not an analysis of the causes of the defeat of the
amendment and does not seek to examine why people voted as they
did, nevertheless, I evaluate the editorial arguments themselves in
terms of their potential as a forceful discourse.
In looking at the electronic media, I focus on television and RTE'S
(Radio Telefis Eireann, the Irish national broadcasting service) pre-
eminent current affairs program, "Today Tonight." Accessible to
all households that have a television set (98 percent), "Today To-
night" reaches a wide audience, and its popularity and legitimacy is
consistently underscored by audience research studies.11 As well as
providing a representative picture of RTE'S referendum campaign
coverage, the focus on "Today Tonight" also shows how the elec-
tronic media dealt with statutory obligations toward objectivity,
impartiality, and fairness during the campaign. The discussion in
chapter 7, therefore, is based on a microanalysis of "Today To-
night" in which I give special emphasis to one of its campaign pro-
grams. My analysis focuses on the interpretive frames used by
"Today Tonight," and I discuss how its representation of the issues
raised by the debate highlights the dilemma confronted by broad-
casters as they try to "balance" an unbalanced reality.
The concluding chapter summarizes the main points that emerge
from the analysis of the divorce discourse in terms of a number of
broad themes. Although the issues I discuss have special relevance
in signifying Irish cultural values, they also apply to how people in
general reason about morals and values. In particular, I address the
multifaceted and concretistic nature of moral discourse, people's
use of contradictory arguments in moral reasoning, the difficulty in
trying to shift moral paradigms during nonrevolutionary times,
and I comment on some cross-cultural themes and nuances in ar-
gumentation. The discussion also encompasses questions about is-
sues of communicative style and about the limited power of the
mass media in moral debates.
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I argue that the various discourses articulated during the debate
illustrate a tension in Irish society, but one not unique to it alone,
between the forces of tradition and those of modernization. Com-
menting on some of the theoretical implications of uneven modern-
ization, I try to understand the puzzle presented—at least with
regard to the Western paradigm of modernization—by the non-
alignment of cultural with economic change in Ireland.
Methodology
A study such as this inevitably raises methodological questions:
how the evidence used was gathered and evaluated, and the biases
of the author. As an Irish person studying an issue of great moral
sensitivity in my own society I have to confront the question of the
"objectivity" of my analysis. But then, of course, all knowledge of
cultural reality is dependent on the perspective and the sociocul-
tural location of the interpreter of that reality. As Max Weber
phrased it: "All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is
always knowledge from particular points of view.... cultural sci-
ence . . . involves 'subjective' presuppositions insofar as it concerns
itself only with those components of reality which have some
relationship, however indirect, to events to which we attach cul-
tural significance.... all evaluative ideas are 'subjective' " [empha-
sis in original].12
The advantage to my subjectivity is that in carrying out this
study I did not have to face the problem an outsider encounters in
studying the society of the "other."13 Unlike so many who have
done sociological and anthropological work on Ireland, I am
deeply immersed in the culture. I was born and lived until my mid-
twenties in the very center of Ireland, the townland of Killare,
which is home to the Hill of Uisneach and Aill na Mireann. This
was the legendary meeting place of the five provinces of ancient Ire-
land and the assembly where laws were made and military courts
and markets conducted. And just as Killare marks the geographic
center of Ireland, it is also in a sense on the center ideologically: it
is neither the most traditional nor the most modern part of Ireland.
But neither is it neutral. It represents some of the cultural jagged-
ness that I believe characterizes Irish society as a whole. This jag-
gedness was reflected in my own family's standing on the divorce
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amendment, with some in favor and some opposed to breaking the
link between law and Catholic teaching.
But while it is disingenuous to pretend that as a researcher one
can be neutral in studying realities, one has an epistemological ob-
ligation to try to attain a certain amount of detachment. One seeks to
find a proper balance between cultural immersion and detachment.
I was helped in this search by doing my graduate work abroad. As
a doctoral student in Berkeley I was able to attain a certain amount
of cultural distance from Irish society. I learned to ask of my native
culture some of the more innocent but critical questions of the out-
sider. My hope for this study, then, is that my immersion within
Irish society will add to the richness of my evaluation, while its
honesty will be ensured by the distance I gained from it.
I approach the study of the arguments of the divorce debate as
an investigator trying to probe and understand the various world-
views articulated and not as a partisan wishing to privilege my own
worldview. I believe it is the duty of sociologists to document and
try to explain the social world but not to evaluate or prescribe val-
ues or courses of social action. To assist in this objective, while I
discuss the social and cultural significance of the various arguments
articulated during the divorce debate, I try, to the best of my ability,
not to evaluate the moral content of the arguments. I have also en-
deavored to be as comprehensive as possible in the research mate-
rials I use.
As this is a study of discourse, and not one of intentions or at-
titudes, my methodology relies primarily on an analysis of the texts
of the various players in the divorce debate. My sources for chapter
3, the discussion of the pro- and anti-divorce discourses, are: orga-
nizational materials relating to all of the various players involved,
including activist groups such as the Anti-Divorce Campaign and
the Divorce Action Group, and the political parties; official tran-
scripts of the parliamentary debate on the divorce amendment;
transcripts I made of the party political broadcasts of the five par-
liamentary political parties in Ireland and of all of the eight "To-
day Tonight" television programs on the amendment; and official
press statements of the various players. These sources, in addition
to the press statements of the national women's organization, the
Council for the Status of Women, were also drawn upon in the dis-
cussion of women and the amendment in chapter 4.
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My discussion of the discourse of the Catholic church uses the
hierarchy's definitive pastoral letter on marriage and divorce, Love
Is for Life; all of the hierarchy's official statements regarding the
divorce question preceding and during the campaign; official state-
ments by the hierarchy and individual bishops with regard to other
relevant issues, such as contraception and abortion; and supple-
mentary Church documents and position papers. I also use a
transcript I made of the sole "Today Tonight" interview with
the hierarchy's spokesman, Bishop Joseph Cassidy, during the de-
bate, and, in addition to its official statement, an excerpt from
the hierarchy's (June 11) press conference transmitted on RTE'S
evening news.
The editorials and column pieces in the three national daily
newspapers—the Irish Independent, the Irish Press, and the Irish
Times—and the editorials in the Cork Examiner dating from April
24 until the end of June, constitute the materials used for the chap-
ter on the print media. The transcripts I personally made of the
eight "Today Tonight" programs directly relating to, and produced
and transmitted during, the referendum campaign comprise the re-
search material for chapter 7.
Finally, in an attempt to enhance my understanding of the de-
bate, I interviewed several people who were involved directly or in-
directly in the campaign, including, among others, William Binchy,
the main spokesman for the Anti-Divorce Campaign; Jean Tansey,
the chairperson of the Divorce Action Group; Bishop Brendan
Comiskey of the Diocese of Ferns; and, from, "Today Tonight,"
presenters/anchors John Bowman, Brian Farrell, and Pat Kenny,
and its then executive producer, Eugene Murray. (A list of the peo-
ple interviewed as part of this study constitutes Appendix C.)
All research is like a journey. Some things are expected, and
some things present themselves as a puzzle or as a happy surprise.
The cultural journey we are about to embark on will take us, via
the discourse of the divorce debate, to the core of modern Irish so-
ciety and will alert us to important markers about broader ques-
tions of values.
CHAPTER TWO
Irish Cultural Themes
Why was a ban on divorce inserted into the Irish Constitution of
1937, fifteen years after independence from Britain? How is it pos-
sible for Ireland, a member of the European Economic Community
since 1973, to remain the only European country along with Malta
to continue prohibiting divorce? What specific forces precipitated
the attempt to remove the ban on divorce in 1986? The answers to
these questions span Irish history, culture, and society.
Historical and Cultural Themes in Pre-1922 Ireland
Ireland's is a rich, varied, and complex history extending from
pre-Christian times and its Celtic culture of elaborate laws, cus-
toms, and rituals. Today, a sturdy reminder of this heritage is pro-
vided by Newgrange, the megalithic tomb in the Tara countryside.
Also, for a small country, Ireland has given birth to a rich literary
tradition, encompassing the writings of Swift, Goldsmith, Wilde,
Joyce, Shaw, Beckett, O'Casey, Synge, and others such as O'Direain
and O'Suilleabhain, lesser known because they wrote in Irish.
The two main themes of Irish identity, nevertheless, are captured
by the all-powerful images of the priest and the potato, represent-
ing, respectively, its Catholicism and its peripheralized agrarian
economy.
Ireland's varied history notwithstanding, the focus here is con-
fined to historical themes relevant to marriage and divorce. These
coincide with the two major and interrelated strands of Irish his-
tory, Catholicism and over four centuries of colonial occupation.
Since the arrival of the British missionary, Patrick, in the fifth cen-
tury, Ireland has been distinguished for its Catholicism and its
strong and vigorous monastic tradition. The monasteries were cen-
ters of religious and cultural learning, and Irish monks established
many similar houses in Europe until the Golden Age of the Irish
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Church ended in the ninth century as successive Viking conquests
targeted Ireland's monasteries.
Acknowledging the importance of its missionary tradition, Ire-
land became known as the "Island of Saints and Scholars." An im-
portant cultural distinction, it created for the Irish a deep
awareness that theirs was a special culture, a bastion of Catholic
civilization in a European world of avarice and moral and cultural
decline. With the Reformation, Ireland remained loyal to Catholi-
cism whereas England became Protestant, thus further cementing
the specialness of Irish values and deepening Irish-English tensions
that had originated with the English Norman invasion of Ireland in
1169. Ireland's persistent struggle to maintain an independent iden-
tity in the light of consecutive foreign invasions was most severely
challenged, however, by English colonization beginning in the six-
teenth century.
The British colonization of Ireland occurred in the broader
context of Counter-Reformation politics, whereby the British Tu-
dor Crown sought to establish English Protestant settlers in Cath-
olic Ireland. As part of Tudor plantation policy, Irish lands in the
midland, southern, and northern regions of the country were con-
fiscated and given to English settlers.1 This policy caused active re-
sentment among native Irish and previously settled Anglo-Irish
families, even though many Catholics continued to own land
and others managed to retain land tenancy. Violence against the
new settlers was commonplace, as was exemplified by the 1641
Rising during which many English fled or were killed. To quell
Irish opposition, Oliver Cromwell invaded Ireland in 1649, mas-
sacring thousands of Irish as he proceeded with his army through
the country.
It was under Cromwell that the displacement of Ireland's wealth
from Catholics to Protestants was consolidated. All of the Catholic
landowners who had rebelled in 1641 were stripped of their land,
while others who were innocent of rebellion since 1641 also for-
feited their land and instead received an equivalent of one-third of
their estate in Connacht, where land was poor. The land in the re-
maining three provinces, which was far superior to that in the west,
was kept for non-Catholics, with Catholics working as laborers
and tenants on the land. Demonstrating the sweep of English col-
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onization, at the end of the seventeenth century, Catholics owned
only 14 percent of Irish land.2
The final assault against Irish Catholic ownership was struck
with the property restrictions under the penal laws operative from
1695 until 1829, which sought to ensure that Catholics "were kept
in a position of social, economic and political inferiority."3 As such
the laws were concerned more with property than with religion,4
even though they extended the religious repression that was so
much a part of Cromwell's regime. The laws against property
meant that no Catholic could purchase or inherit land previously
owned by Protestants, hold land on a lease for more than thirty-one
years, or hold land worth more than thirty shillings a year.5
As well as ensuring economic dispossession, the British Crown,
again more from a purely political than religious motive, also
sought to destroy the "popery" and Catholic faith of the Irish peo-
ple. Toward this end, the penal laws prohibited the administering
of the sacraments, terminated Catholic education, including the
education and ordination of priests, and ordered the exiling of
priests and bishops, with apostates encouraged with financial
incentives.
The laws against religion, however, were ineffective in attenuat-
ing Irish Catholicism. The established Protestant church was mostly
indifferent to the religious state of the people, and, at any rate, it
"lacked the means to mount a serious campaign of evangelisation."6
Despite the threats against it, the Catholic church managed to fur-
ther organize its diocesan and parish system, which had initially
been drawn into line with Rome in the twelfth century. The Cath-
olic religious culture shaped during the penal era was based on the
Tridentine pattern established in the early seventeenth century. As
church historian Patrick Corish notes: "Religious life was rooted in
the catechesis of the Counter-Reformation.... this stressed obedi-
ence to church authority, regular sacramental practice, centred on
the Sunday Mass, and a regular round of prayers and devotions,
especially to the Blessed Virgin."7 Throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury, Irish priests were trained in the seminaries of Continental Eu-
rope, and although there was some regional variation, Mass and
devotions were regular features of Irish life, and Catholic booksell-
ers and publishers flourished.8
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The socialization of the Irish into the rigors of neo-Tridentine
Catholic theology was underwritten, ironically, by the Protestant
British state. In 1795, the British government came to the aid of the
Irish Church, which was confronting a personnel shortage due to
the closure of the Continental seminaries following Britain's war
with France, and endowed the founding and establishment of
Maynooth College, still the foremost Irish national seminary.9
Here, Irish priests were trained under an allegedly French Jansenist
influence—one that sacrificed humanist principles to strict disci-
plinary laws and precepts—in the moral and devotional austerity
that became so much a part of late nineteenth-century European
and Irish Catholicism.10 One of the striking paradoxes of the
British-Irish relationship was that by the nineteenth century the
Irish Catholic church was well interlocked with the British state in
the areas of education and social control—it took charge of chil-
dren's education in 1750—enabling it, supported by the State, to
act as a "civilising agent" on the undisciplined Irish.11
Even though the penal laws represent the most systematic British
subjugation of the Irish, they were counterproductive insofar as
they instead contributed to the consolidation of the Catholic
church and Irish Catholic identity. Responding to their colonial
domination, the economically dispossessed Irish appropriated Ca-
tholicism as a symbolic force against British Protestant oppression.
Regarding Catholicism as signifying their unique status as a special
"chosen people" in an exploitative Protestant world, it enabled the
Irish to maintain a distinct identity from Britain and from the
Anglo-Irish Protestant ascendancy. Catholicism and Irishness thus
became intertwined as synonymous and gave the Irish people an
inflated sense of social value grounded in a collective, rigorously
Catholic identity.
Catholicism, therefore, acts as a central cohesive force for the
Irish, providing them with a sense of community and unity, its well-
defined values serving as a counterpoint against anomie and alien-
ation. Cultural identification with Catholicism has also played a
major role in the formation of a distinct Irish worldview. Dominant
here is a tendency to obfuscate any distinction between the spheres
of public and private life, in large part because of a widespread as-
sumption that Catholic moral teaching should inform civil legisla-
tion. For Irish Catholics, the need to exercise personal conscience
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clearly recedes in importance when the civic culture is itself under-
pinned by the Catholic ethos. Thus Catholic teaching and public
morality tend to be equated at the expense of an autonomous per-
sonal morality.
Related to this is a legalistic strand in Irish society. The cateceth-
ical tradition is one that outlines a clear set of duties and obliga-
tions that need to be executed,12 with Irish moral theology tending
toward "an overcategorisation of offences."13 Extensively docu-
mented by empirical studies, many Irish Catholics exhibit a "dog-
matic religious mentality."14 They equate rigid observance of the
law with morality, seeing this as the ultimate criterion in evaluating
behavior, and ignore the relevance of personal values and moral
principles as guides to behavior. As observed by moral theologian
Raphael Gallagher: "We convince ourselves that we are morally
good because we externally keep the law."15
Another distinction of Irish society and one that in part ema-
nates from the Catholic tradition, is the absence of an established
and well-accepted discourse of individual rights. Unlike the situa-
tion in the United States where it is commonplace for people to
freely use a language that talks about their individual rights,16 the
use of a "rights" discourse in Irish society is uncommon. Although
such a language is not totally absent—trade union leaders use a
"workers' rights" discourse, for example—it is segmented and spe-
cific, and not readily available to the mainstream.17
Because of its communitarian emphasis, the Catholic view of in-
dividual worth is relational, dependent both on the person's benev-
olent disposition toward other members of the community and on
acceptance of sacramental grace, which only the Church can con-
fer. Thus, in Ireland, when an individual achieves success, it is not
unusual to attribute this to the fact that "God is good," not that the
successful person is good or deserved the reward in his or her own
right.18 This relational emphasis is well suited to a poor economy
where preoccupation with economic viability preempts consider-
ation of the post-materialist values represented by individual rights.
Although the Irish endorse individual rights when asked such ques-
tions in surveys, for instance,19 this more closely resembles affir-
mation of an abstract principle rather than the expression of a
pervasive cultural ethic that values individual autonomy over obli-
gations to family and society. In public moral debates such as
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divorce, therefore, where issues of individual freedom come into
conflict with traditional notions of the social good, the Irish do not
have ready access to a common language of individual rights that
might be usefully appropriated in making a case for the introduc-
tion of divorce.
Economic Development
One outcome of colonialism, as we have seen, was its exacerbation
of Catholic identity. But there are also other implications. Of par-
ticular significance was the moratorium that colonialism placed on
Irish economic development through its stifling of economic
growth.20 British policies did not result in the obliteration of an
Irish Catholic capitalist or bourgeois class but in the suppression of
its capitalist spirit. Despite the plantations and the penal laws, a
small minority of Catholic landowners and middle class survived.
The repeal of various property laws beginning in the late eighteenth
century—as of 1782 Catholics could buy land—facilitated the
growth of Catholic economic wealth. Large landholding Catholics
who were descendants of former proprietors secured ownership of
land from Protestant landowners, while a substantial class of ten-
ant farmers continued to exist.21 In fact, the nineteenth-century
Irish Catholic population was a remarkably stratified one, ranging
from a minority of large landowners and merchants to large land-
holders, small tenant farmers, and laborers.22 What is important in
terms of Irish economic development, however, was the paucity
and nature of the economic channels available to those Catholics
who had excess capital.
The British occupation of Ireland occurred as Britain was enter-
ing the industrial age, and the economic policies that it pursued in
Ireland were ones that suited its broader expansionist agenda.
Most of Ireland was reserved primarily to function as Britain's
farmyard, as a supplier of food for Britain's industrial classes, thus
suppressing its own internal industrial development. The profits
from Irish agricultural production were used by the British govern-
ment to finance its own industrial growth as well as that of the
Protestant, northern region of Ireland where, from the eighteenth
century, industrialization was also pursued.23 The results of this
differentiation in colonial policy, industrialization in the North,
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and its virtual repression in the rest of the country, is crucial to ap-
preciating the differentiated structure of nineteenth-, and subse-
quently, twentieth-century Ireland.
Colonialism accounts for the fact that as recently as the time of
the Famine (1845—1849), when much of the Western world was
fully industrialized, "almost half of the holdings in Ireland were
below the minimum size even for manual agriculture."24 The ma-
jority of Ireland's population was made up of tenant farmers rent-
ing from landlords, many without security of tenure. Part of the
legacy of colonialism was to reinforce Irish agrarianism at a
time when agriculture was being displaced elsewhere in the West
with industrial and capitalist expansion. Whatever the chances of
an entrepreneurial spirit emerging from the nineteenth-century
Irish Catholic middle class, it was stifled by British maintenance
of traditional, Irish peasant agriculture and its attendant economic
values.
Moreover, the political and cultural implications of colonial-
ism—the absence of an indigenous self-governing tradition,
nonidentification with the colonizer, the attendant inferiority, in-
security, and instability of a colonized people, and the absence of a
state-created environment conducive to entrepreneurial, industrial-
ized culture—also militated against economic development. Re-
flecting the confluence of these factors, the expanding urban and
rural middle class invested their excess capital not in industrial ven-
tures but in the security and respectability of professional training,
law, and medicine, for their children.25
The political-economic environment of nineteenth-century Ire-
land also accounts for the impact that the potato blights of the time
had on Irish society. Had Irish laborers and tenant farmers outside
of Ulster not been structurally dependent on the potato, both as a
source of food and as a medium of capital exchange, the ravages of
its failure would not have been as extensive as they were. Regarded
as "a major dividing line in the history of modern Ireland,"26 dur-
ing the Famine "not far short of 1,000,000 people died either from
disease or hunger,"27 while millions of others emigrated. Continu-
ing a pattern of mass emigration that had begun three decades ear-
lier, over three million people left Ireland between 1845 and
1870.28 In short, this period in history saw the Irish population de-
cline by half, a major transformation for any society.
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But especially significant about the Famine was the selectivity
of its impact and the consequent social and cultural implications.
It was the poorest classes in Ireland—the landless laborers and
the cottiers (farmers with less than five acres of land)—whose
numbers suffered the greatest decline, while the Catholic tenant-
farmer class remained virtually intact.29 After the Famine, land
became scarcer as holdings were gradually consolidated, thus
shifting the class balance in favor of the large tenant farmers.30
Agrarian reform was a major political issue during the second
part of the nineteenth century as the tenant farmers campaigned
to establish a more secure, independent economic base. After
decades of sporadic violence against the landlords and their repre-
sentatives, they adopted more conventional tactics and joined
the Tenant League, founded in 1850. Their demands were eventu-
ally resolved with the 1870 and 1881 Land Acts of Glad-
stone, which formally recognized the property rights of Irish
farmers.31
It was not until the first years of the twentieth century, however,
that legislation was enacted in Ireland that initiated the transfer of
land from landlord to tenant and changed Ireland into a country of
landowning small farmers. Encouraged by the Wyndham Land Act
(1903), landlords sold entire estates to their tenants, who were ad-
vanced the money for the purchases by the state under very reason-
able conditions. The success of this legislation was so immediate
that by the time of Irish independence in 1922 "landlordism in ru-
ral Ireland had become a thing of the past."32 Once the struggle for
land ownership was over, the tenant farmers consolidated their in-
fluence as a highly conservative force in the shaping of the new
Irish nation, an influence extending from the nineteenth century
when they were the mainstay of the Catholic church, providing it
with priests and money.33
The legacy of British domination in Ireland had important con-
sequences for the issue of marriage and divorce. Small-scale agrar-
ianism accentuated the importance of economic considerations in
informing marital choices, while identification with Catholicism
was maintained and publicly signified in post-independence
Ireland through institutionalizing the sacramental definition of
marriage.
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Land and Marriage
For a people preoccupied with security of land tenure the question
of marriage was harnessed to economic interests. In post-Famine
Ireland, marriage was contemplated only if it maintained or en-
hanced the economic resources of the farmer. Such prospects were
attenuated by a widening social class differential following the con-
solidation of farm holdings, which restricted the availability of
suitable, that is, within-class, marriage partners.34 Consequently,
as demographers have well documented, the Irish exhibited high
rates of postponed or late-age marriage and permanent celibacy.35
While various theories have been put forward to explain Ire-
land's distinctive demography,36 Robert Kennedy's economic anal-
ysis seems the most convincing. He argues that the Irish, similar to
their European counterparts, postponed or excluded marriage in
order to maintain or improve their material and social ambitions.
The meager economic resources of many people militated against
their marrying because the acquisition of dependents would detract
from their established standard of living.
At the same time, of course, despite its economic drawback,
marriage was essential to the rural economy because it provided la-
borers to work the land and an "heir" to reproduce the viability of
the family holding.37 This tension was resolved by the institution-
alized way in which inheritance operated—the stem-family system.
Under this system, only one child (usually a son) in each generation
could inherit the family holding, marry, and produce the next gen-
eration, and another (usually a daughter) could marry a locally in-
heriting heir. The rest of the siblings either emigrated or remained
unmarried, because, had they married, they would have been un-
able to support a family at the same standard of living to which
they were accustomed as members of a landholding family.
Kennedy argues, therefore, that in spite of the Church's encourage-
ment of marriage, many Irish people who might have married re-
pressed their emotional and sexual needs in order to fulfill their
economic objectives, or else they emigrated.38
The association of marriage and land was fortified by the prev-
alence of a dowry system in Irish courtship and marriage, a feature
that remained in operation in some parts of the country until the
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1940s.39 Women brought to the marriage a dowry, either land or
money, calculated on the basis of the value of the land of her future
husband—to support herself and expected children, because with
noninheriting siblings remaining on the farm, any extra demand on
the existing resources would reduce the standard of living of the
groom's family. The dowry thus enabled the inheriting son to
marry, acquire further economic capital, produce an heir, and thus
consolidate the family's generativity and economic security.40
The availability of a dowry also increased the chances of marriage
of the bride's inheriting brother, because, in turn, her marriage re-
duced the number of siblings dependent on her brother's resources,
thus enabling him to marry, acquire more land or money from
his wife's dowry, produce an heir, and consolidate his family's
status. The dowry system, therefore, served as the linchpin in the
relationship between land and marriage. As the Irish historian
Joseph Lee has remarked, "Marriage might be a sacrament, but for
the farmer the marriage contract was essentially, a commercial
transaction."41
The importance of the dowry grew after the Famine because,
among its other consequences, the Famine caused a deterioration in
the independent economic status of women, who prior to then had
an active economic role both in domestic industry (wool, linen, and
cotton) and on the land.42 The decline in women's marriage pros-
pects attendant on their loss of economic resources was redressed
by the availability of a dowry. Importantly, however, it also clasped
women into a system of economic dependence on their fathers and
husbands, and, along with the expanding moral disciplinary role of
the post-Famine Catholic Church, cemented the notion that wom-
en's domain was that of the home.
Independent Ireland
Rather than being undermined by its framing as an economic ques-
tion, the sacramental importance of marriage and women's depen-
dency in relation to it became, after independence, a key marker of
Irish identity. The achievement of political independence with Ire-
land's secession from the United Kingdom and the establishment of
the Irish Free State in 1922 was not itself, of course, a total victory.
The deep historical religious divisions, along which so much of
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Irish cultural topography has its roots, continued. Differences in
cultural identity were now officially institutionalized under the
1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which established two separate legal ju-
risdictions in Ireland: the twenty-six counties of the Irish Free State
and the six counties of Northern Ireland, which remained part of
the United Kingdom.
Reaction to the treaty and attendant questions of nationalism
became the sole ideological axis driving Irish politics, the legacy of
which is still evident today. Opposed by Sinn Fein, the precursor
to Fianna Fail, and accepted by Cumann na nGaedheal, from
which Fine Gael evolved, independence was followed by a bitterly
fought Civil War (1922-1923), during which more than six hun-
dred people died.43 The treaty forces prevailed, and Cumann na
nGaedheal under the leadership of W.T. Cosgrave became the first
post-independence government. With the implicit support of the
Church, which during the civil war excommunicated anti-treaty
leaders, including Eamon de Valera, for their acts of violence
against the new state, the Cosgrave government established demo-
cratic political stability. It remained in power for ten years until
ceding to Eamon de Valera (now back in favor with Church author-
ities) and Fianna Fail, the party he founded, which has been a dom-
inant force in Irish politics and society since then.
Despite the costs that the nationalist struggle had exacted, how-
ever, independence was not accompanied by the establishment of
new institutions that would have allowed a complete break with
Ireland's colonial past. None of the fervor that had successfully en-
ergized the fight for independence was converted into fashioning a
new state that would embody the libertarian and republican prin-
ciples officially proclaimed by the revolutionary leaders. Instead,
the period following independence saw the continuation of the
cultural themes that had distinguished the colonized Irish: Cathol-
icism and agrarianism. And although church and state were sepa-
rate institutions, they mutually affirmed a national identity
grounded in Catholic teaching. This constituted part of the larger
post-independence project of establishing a truly sovereign country
that was independent not just politically but economically and cul-
turally, an agenda that was interpreted by successive governments
and endorsed by the electorate as one of economic and cultural
protectionism.44
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While the nations of the Western world were becoming more in-
terconnected and interdependent, insular self-sufficiency became
the dominant objective in Ireland. This led to agricultural policies
that sought to increase the number of people working and living on
the land. Tillage production was expanded and accompanied by
guaranteed prices for crops, while grazing was discouraged and
tariffs imposed on imported food products as well as on a large
number of imported industrial products.45 As Irish society became
more "backward" relative to its modern, industrialized neighbors,
the superiority of rural life and traditional values—de Valera's vi-
sion of "a countryside bright with comely maidens, athletic youths
and romping children"46—became the cultural paradigm vener-
ated by political and Church leaders.
The monolithic view was that Catholic values should be the
definers of Irish identity, notwithstanding the existence of a sub-
stantial number of Protestants in the South.47 Knowing, as he pro-
claimed, the hearts of the Irish people through looking into his own
heart,48 de Valera saw Ireland as essentially a "Catholic nation," a
worldview that he eloquently explained: "Since the coming of St.
Patrick fifteen hundred years ago, Ireland has been a Christian and
a Catholic nation. All the ruthless attempts made through the cen-
turies to force her from this allegiance have not shaken her faith.
She remains a Catholic nation."49
Committed to upholding Ireland's uniqueness as a Catholic na-
tion, de Valera's government enacted legislation supporting the
principles of Catholic social teaching. It prohibited the sale and im-
portation of artificial contraceptives, regulated dance halls, and
taxed foreign newspapers. In keeping with the cultural consensus
characteristic of the first decades of Irish independence, the previ-
ous government had already enacted legislation censoring books
and films.50
Irish Catholic identity was most clearly demonstrated with the
publication of the constitution in 1937. Reputed to have been
single-handedly written by de Valera with advice provided by his
close friend, John Charles McQuaid, who later became an influen-
tial archbishop of Dublin, de Valera explained: "Our people are a
conservative people. For fifteen hundred years we have preserved
the tradition and practised the rule of the Christian life. . . . If ever
there was a time in which it was desirable for our people—whose
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spiritual history has been that of an uninterrupted spiritual cru-
sade—to record a solemn declaration of their adherence to these
fundamental principles, it is the time in which we live."51
The constitution thus represents "a synthesis of Catholic social
principles."52 It officially recognized the "special position" of the
Catholic church in Ireland53 and, in line with Catholic teaching,
gives special recognition to the family "as indispensable to the wel-
fare of the Nation and the State," affirming it as "the natural pri-
mary and fundamental unit group of society . . . antecedent and
superior to all positive law." Consonant with the significance at-
tached to the family, the constitution also pledges to "guard with
special care the institution of Marriage . . . and to protect it against
attack." Thus "no law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a
dissolution of marriage"; in other words, no divorce.54
But while the boundaries between public and private morality
were formally blurred by the constitution's privileging of Catholic
morality, Catholicism and traditional values also account for the
imposition of a strict separation of the domestic from the public
sphere. The constitution defined women as the preservers of the
structure and the values of marriage and the family. Expressing the
official Irish view of women and underscoring the language of re-
lational duties that informs perceptions of personal rights, the con-
stitution states: "In particular, the State recognises that by her life
within the home, woman gives to the State a support without
which the common good cannot be achieved. The State shall, there-
fore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by eco-
nomic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in
the home."55 The constitution thus formalized the Irish mother as
"the organisational link between the Catholic Church and the in-
dividual," a relationship in place since the middle of the nineteenth
century, which forged a powerful alliance between priests and
women as family morality became the responsibility of mothers.56
Ignoring the active participation of women in its founding
and the precedent of women in the public sphere set by Countess
Markievicz, a minister in the first independent government,57
the new state was committed to ensuring that women would exe-
cute their duties in the home. Accordingly, it enacted various leg-
islative measures such as a ban prohibiting women from working
in the public sector after marriage, which until repealed in the
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mid-1970s prohibited or obstructed the participation of women in
the public sphere.58 Reflecting these structural and cultural barri-
ers, in 1961, a mere 5 percent of married women participated in the
labor force, while many women in present-day Ireland continue to
eschew the public for the domestic domain—currently, married
women have a labor force participation rate of only 21 percent.
The constitutional prohibition of divorce in Ireland, therefore, is
relatively recent in its origins. It came about as part of a broad at-
tempt by the state to establish a society in which Catholic values
would define national identity. Significantly, a divorce procedure
that had been established by the British was still legally available in
Ireland until 1937,59 a situation that echoed the tradition of early
Irish society when divorce was commonplace under brehon law.
But less than two decades after the establishment of the new
Irish state, politicians had gained public approval for a constitution
and enacted legislation that was in accordance with Catholic teach-
ing. This influence extended from the immediate domain of mar-
riage and sociosexual morality to inform also the formulation of
education, health, and social policies,60 resulting in a church/state
consensus on public morality that continued virtually undisturbed
until the late 1970s.
The one issue that threatened to crack the consensual relation-
ship between political and Church leaders was an attempt in 1947
to introduce legislation that sought among other health changes to
provide universal health care for mothers and their children.61 First
introduced by de Valera's Fianna Fail government, it was subse-
quently taken up by the coalition government that succeeded it in
1948. Known as the "Mother and Child" scheme, the Church for-
mally communicated their total disapproval of the proposals to the
government, emphasizing that they were "entirely and directly con-
trary to Catholic teaching on the rights of the family, [and] the
rights of the Church in education."62 The hierarchy further main-
tained that: "physical or health education is closely interwoven
with important moral questions on which the Catholic Church has
definite teaching... . The State has no competence to give instruc-
tion in such matters."63
Interestingly enough, the controversy only developed when the
new minister responsible, Noel Browne, a young liberal maverick
who was alone in those years in pushing for a greater autonomy
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between Catholic teaching and civil legislation, publicized the pri-
vate correspondence between the bishops and the government on
the matter. Once the dissension became known, the government,
not wishing to engage in open confrontation with the hierarchy
and reflecting many of the cabinet members' own ambivalence to-
ward the scheme, withdrew it. The succeeding Fianna Fail govern-
ment once again expressed commitment to the intent of the
proposal, but when the act was finally passed into law in 1953,
the bishops had received virtually all of the concessions they
demanded.64 The controversy clearly demonstrated that in the
early decades of the newly independent Irish society, as Archbishop
John Charles McQuaid stated: "The hierarchy cannot approve of
any scheme which, by its general tendency, must foster undue con-
trol by the State in a sphere so delicate and so intimately concerned
with morals."65
Ireland since the 1950s
While the opening years of the 1950s saw the forceful reaffirmation
of Ireland's Catholic identity, the end of the decade would see the
beginnings of a new orientation that would eventually challenge
that hegemony. Strikingly high rates of unemployment and emigra-
tion became the hallmark of Irish society in the late 1940s and
1950s. It is estimated that between 1951 and 1961, 409,000 Irish
people emigrated, an amount equivalent to about one-seventh of
the total population in Ireland in 1961 (2.8 million).66 With in-
creasing evidence that an indigenous protectionist economic policy
had failed to provide for the material needs of the Irish people, and
extensive popular awareness throughout the country that those
who emigrated were economically successful abroad, the Fianna
Fail government, now under de Valera's successor, Sean Lemass,
embarked in 1959 on a major overhaul of the economy. The results
of the new orientation marked this period as the watershed in Ire-
land's modernization.67
Redirecting economic policy to focus on industrial development
and its needed infrastructure, the government established economic
growth as the dominant and uncontested project of Irish society.68
The ensuing years recorded high and unprecedented growth in the
national economy—between 1959 and 1963, for example, the
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annual growth rate was 4 percent per annum—accompanied by
significant increases in the gross domestic product and personal
disposable income.69 The changes initiated by the government
and fueled by Ireland's membership in the European Economic
Community in 1973 transformed the Irish social structure and
economy.70 Agriculture was displaced by manufacturing industry
and services as the main economic sectors.71 Despite the quantita-
tive decline in the numbers engaged in agriculture, however, the
farming classes in general, and particularly the medium and large
farmers who have benefitted disproportionately from Ireland's
membership in the European Community, continue to exert a po-
litical influence their numbers belie.
Importantly, however, agriculture's lessening economic role be-
came the engine for broader societal change. Attendant on this was
the increasing urbanization of society, with one-third of the popu-
lation currently residing in the greater Dublin metropolitan area;
increased participation in education; the expansion of a white-
collar middle class; increasing participation of women in the labor
force; expanding consumerism; and, since television was intro-
duced in 1962, extension of the reach of mass media.
As the social and economic structures underwent change, so too,
but less forcefully, did the cultural environment, as manifested by a
loosening of traditional values and attitudes. Since 1970 there has
been, for example, a significant decline in fertility rates,72 a steady
increase in approval for divorce and contraception,73 and slight ev-
idence of a greater willingness to embrace the principle of church/
state differentiation.74
The gains made by women in the political arena also reflect the
interlocking changes. Since the early 1980s women have main-
tained a strong presence in national and European parliamentary
politics, constituting an average of 8 percent of the seats in the na-
tional legislature, a rate surpassing that of many Western democ-
racies including the United States and Great Britain.75 Highlighted
by the recent election of Mary Robinson as president of Ireland, the
comparative political success of Irish women is in part because of
Ireland's proportional representation electoral system, which, with
its system of vote transfer, tends to favor "minority" candidates. It
is also a testament to the strong interest that Irishwomen have in
politics. Sixty-nine percent of women, similar to the figure ob-
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served for men (70 percent), express interest in current political and
economic affairs,76 and many women participate in political sem-
inars and events organized by women's associations.77
Ideologically, Irishwomen present as a heterogeneous group
holding a diversity of moral, social, and political attitudes ranging
from conservative to liberal.78 Their political orientation and level
of confidence in political institutions displays a differentiated pat-
tern similar to men's.79 In terms of party affiliation, there is only
slight evidence of a gender gap: more women than men support
Fine Gael,80 a difference that may owe more to that party's active
efforts since the mid-1970s to recruit women members and candi-
dates rather than to any ideological affinity with its progressive so-
cial platform.
But for all of women's political interest and activity, activist or-
ganizations that specifically represent women's interests and lobby
on their behalf have not emerged as a strong force in Irish society.
A promising Dublin-based women's movement, with women jour-
nalists in the forefront, formed in 1970 and received quite extensive
national media attention, particularly for its lobbying efforts with
regard to the liberalization of contraception. It quickly disbanded,
however, because of the diversity in composition and ideology of its
founding members,81 which led to divisions over strategies and pol-
icies fueled by social class and nationalist conflicts. Subsequently,
many of its original members were instrumental in establishing
more focused organizations working on behalf of women's rights.
The mushrooming of various women's groups encompassing a
wide range of concerns led to the establishment of the Council for
the Status of Women (csw) in 1973, and it has coordinated action
on certain issues, most notably in the area of economic participa-
tion. Lacking recognition as one of the nation's "social partners,"
however, it functions more as a national administrative body for
women than as an activist lobby.82
In consequence, the extension of women's rights in Ireland owes
more to Irish judicial review and equality directives from the Eu-
ropean Commission than to the lobbying efforts of organized
women.83 The decriminalization of contraception was hastened by
a 1974 Supreme Court case in which the justices ruled that its crim-
inal status violated the right to marital privacy.84 Following this,
and after a number of failed attempts, Parliament eventually passed
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legislation in 1979—the Health (Family Planning) Act—which
provided that both medical and nonmedical contraceptives could
be purchased only for bona fide family planning purposes and only
on the basis of a doctor's prescription.85 This "Irish solution to
an Irish problem"86 remained intact until 1985, when Garret Fitz-
Gerald's government extended the legal availability of nonmedical
contraceptives without prescription to persons over eighteen years
of age.87
The 1979 act also reaffirmed the nonlegal status of abortion,
criminalized in Ireland since 1861.88 Nonetheless, a right-to-life
movement emerged in Ireland in 1980. Alarmed by the changes in
Irish society, epitomized by the founding of a small "Woman's
Right to Choose" group, and encouraged by Pope John Paul IPs
Irish visit in 1979 and the "Human Life Amendment Campaign"
in the United States,89 the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC)
successfully lobbied the political leaders to hold a referendum.90
Pro-life lobbyists sought to copperfasten the criminalization of
abortion by having a pro-life amendment inserted into the consti-
tution that could then only be changed, not by Parliament or the
Judiciary, but by public referendum.
After a vigorous and bitterly fought campaign, where an anti-
amendment stance was equated, erroneously, with pro-abortion,
two-thirds of the electorate endorsed the amendment.91 Content
not simply with a moral or symbolic victory,92 since passage of the
amendment, the pro-life movement has used it to successfully seek
legal injunctions against the operation of nondirective pregnancy
counseling clinics in Ireland, prohibiting them from disseminating
information about abortion services in England.93
So, when Garret FitzGerald announced the divorce referendum
in 1986, it was against the backdrop of a sociocultural environ-
ment that, despite its many modernizing changes, continues to af-
firm strong links between private and public morality. It was
fitting, however, that FitzGerald should be the government leader
who, in initiating divorce, attempted to forge a break between the
public and private spheres of Irish life. Embodying the embryonic
spirit of modern Ireland, just as de Valera had once forcefully rep-
resented its deeply embedded traditional values, for many years
FitzGerald has publicly articulated an intellectual, pluralist vision
of Ireland. Arguing that religious freedom is central to a modern
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heterogeneous society, FitzGerald, a devout Catholic himself, has
argued for the displacement of the singular importance of Catholic
teaching in informing public morality and for the removal of sec-
tarian thinking from Irish laws and institutions.94
This is what FitzGerald proposed to effect with divorce, and this
is what he needed to convince the Irish people of if they were to
endorse the amendment. But just as economic questions have al-
ways played a pivotal role in Irish history and society, they would
also impact on the divorce question. The divorce amendment oc-
curred at a time when the longstanding cultural preoccupation
with economic issues was revitalized by an economy in decline.
Notwithstanding its growth in the 1960s, Ireland's small, depen-
dent economy is highly vulnerable to the state of the larger world
market. Accentuated by the pressures of the global recession caused
by the 1973 oil crisis, Ireland had to borrow heavily abroad in or-
der to offset demands on its Exchequer, fueled, in part, by the rising
expectations of the late 1960s and 1970s. The cumulative effects of
an increase in the national debt caused a deterioration in labor
market conditions, and since the early 1980s the problems of un-
employment and emigration have once again become central con-
cerns in Ireland.95 In 1986, at the time of the referendum, the
unemployment rate was 18 percent, with that of the youth labor
market reaching 25 percent.
Irish preoccupation with economic problems is underscored in
political election campaigns and opinion surveys in which eco-
nomic issues are consistently ranked as top priorities. Although it
is no surprise that people express interest in improving their eco-
nomic status, Irish economic attitudes seem to demonstrate a more
urgent acquisitive drive and concern with the immediate material
situation.96 Between 1982 and 1988, for instance, the Irish scored
significantly lower than the European Community average on in-
dices measuring satisfaction with both their household's financial
situation and the general state of their country's economy.97 Im-
portantly, the gap between the Irish and the European score
was at its greatest in 1986,98 highlighting the extent to which the
Irish were sensitive to economic difficulties at the time of the
referendum.
The amendment, therefore, would bring together two key issues
that over the centuries have been fundamental in shaping Irish
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national identity: Catholicism and economic status. Arguing about
divorce, then, which is in and of itself both morally and economi-
cally charged, would penetrate directly the bedrock of Irish values.
The difficulties that this debate presented for those engaged in it
are the topics of this book.
CHAPTER THREE
Arguing about Divorce
The debate between the announcement of the divorce referendum
and the final vote was a heated one. It involved the entire spectrum
of Irish society from the chambers of Parliament to the local par-
ishes. The pro- and anti-divorce arguments were featured promi-
nently in the daily newspapers and were aired on radio and
television. Spearheaded by the Fine Gael/Labour coalition govern-
ment of Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald, the divorce proposals
were supported by most, but not all, of the government ministers
and Fine Gael parliamentarians1 and were strongly supported by
Labour under the leadership of Dick Spring, whose party had failed
in previous attempts to win parliamentary approval for a divorce
bill. The divorce proposals also received the support of the other
minor parliamentary parties.
Also engaged in the pro-divorce campaign was an independent
pro-divorce group, the Divorce Action Group (DAG). Founded in
1980 to lobby for the holding of a divorce referendum, the DAG is
composed primarily of separated people. It has its headquarters in
Dublin, the area from which it draws most of its support, and has
branches around the country. The DAG was headed by Jean Tansey,
a married woman, and, significantly, its executive committee com-
prises both men and women.2
The campaign against the government's divorce proposals was
led, not, as one might expect, by the Catholic bishops or the op-
position Fianna Fail party, but by a lay group, the Anti-Divorce
Campaign (ADC), a group that was formally independent both of
the Church and of party politics. Although the issue of divorce is
central to the moral teaching of the Church and in the past the
Church has condemned outright any legislation that sought to go
against its teaching, the hierarchy confined its official participa-
tion to the issuing of episcopal statements discussing divorce. Sim-
ilarly, the largest political party in Ireland, Fianna Fail (the party of
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de Valera, whose idea it was to have a constitutional ban on di-
vorce), which continues to demonstrate a relatively conservative
disposition on sociomoral issues, adopted an official line of
neutrality.
Unlike the pro-divorce lobby, which was composed of a number
of disparate groups, the one official opponent of divorce was the
Anti-Divorce Campaign (ADC), thus making it a cohesive and uni-
fied player. The ADC did not represent a mass social movement
against divorce but was an ad hoc group of Catholic lay people that
formed only after the government announced the holding of the di-
vorce referendum.
Despite the recency of the ADC'S formation, its leaders were ex-
perienced canvassers on moral issues. Its main spokespersons and
some of the members of its organizing committee were active in the
successful pro-life amendment referendum campaign in 1983. Un-
like the Divorce Action Group, which was led by a woman, the pri-
mary ADC figures were men.3 The chairman of the ADC was Des
Hanafin, a Fianna Fail Senator noted for his expertise as a fund
raiser, his close ties to the Vatican, and his active role in the 1983
pro-life amendment campaign. The ADC'S primary spokesman was
not their chairman, but William Binchy, a barrister and author of a
short book Is Divorce the Answer?, who was also a visible partic-
ipant in the pro-life amendment campaign.4 Two other members of
the ADC'S organizing committee who served as spokespersons were
Joe McCarroll, a lecturer in ethics at the Dublin diocesan seminary,
and Bernadette Bonar.5
The ADC was also able to draw on the active support of Family
Solidarity, a social organization founded in the aftermath of the
success of the right-to-life amendment as a lobby against what it
perceives as increasing social and economic threats to traditional
marriage and family life.6 It is organized on a national parish basis,
has the support of the Catholic clergy, and uses parish facilities for
its meetings.
Importantly, the Anti-Divorce Campaign, through its affiliation
with Family Solidarity, had access to an already established na-
tional parish network of active members and was able to use these
local volunteers to canvass people in the various communities. This
gave the ADC a significant organizational advantage over their
opponents in the pro-divorce lobby, because both the pro-divorce
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political parties and the Divorce Action Group have a more cen-
tralized regional structure, thus making them more distant from the
electorate in organizing campaign strategies for acceptance of the
amendment at the grassroots level.7
In addition to arguments expressed by the ADC and by Family
Solidarity, my analysis of the anti-divorce discourse also includes
arguments by Fianna Fail. Because, although Fianna Fail did not
officially participate as a party in the divorce campaign, not wish-
ing, as it stated, to "politicise the debate,"8 the majority of indi-
vidual members who spoke publicly during the debate adopted a
clear anti-divorce stance. The party's leader, Charles Haughey, and
all of the shadow ministers expressed their opposition to divorce,
and its party political broadcast on the amendment was unequiv-
ocally anti-divorce.9
I propose to start my analysis of the divorce campaign right at
the beginning, with an analysis of Garret FitzGerald's opening
statement—a statement that, by what it said and what it failed to
say, provides a template for the understanding of the pro-divorce
strategies and arguments. FitzGerald announced the divorce refer-
endum at a press conference held at Government Buildings. At this
time he outlined the details of the four-point constitutional amend-
ment as well as the provisions of the accompanying legislation that
would be implemented if divorce was introduced. In elaborating on
the government's reasons for favoring the introduction of divorce,
FitzGerald stated:
The government is committed to seek and ensure the passage of the con-
stitutional amendment through the House so that the people may be given
the opportunity to discuss their views on i t . . . . Speaking for my own
party, Fine Gael, we wi l l . . . be supporting it before the electorate, while
accepting that individual members may on grounds of conscience not wish
to participate in this exercise because they hold a contrary view to the
amendment. In thus providing the people with an opportunity to express
themselves on this subject, the parties in government are conscious that
diverse views may be held on whether the introduction of divorce on the
restrictive basis proposed is for the social good, or is necessary for the relief
of cases of marriage breakdown where spouses have entered into or pro-
pose to enter into other liaisons. The parties believe that the balance of the
social good will be served by making this provision, and while it is ac-
cepted that the divorce provision may have a negative effect on some
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existing marriages, on the other hand, the number of people now involved
in irregular unions and the number of children adversely affected by the
situation is, in the considered view of the parties, more destabilising. The
government is grateful to the churches for the manner in which they of-
fered their views on the issues dealt with in the amendment and on the
statement of the government's intentions with regard to marriage, separa-
tion and divorce. The discussions with the churches were extremely con-
structive and the arrangements now proposed in relation to a number of
these matters bear the mark of the views expressed by the churches. The
government recognises, however, that some or all of the churches may have
different views on some of the matters dealt with, including the proposals
for the provision of divorce, and that the churches will wish to put forward
these views to their members [emphasis mine].10
The Private-Public Dichotomy
FitzGerald's remarks provide a complex text in which are embed-
ded several arguments favoring the introduction of divorce. Impor-
tantly, in his opening address, FitzGerald both comments on his
discussions with the churches11 and remarks on the differences be-
tween him and the church authorities. Although he does not single
out the Catholic church, it is the majority Catholic church to which
he is primarily referring when he states that there may be different
views held by some or all of the churches on divorce. Both the
Catholic and Protestant churches oppose divorce on theological
grounds, but it is only the Catholic church that opposes divorce as
a civil response to marital breakdown.12 FitzGerald's open refer-
ence to disagreement between the Church and him, and between
him and members of his own party, on the question of divorce, con-
stitutes a cornerstone of the pro-divorce campaign, and gives us in-
sight into one of the most complex arguments raised in favor of
divorce.
Given the strong association in Irish society between Catholic
teaching and state law, in order to argue successfully for divorce,
its proponents had to do two things. First, it was imperative that
they establish their credentials, which, in part, meant convincing
the electorate that they were good Catholics. Secondly, they had to
succeed in forging a break between civil legislation and religious
morality. FitzGerald had to demonstrate first the authenticity of his
Catholicism and the attendant credibility of his government in
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holding a referendum with a view to introducing divorce. An at-
tempt then had to be made at breaking the popularly endorsed re-
lationship, embedded in tradition, between civil legislation and
Catholic morality. The issue was: how to argue for divorce without
undermining the well-respected traditional approach to marriage
as a sacramental lifelong commitment and the attendant belief that
state law should support this.
The Irish electorate had to be convinced of the public need for
divorce, and, if they conceded this point, they then had to be con-
vinced of the acceptability of having legislation in the civil sphere
that was independent of and contrary to Catholic teaching. Accus-
tomed to viewing marriage as a lifelong commitment and to think-
ing in terms of a direct relationship between (Catholic) religious
morality and public morality, the Irish people, with the introduc-
tion of divorce, were being asked to overturn these two bedrock
values in their culture and have them displaced with counter value
positions. For them to vote in favor of divorce would thus demand
a fundamental change in worldview.
It is understandable then why, in his opening statement intro-
ducing the divorce referendum, FitzGerald emphasized his consul-
tations with the churches. It seems clear that the reference to his
consultations with church authorities has to be construed as an at-
tempt at legitimation of his newly proposed legislation. It enabled
FitzGerald to show respect for all denominational perspectives, but
particularly, given its dominance, the Catholic ethos, and to under-
score his deference to the Catholic hierarchy. It also served to em-
phasize that FitzGerald's decision to hold a referendum was not an
impulsive one but was the result of careful deliberation, including
deliberation on the Catholic church's position on divorce. It indi-
cated his concern to take full account of the needs and wishes of the
Irish people and his personal desire not to introduce a form of di-
vorce that would be totally at odds with Irish cultural values.
Accordingly, while his evaluation of the problem of marital
breakdown in Ireland convinced him that divorce was needed, his
consultations with the churches had helped him to construct di-
vorce proposals that were relatively restrictive. Consulting with the
Catholic church resulted in a reaffirmation of the Church's oppo-
sition to divorce, but, FitzGerald was saying, it also provided the
opportunity for him to hear more fully the bishops' concerns about
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marriage and marital breakdown in Ireland. Having given serious
consideration to these concerns, the government was in a position
to take account of the fears and reservations expressed. The sub-
sequent divorce proposals and accompanying pro-marriage legisla-
tion he had introduced were, in part, a product of these concerns.
In a fairly direct way, therefore, FitzGerald was attempting to gain
personal legitimacy by referring to his talks with the church repre-
sentatives and to his incorporation of some of the ideas that they
put forward, a legitimacy he needed if his government's divorce
proposals were to be acceptable to the Irish people.
It is significant in this regard that other senior members of the
cabinet also stressed the consultations with the churches. Opening
the Parliamentary debate on the amendment, the minister for jus-
tice, Alan Dukes, stated:
In deciding on the form of the constitutional amendment that should be
presented and in forming its further proposals, the Government have taken
fully into account the views expressed by the various persons and groups
who have contributed to the debate, including the views expressed by the
various Churches in their meetings with the Taoiseach [prime minister]
and myself. The Government have carefully weighed the various argu-
ments on each side, both from the point of view of the individuals directly
involved and of society as a whole. In the Government's considered view,
the balance of the social good lies with the introduction of divorce in lim-
ited circumstances.13
Similarly, Dick Spring, the deputy leader of the government
[Tanaiste] and leader of the Labour party, maintained: "It's very
difficult to establish perfection in any solution. But I believe that
after careful consideration and after consultations with the church
authorities, I believe that the government has brought forward a
very balanced amendment to the constitution to cope with very se-
rious problems in Irish life."14
More important, however, FitzGerald's reference to consulta-
tions with the churches reflects one of the main thrusts in the strat-
egy to break the link between Catholic and civil morality. By
referring to the consultations with the Church, acknowledging dis-
agreements, and yet proceeding forward, FitzGerald, with one
swift blow, challenged the Irish conflation of the public and the pri-
vate spheres of life.
Arguing about Divorce 37
In proposing divorce, as with liberalizing contraception legisla-
tion one year previously, FitzGerald in his opening remarks chal-
lenged the absence of autonomy between the personal and the
public. He introduced a proposal that not only went against Cath-
olic dogma but that was contrary also to the commonsense view
that public legislation should bolster personal Catholic belief. By
stating that the Catholic bishops and some individual legislators,
his own party colleagues, took a view contrary to his on the di-
vorce question, FitzGerald with his own actions demonstrated that
this posture was acceptable. While politically it may have ulti-
mately undermined the credibility of his agenda, nonetheless, the
greater point that seemed central to FitzGerald's argument was the
fact that a modern society is characterized by a multitude of indi-
vidual value positions. Moreover, the subtext of his argument says
that this diversity of values and beliefs is not problematic for the
maintenance of social order, precisely because there is a formal au-
tonomy between privately held values and public law.
Just as he was willing to accept the autonomy of personal con-
science and to respect the wishes of parliamentary members of his
own party to act contrary to the collective agenda of Fine Gael, it
was implicit in FitzGerald's remarks that he was asking the Irish
people to adopt the same attitude to those whose personal con-
science allows them to avail of divorce. Allowing divorce to be pub-
licly available, he was suggesting, would enable those who wish to
avail of it to do so and would still allow those people who object to
divorce to maintain their personal commitment to lifelong mar-
riage. The introduction of divorce, FitzGerald was saying, while
formally making divorce publicly available, was not imposing a
new private morality, because the two spheres were distinct. Private
morality could be maintained independently of the changed civil
law, because personal morality and public morality, while they are
related, are not one and the same thing.
The distinction between personal belief and civil legislation and
the argument that the introduction of divorce was not an attempt
to undermine religious teaching or the family were also stressed by
other members of the government. Peter Barry, the minister for for-
eign affairs, for example, argued that "the forthcoming referen-
dum. . . . is about freedom for the people of this country to follow
their conscience in matters of private faith and morality.. . . We
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respect the incalculable contribution of the Christian Churches to
our national way of life and we want to preserve our Christian
identity. We cannot do this by denying people their conscience."15
Alan Dukes, minister for justice, contended: "In promoting legis-
lation to permit divorce the Government are not opposed to mar-
riage. The Government are fully committed to the protection of
marriage."16
In sum, FitzGerald's challenge to the Irish tendency to equate
private and public morality was a bold move that served the dual
purpose of preserving his own legitimation and supporting the
cause of divorce. At the same time, however, articulating such an
argument was a difficult undertaking in a society where the two
concepts have been historically conflated. Yet, in many ways, this is
what FitzGerald and the pro-divorce forces had to confront if the
divorce proposals were to have a chance of success. To argue for the
introduction of divorce was a difficult and complex undertaking
precisely because it challenged such fundamental Irish attitudes. It
was not simply a question of overcoming a specific religious tenet.
Rather, because of the sociocultural influence of the Catholic
church, the privileging of its teaching in civil legislation, and the
pervasiveness of the association of Catholic and public morality,
the proposal to introduce divorce challenged the basic cultural
identity and worldview of the Irish.
The Social Good
We saw that FitzGerald, in his opening remarks to the divorce de-
bate, attempted to justify his legislation by arguing for a separation
of private and public morality. At the same time, he invoked also
the notion of the social good in support of his cause. This invoca-
tion of the social good, just as did his reference to the private/public
distinction, attempted to break the link between Catholic morality
and civil legislation. While the notion of the social good is one well
known to the Irish, FitzGerald injected it with new meaning and
stripped it of its traditional Catholic-based connotation.
FitzGerald argued that divorce would serve "the balance of the
social good" in view of the significance of marital breakdown in
Irish society.17 While he acknowledged that divorce would have
some negative effects on existing marriages, he contended that
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these would be outweighed by the stabilizing effect divorce would
have by, for example, enabling the instability caused to society by
the pervasiveness of new illegal unions of separated people and the
children involved in these irregular situations to be redressed.
Throughout the debate, FitzGerald stressed the significance of
the problem of marital breakdown, stating, for example: "We face
the situation where there is a very large number of marriage break-
downs. Many more than there used to be. There is a huge volume
of human misery... . These problems are on such a scale, and so
many of them have in fact entered into other unions and have chil-
dren in many cases, that it is not a problem that we can ignore and
sweep under the carpet."18 The project of the achievement of the
balance of the social good, FitzGerald argued, would be aided by
the fact that the government's divorce proposals were a restrictive
response to the problem of marital breakdown, requiring as they
did, the fulfillment of specific criteria before a divorce decree could
be granted.
FitzGerald maintained that the absence of divorce would lead ul-
timately to the undermining of marriage as an institution, as in-
creasing numbers of people, experiencing marital breakdown and
unable to divorce and remarry, would opt to cohabit without the
social and legal sanction of marriage. Significantly, throughout the
campaign, he elaborated on the importance of marriage as a soci-
etal institution and its role in contributing to the common good of
society. Attendant on this, he argued that the introduction of di-
vorce should be viewed as supporting, not undermining, the com-
mon good, as well as reflecting social values of diversity, tolerance,
and compassion. Thus FitzGerald stated: "On the merits of [the di-
vorce proposals] there are not merely deeply divided opinions;
there are deeply divided approaches to the whole matter.. . . The
first of these approaches involves the application of the criterion of
the common good. I believe that this is in fact the most important
criterion that we should apply to the issue because of the social na-
ture of marriage itself. I have always held this view."19 The minister
of state at the Department of Justice, Nuala Fennell, similarly ar-
gued that: "The divorce referendum Bill . . . strikes a balance be-
tween the interests of society generally and the need to deal
humanely and fairly with people whose marriages have broken
down.. . . the reality of life is that many marriages break down.. . .
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we must face up to it and deal with the consequences. The non-
existence of divorce in our society is itself a destabilising factor at
this stage in that many people whose marriages have broken down
openly live in a relationship outside of marriage."20
Since the Irish electorate is well familiar with the notion of the
social good, the invocation of it by FitzGerald and other propo-
nents of divorce seemed at first like a promising strategy. The ap-
peal is made to a culturally accepted concept that can then be used
to support the controversial and nontraditional issue of divorce.
However, the concept of the social good as used by FitzGerald was
far removed from the meaning attached to it by the Catholic
church. According to the perspective articulated by the Catholic hi-
erarchy, the social good is achieved by the implementation of the
Church's moral and social teachings. The Catholic good is the so-
cial good; a definition that has never formally been challenged in
Irish society. As far as the Irish people were concerned, the social
good traditionally was maintained by explicitly prohibiting di-
vorce. Therefore, the attempt by FitzGerald to use the notion of the
social good in the service of divorce has to be seen as yet another
attempt by him to, creatively, break the link between the public
sphere and religious morality.
In arguing that the introduction of divorce was necessary as a
way to serve the social good, FitzGerald was challenging directly
the understanding of the social good already prevalent and deeply
rooted in Irish society. He was challenging the Irish people to move
from a situation where the constitutional prohibition on divorce
was popularly thought to serve the common (Catholic) good to
one where, in his opinion, the introduction of divorce would serve
the common good, but in a way that would be independent of
Catholic teaching. It was not sufficient, he was arguing, to equate
the social good with that which supported only the ethos of the
Catholic majority. Rather, the social good must include honesty in
recognizing social problems and tolerance of opposing views and
minority interests. As Dick Spring, the leader of the Labour Party,
phrased it, "the test of the social morale and fabric of a society is
how it caters for its minorities."21
The complexity of the notion of the social good as it applies to
the introduction of divorce was intensified by the fact that divorce
can be and has traditionally been perceived as primarily serving the
needs of the individual: the individual's right to be liberated from
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an unsatisfactory marriage and the freedom to establish a new le-
gally sanctioned union. This focus on the individual and the im-
portance of individual rights, however, does not fit so easily with
Irish cultural values. The tension in FitzGerald's pro-divorce posi-
tion was thus heightened by the fact that in introducing divorce he
was explicitly emphasizing the needs of individuals and stressing
the need to give those in broken marriages the option of divorce
and remarriage, even though this went against the ethos of Irish so-
ciety. Notwithstanding that the government divorce proposals were
contrary to the teaching of the Catholic church, were contrary to
the commonsense notion of the social good, and were proposals
that demanded a new vision of the individual—to see the individ-
ual as an autonomous person rather than primarily as a member of
a larger community with family and societal obligations—through-
out the campaign, FitzGerald boldly maintained that divorce
would, on balance, serve the social good.
Indissoluble Monogamy
During a television interview following the press conference at
which he announced the divorce proposals, FitzGerald stated:
"On the specific issue of provision for divorce, the Catholic church
has a theological position and also a sociological view which it
will, I'm sure, want to put forward. We as a government don't have
a theological view. We may have it individually, and indeed we
have our own attachment to indissoluble monogamy as individuals.
But we do have to take a sociological view and that view is per-
haps somewhat different to that of the Catholic church" [emphasis
mine I.22
This statement in many ways summarizes the thrust of the ar-
guments of the pro-divorce campaign and points yet again to their
difficulties. In a somewhat convoluted and intellectualized manner,
what FitzGerald acknowledged in the interview was that he as a
good Catholic did not want a divorce for himself—he believes in
indissoluble monogamy—but that in introducing the legislation he
is arguing for the freedom of a hypothetical Irish person who
should be able to partake of this option.
These remarks were problematic because if, as Catholics, Fitz-
Gerald and his colleagues in government believed in indissoluble
monogamy, then it was also likely that their fellow citizens and
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coreligionists felt likewise. FitzGerald had already acknowledged
that the Catholic church opposed divorce and stated his acceptance
that members of his own parliamentary party may "on grounds of
conscience" not wish to participate in the pro-divorce campaign.
At the same time, he was prepared to ask the Irish electorate to
detach themselves from their personal beliefs and circumstances,
conceptualize an abstract Irish citizen in a hypothetical broken
marriage who hypothetically wanted to divorce and remarry, and
thus vote in favor of the proposals even though they did not want
a divorce for themselves and indeed were opposed to it on moral
grounds.
Confronting the electorate with a hypothetical situation may not
be the best political strategy, and invocation of the distinction be-
tween theological and sociological perspectives may be of little use
in a society where the former subsumes the latter. Yet, if the divorce
amendment was to pass and if FitzGerald's vision of a pluralistic
Irish society was to materialize, then this is what the Irish people
had to do. They needed to be sensitive to these distinctions and
willing to make the break with the traditional relationship between
Catholic morality and state law. In articulating these remarks,
therefore, FitzGerald was reiterating the social project at issue if di-
vorce was to be permitted.
FitzGerald's use of the phrase "indissoluble monogamy" in this
context is also significant because it demonstrates, from the outset
of the debate, some of the tensions that surrounded the pro-divorce
arguments. Clearly terms like "indissoluble" and "monogamy" are
not words used in everyday discourse. While the Irish believe in
marriage as a lifelong commitment, they do not consciously think
of it as being one specific form of matrimony, indissoluble mo-
nogamy.
FitzGerald's use of the term "indissoluble monogamy" does
show the inevitable tendency toward intellectualization and ab-
straction that was forced upon him and the pro-divorce advocates.
In Ireland the most popular and authoritative forms of argumen-
tation tend to be grounded in religion and/or economics. In present-
ing reasons for the introduction of divorce, however, neither of
these could really be used by the pro-divorce lobby. Clearly, reli-
gious arguments in support of divorce could not be articulated be-
cause the introduction of divorce goes against both Catholic
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teaching regarding divorce per se and the traditional expectation of
the relationship between Catholic morality and civil legislation.
Neither could an economic discourse that would have articulated
the material and practical effects of divorce be initiated, because
this would run the risk of being regarded as the imposition of a sec-
ular framework on what, for many people, is fundamentally a sac-
ramental issue.
Unable to resort fully and effectively to either of these authori-
tative discourses, therefore, FitzGerald and the pro-divorce lobby
were drawn to the use of abstract intellectual concepts—as was the
case with their call for a separation between the public and the pri-
vate and the way in which they used the concept of the social good.
This more intellectualized approach characterized their arguments
throughout the campaign. FitzGerald maintained this perspective
even in the chambers of Parliament. Reiterating his initial argu-
ment, he stated: "Even though it has been repeatedly repudiated by
the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church . . . [the attitude ex-
ists] that the theology and law of that Church should be the foun-
dation of, or even constitute the content of, the civil law of our
State. While personally committed to the indissoluble character of
sacramental marriage in the Church of which I am a member, I re-
ject that approach, in common with the authorities of my Church
and the vast majority of the Irish people."23
The use of the term "indissoluble monogamy," therefore, can be
seen as crystalizing the legitimation difficulties and tensions in-
volved in being an advocate of divorce. The tension in the question
posed by the divorce referendum ran thus: if you are a good Cath-
olic you cannot be pro-divorce; but if you are pro-divorce, can you
be a good Catholic? The answer is probably yes, but it is a complex
answer and one that is not necessarily well suited to political
discourse.
Pro-divorce Economic Arguments
Even though the pro-divorce lobby did not use economic points as
the linchpin of their case, they did make recourse to an economic
discourse. However, economic arguments were used by them hes-
itatingly and frequently in a secondary, reactive, defensively justi-
fying mode. In his opening statement on divorce, the same context
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in which he dealt with the social good and the public/private dis-
tinction, FitzGerald referred to the possible negative economic ef-
fects of divorce, but he linked the issue of divorce and economics in
a somewhat weak and negative manner. FitzGerald stated: "The
legislation will include provisions to enable the Family Cour t . . . to
make various financial orders with a view to ensuring that the in-
terests of spouses and dependent children are adequately protected
and appropriately provided for. These orders will relate to mainte-
nance, lump sum payments, and property owned by the spouses,
including the family home.. . . A dependent spouse will not be
prejudiced in any determination of property rights by virtue of the
fact that he or she gave up employment to attend to duties in the
home. And provisional support for families in distress will be re-
viewed with a view to ensuring that as far as possible support will
be made that will allow [families] to stay together."24
Rather than putting forward a positive claim that divorce may
be beneficial insofar as it would give dependent spouses a more eq-
uitable share in the couple's joint resources than the current legal
situation allows, FitzGerald stated that divorce would not harm
people: with divorce, he said, dependents' interests would be "ad-
equately protected," "appropriately provided for," and "not preju-
diced." From the perspective of economic security these are rather
tentative arguments for favoring divorce.
Subsequently, in rejecting a journalist's claim that the proposals
being introduced would provide "divorce for the rich but not for
the poor," FitzGerald acknowledged that financial problems al-
ways exist in any case of separation, but stated, without elabora-
tion, that the government's divorce conditions required that
adequate economic arrangements would have to be made before a
divorce could be granted.25 Later, in response to the economic crit-
icisms expressed by opponents of divorce, FitzGerald found it nec-
essary to, in his words, "clarify" some points that had arisen. These
related to the alleged negative economic effects of divorce on
women and children. He stated: "The children of the first marriage
remain the children of a family founded on marriage, with full
rights under the Succession Act.. . . the dependent spouse has her
or his interests protected better than at present.... No dissolution
of a marriage with a right of remarriage will be constitutionally
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possible unless adequate and proper provision is made for a depen-
dent spouse and dependent children."26
Continuing this defence of their proposals, other government
spokespersons emphasized throughout the debate that negative
economic consequences would not accompany the introduction of
divorce. The minister for justice, Alan Dukes, stressed that: "The
provision in the proposed amendment... clearly states that a di-
vorce cannot be granted unless a court is satisfied that adequate
and proper provision having regard to the circumstances, will be
made for any dependent spouse and any dependent child of, or any
child who is dependent on either spouse.. . . the constitutional and
the succession rights of the first family are unaffected."27 It was
also emphasized that the status of social welfare entitlements would
not change with the introduction of divorce. Dick Spring argued:
"All spouses can be absolutely assured that they will not be disad-
vantaged in terms of their social welfare entitlements as a result of
their legal status being changed from married, separated, or de-
serted to divorce."28 The minister for social welfare, Gemma
Hussey, similarly stated that "the social welfare code is sufficiently
flexible to cater for a wide range of families in different
circumstances."29 Responding to claims that "family farms" would
be lost, the minister for agriculture, Austin Deasy, reassured farm-
ers that divorce "poses no threat for the family farm."30 The min-
ister for justice, Alan Dukes, also gave assurances that: "A court,
before granting a divorce will have to be satisfied that the provision
made for the [farmer's] wife takes into account the fact that she
will be losing inheritance rights."31
Similar to the government, the DAG did not initiate economic ar-
guments in support of their case, but, as the campaign progressed,
they too responded to arguments made by those opposed to divorce
that women and children would suffer economically in a divorce
situation. The DAG emphasized that women already suffer—
"deserted women, battered women, women whose husbands re-
ceive foreign divorces"—and that divorce could only help to
improve their economic deprivation.32 Counter-arguing that the
wife and family from the first marriage would not lose their inher-
itance and succession rights if divorce was introduced, the DAG em-
phasized that the divorce amendment would economically favor
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women in particular. Jean Tansey maintained: "In fact, what the
legislation does is it brings forward women's rights with regard to
succession. The time of marital breakdown, that is the time when
women need to have financial and property arrangements sorted
out, not in ten or twenty years or when somebody dies."33
When divorce clearly has a range of economic consequences for
those involved, it is significant that FitzGerald and other advocates
of divorce did not initiate economic arguments nor demarcate the
economic dimension as a central consideration regarding the
amendment. This can be understood in terms of the problem of le-
gitimation that I have already highlighted. Advocates of divorce did
not have the legitimacy to initiate an economic discourse because
this would have been perceived as trivializing marriage.
To initiate the argument that divorce would redress some of the
economic problems currently confronted by deserted or separated
people would have been a valid contention, but an inappropriate
one. The imposition of a secular frame on what is, after all, a sac-
rament would have ensured that FitzGerald's proposals would be
viewed as anti-Catholic, a label that proponents of divorce needed
to avoid if their case was to be heard. The use of economic argu-
ments in support of divorce was constricted, therefore, by the le-
gitimation dilemma confronting those arguing in its favor. They
were free to invoke economic reasons only in response to the eco-
nomic arguments of anti-divorce campaigners. In campaigning for
the introduction of divorce, FitzGerald and others already were go-
ing against the traditions and values of the Irish regarding mar-
riage. To have then initiated arguments for divorce grounded in the
context of its practical and economic consequences would have
been to exacerbate the radical nature of their proposals and to de-
legitimate further their agenda.
Arguments against Divorce
After FitzGerald's announcement of the government divorce pro-
posals, the anti-divorce position was stated by William Binchy on
"Today Tonight" immediately following its transmission of the
government press conference. It was a brief interview. Nonetheless,
from the outset, Binchy took the initiative, was on the offensive, set
the tone for the debate, and defined the issues. He stressed the legal
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and consequent economic implications of divorce, which he argued
would follow if the government's proposals were accepted. I quote
below the full exchange between William Binchy and the inter-
viewer, John Bowman.
BOWMAN: YOU are campaigning against divorce. What is your response
to the fact that your campaign against it has now failed since the govern-
ment is proposing it?
BINCHY: Well I think it is interesting to note the type of divorce system
that the Taoiseach [prime minister] has proposed here. The divorce system
that is now going to be put before the country is in fact the type of modern
divorce laws which exists, really one could say, throughout Europe, North
America or the world.
BOWMAN: HOW can you say that? In a lot of those jurisdictions one
has what is known as quickie, no-fault divorces. The provisions here are
very strict.
BINCHY: Well, in fact, this is divorce based on demand, delayed de-
mand. It is not hard divorce but easy divorce. It transforms marriage from
a lifelong commitment into a commitment that either spouse provided they
are willing to stay long enough apart can get a divorce. Once one does
this in one's society, once one transforms marriage into a revocable
commitment, then necessarily all the social support that we know, the
maintenance entitlements, the succession entitlements, the Family Home
Protection Act, as we know from other countries, once divorce has been
introduced... we know that all these processes happen. They happen
because marriage is no longer for life, and it would make no sense attach-
ing to marriage the type of entitlements that are based on marriage being
for life.
BOWMAN: But some of the entitlements which you claim would be
ended are in fact those points which are covered in the supplementary doc-
ument . . . and the people would have to be referred to again if there was
to be any slippery slope, which is what you seem to be describing.
BINCHY: That's right, but I think you misunderstand me there. The type
of divorce system that is now on offer means that the type of maintenance
entitlements that exist under our existing law that were introduced ten
years ago, the type of succession entitlements that exist under our existing
law, would be modified because marriage is no longer for life and it makes
no sense attaching to non-lifelong marriage the type of support and scaf-
folding, legal scaffolding, that we have in our country at the moment.34
It is evident from this exchange that William Binchy's opening
remarks, just as did those of FitzGerald, contain outlines of several
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arguments to be elaborated and fleshed out by the ADC during the
campaign. Binchy argues that the government proposal was for a
"modern," easy divorce, that it would change the nature of mar-
riage from a lifelong to a revocable commitment, and that, as a re-
sult of the changed status of marriage, the legal and consequent
economic protection currently offered marriage would no longer
hold. Binchy's remarks are striking in that they contain the seeds of
two very different types of arguments. The first set, and the one to
be emphasized by the ADC throughout the campaign, is very this-
worldly, down-to-earth, and practical. Here fit Binchy's arguments
concerning the unrestrictiveness of the proposals and the eradica-
tion of the constitutional and legal economic benefits attendant on
marriage. The second set of reasons, however, the one deempha-
sized during the campaign, has clearly an other-worldly, moral cum
spiritual tone; here belongs the issue of lifelong commitment.
Easy Divorce
A prominent theme in the arguments of the anti-divorce campaign
was an emphasis on the unrestrictiveness of the proposals. On the
night after the amendment was announced, Binchy elaborated that
the proposals were not as restrictive as the government was claim-
ing because the word "failure" and not "separation" was con-
tained in the proposed amendment. He stated, "if one examines the
proposal that is going to go to the people there is no mention what-
soever of separation . . . all that is necessary is that the marriage
should have failed.... the type of divorce that is proposed is di-
vorce that doesn't even require one week of separation between the
spouses."35
Binchy contended that because failure entailed a subjective judg-
ment on the part of an individual spouse or judge, it was a more
vague and flexible criterion than if the constitution itself contained
a provision requiring an objective separation period of five years
before a divorce could be granted. "Failure," Binchy argued,
"could mean anything." Thus he stated: "If anybody who is mar-
ried thinks about the notion of failure of a marriage, what do they
say it means? I'm not sure what it means. I suggest that perhaps
you're not sure. I suggest that the viewers . . . will not be sure. It
could mean, for example, a case where a woman got married and
Arguing about Divorce 49
the husband was an obnoxious guy, I'd be thinking . . . that would
be failure. It could mean . . . an unhappy relationship with my hus-
band or wife as the case may be; it just simply hasn't fulfilled
me. That's a form of failure. . . . Failure could mean any form of
failure."36
Because "failure" would have such subjective meanings, Binchy
and other ADC spokespersons argued that "failure" as a criterion
for divorce would mean that if one spouse defined the marriage as
a failure from his or her perspective, then a court would have to
grant a divorce, even against the wishes of the other spouse. The
form of divorce that the government was proposing, therefore,
Binchy reiterated, was "an easy divorce law." Thus, "under this
wording . . . any married person can literally walk out on the other,
claim that his or her marriage has failed... . What judge can say
'No, I think your marriage has not failed'? It's only the person him-
self who could be the judge of that."37
Joe McCarroll similarly stressed that the amendment was so per-
missive that if it was endorsed, "all of the marriages that are over
five years will be able to be dissolved immediately."38 Another anti-
divorce activist, Bernadette Bonar, argued that the type of divorce
being proposed was "the most liberal form of divorce we could
possibly have. It took England nearly one-hundred years to arrive
at that type of divorce."39
The ADC emphasized that, if the amendment was accepted, the
Irish would have a situation whereby people could be "divorced
against their will"; that, as one campaign slogan stated, "you could
be forced to divorce"; as long as one partner wanted the marriage
dissolved, then that would be sufficient for a divorce to be granted.
The ADC continuously stressed that the form of divorce being pro-
posed was so liberal that: "DIVORCE COULD BE OBTAINED BY ONE
SPOUSE AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE OTHER. . . .  WHILE IT TAKES A
COMMITMENT FROM TWO TO GET MARRIED, LEGALLY, IT NEEDS
ONLY ONE TO BREAK THE MARRIAGE" [emphasis in original].40 Joe
McCarroll reiterated this position, arguing that divorce would "in-
troduce the idea of a throw-away spouse . . . if a problem comes up
you just throw away the spouse and throw away the children."41
Further highlighting the unrestrictiveness of the proposals, the ADC
contended: "If this Amendment is passed, it will be easier to dis-
miss a spouse than an employee. In an age of unemployment,
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employees are better protected and more secure than your wives
and your husbands will be if this amendment is carried."42
Like the ADC, spokespersons from the Fianna Fail party also ar-
gued that the proposals were unrestrictive. They too expressed con-
cern that the notion of "failure" of a marriage was weak, vague,
and ambiguous. Their primary anti-divorce spokesman, Michael
Woods, argued, for example, that: "If one spouse considers that the
marriage has failed, will anybody be able to say in those circum-
stances that it has not? . . . . The word "failure" is subjective.. . .
I do not think there is finality in the word. . . . I regard the word
"failure" as a weak word and one that sets a low threshold."43 An-
other Fianna Fail member, Padraig Flynn, who represents a constit-
uency in the west of Ireland, similarly maintained: "I understand
that failure, breakdown, or whatever word is used is nothing more
than a formula of words to allow 'no fault' divorce to be intro-
duced into this country. The ordinary person in the street sees it
like that—as easy divorce in certain circumstances.... This will
not be restrictive legislation. . . . [it] will make for easy divorce be-
ing made available in this jurisdiction."44
Related to their emphasis on the unrestrictiveness of the pro-
posals, both ADC and Fianna Fail spokespersons claimed that the
introduction of divorce would lead to the development of a divorce
culture. The ADC stated: "We believe that divorce introduces a
climate of opinion that militates against the success of each and
every marriage. The acceptance of divorce in a society introduces
the concept of defeatism into every marriage."45 Importantly, the
ADC emphasized that this was not simply their viewpoint, but was
based on "facts,"46 facts from the divorce experience of other
countries. In support of their position they argued that: "Interna-
tional statistics and the international experience of divorce shows
tha t . . . if divorce is available . . . the numbers of people resorting
to divorce will be high and will increase47.... In England alone,
divorce has resulted in an increase from 75,000 applications . . . to
175,000 applications . . . from 1970 to 1985."48 Echoing this
ADC approach, a Fianna Fail parliamentarian similarly stated
that: "Experience in countries where divorce is available... . un-
derlines the fact that divorce breeds divorce and in some countries
has led to what is tantamount to a breakdown of marriage as an
institution."49
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In the context of this argument, Fianna Fail speakers challenged
Garret FitzGerald's contention that divorce would serve the social
good. Taking a dichotomously opposed perspective to FitzGerald,
Michael Woods equated the introduction of divorce with evil,
graphically portraying it as a "constitutional Frankenstein." He ar-
gued: "If this proposed amendment is put into the Constitution
and divorce becomes common, as it has in other countries, legal
reasons will be sought for terminating the financial shackles of pre-
vious marriages. This trend has clearly emerged already in Britain
and the USA. In this context the government's proposed amendment
could in future be used as a sledgehammer to crush the rights of the
first family.... Could it be that the Government have unwittingly
created a 'constitutional Frankenstein' which may sleep for a time
but then rise and stalk the land?"50 Charles Haughey, the leader of
Fianna Fail, similarly argued that the consequences of introducing
divorce "would represent a major change in Irish society" and dis-
missed FitzGerald's argument as "just not credible."51
Economic Effects
Throughout the divorce campaign, its opponents also highlighted
the economic consequences of changing the legal and constitu-
tional status of marriage. In fact, the consequences of the erosion of
legally sanctioned economic support for marriage served as the pri-
mary theme of the anti-divorce discourse. In elucidating their op-
position to divorce, the ADC concentrated on what Binchy defined
as the "legal pitfalls"52 in the proposals, weaknesses they posited,
that would have particularly serious economic implications for the
dependents from the divorced person's first marriage.
Elaborating on one of the initial statements made by Binchy, the
ADC argued: "Once we decide that the marriage is no longer for
life, then all the legal supports for marriage as a lifetime commit-
ment are eroded. The protection given to wives, husbands and chil-
dren by the Succession Act, the Family Home Protection Act and
the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, would
be weakened significantly by divorce."53 Throughout the debate,
the ADC further contended that "the law would shift its support to
the second family to the disadvantage of the first family. The sec-
ond family of a divorce would become the primary focus of the
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constitutional protection. . . . THE DIVORCED FAMILY WOULD LOSE
ALL THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTION WHICH ARE
POSSESSED UNDER OUR LAW BY A FAMILY BASED ON MARRIAGE"
[emphasis in original].54 As William Binchy phrased it, the pro-
posed amendment would lead to a "legal schizophrenia" that
would force people to redirect all their resources into a second
marriage.55
The ADC argued that the introduction of divorce could only have
negative economic effects on all the parties involved. They sug-
gested that in the case of a couple owning property, the family
home or business or farm would have to be sold in order for an
economically equitable divorce settlement to be made. Given the
economic circumstances of many people, they maintained, the pro-
ceeds from such a sale would not be sufficient to continue support
of the family from the first marriage and to support a second mar-
riage. Accordingly, the ADC emphasized that the consequences
would be devastating for all concerned. Binchy presented a vivid
depiction of the likely scenario: "The implications of this prema-
ture liquidation of the man's assets, assuming that he is the person
with the property . . . is going to be equally alarming for him [as
for his wife]. He is going to have to produce, if the settlement is to
be any way other than grossly inadequate, he is going to have to
produce a significant proportion of his assets there and then. Now
most people who have a house . . . a farm or a business already
have some degree of mortgaging or charging on those properties.
The reality of that means that if the husband has to produce one-
third of his value at the time of the divorce, that means the sale of
the house certainly . . . in many cases . . . farms or businesses . . .
the sale of part or all of the property."56
Quite apart from the implications of this type of situation, the
ADC argued that the salary of a divorced man would not be suffi-
cient for him to fulfill his financial obligations to two wives and
families. As they emphasized, because a second marriage added to
the number of dependents, the first family would have to share an
unenlarged economic pie with a greater number of people, thus re-
ducing their individual share. The ADC was unequivocal about this.
Joe McCarroll stated: "Divorce doesn't multiply a man's income
by two. If a man can just about scrape by on one income and then
he sets up a second relationship, I think the society is unwise to
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transfer the stamp of social approval to that as if it were something
responsible, when in fact, the money isn't there."57 And as Binchy
reiterated: "If one has the right to remarry that means the right
to establish a second family, and the reality of life is that unfortu-
nately if a man enters into a second family, his salary doesn't
increase, doesn't double. It is just one salary and in these circum-
stances the one salary has to cover two families."58 In particular,
the ADC constructed the negative economic effects of divorce as
having a detrimental impact on women. "Wives," they argued,
"tend to suffer a massive drop in living standards."59 As dependent
spouses, married women would be most vulnerable to divorce be-
cause they would lose all their rights—the right to the family home,
the right to their husband's land or property, the right to their hus-
band's pension, the right to social welfare benefits. In sum, Binchy
argued that divorce "deprives the first wife of her [economic] rights
as wife." He stated: "The right to remarry . . . says that it is rea-
sonable that the second wife . . . should have a whole range of
rights. The only way that the second wife can have a whole range
of rights is at the expense of the first wife."60
The constitutional amendment that was proposed included a cri-
terion stating that a divorce could not be granted unless "adequate
and proper provision having regard to the circumstances" was
made for dependent spouses and children. The ADC contended,
nonetheless, that this clause would favor the primary or sole earner
of the couple, most usually the man, and they delineated what this
would mean in practice. Thus William Binchy argued: "Practical
implication one, the succession rights of the first wife are removed.
Practical implication two, the succession rights of the children of
the first family are reduced. Practical implication three, a person
can be divorced against their wishes. Practical implication four . . .
a working spouse, a working wife will receive no protection under
the amendment the way it is drafted.... a final practical implica-
tion. . . . [The amendment] does not consider the position which
might arise, say two or three years after the divorce where a di-
vorced wife is injured in a traffic accident or sick."61
In support of their argument that divorce causes economic hard-
ship for women and children, the ADC again invoked statistics from
other countries. They stated, for example, that "in the United
States . . . sixty to eighty per cent of fathers ignore court orders
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and currently owe some four billion dollars to their former
families62.... the reality in the world where divorce has been in-
troduced, and this is a matter of fact, in every country where di-
vorce has been introduced, women and children have suffered from
the introduction of divorce . . . married women have suffered . . .
and women with young children have been particular casu-
alties63. . . . No matter what country in which you examine the is-
sue and study it you find that it is women and children who are
suffering."64
Because of the harsh economic realities that women and children
would experience with divorce, it was the ADC'S claim, in part as a
response to a pro-divorce slogan "Put Compassion in the Consti-
tution," that compassion was due, not solely to individuals whose
marriages had broken down, but to the "unilaterally repudiated"
first spouse (wife) and children. The "balance of compassion," the
ADC contended, "demands an unequivocal NO to divorce."65
The ADC argued that the overall impact of divorce would be to
"bulldoze people into poverty,"66 thus leading to the establishment
of a new category of social welfare dependents. Supporting these
"victims of divorce," the ADC maintained, would cost the taxpayers
at least an additional one million pounds per week. The ADC
stated: "The implications for the State have not been costed but
there are suggestions that it would amount to a need to generate
extra taxation of more than a million pounds a week to aid the vic-
tims of divorce."67
The post-divorce scenario that was elucidated by Fianna Fail op-
ponents of divorce was also clearly one of negative economic
consequences.68 In the opening statement by Fianna Fail to the Par-
liamentary debate on divorce, their justice spokesman, Michael
Woods, depicted what he regarded as the devastating economic ef-
fects of divorce on the first family. He specifically pointed out that
the dependent wife and children would be economically disadvan-
taged; they would become "constitutional orphans."69 Continuing
to focus on the dependent situation of women, and simultaneously
paying attention to the specific consequences of divorce for farm-
ers, Woods highlighted the negative post-divorce situation of farm
wives and children: "The effects of the proposed amendment on
succession would have very serious implications for the farming
community. For example, if a farmer gets divorced the wife who
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may have contributed substantially to the development of the farm
as a farming enterprise wi l l . . . be deprived of her home on the
farm and her way of life. If the farmer dies intestate, she will have
no share in the inheritance. Her children may also be excluded
from inheriting even though one or more of them may have been
working the farm with the father before his death."70 The eco-
nomic costs of divorce, Woods argued, would fall not just on those
in the divorced situation, but, significantly, on the taxpayer. He
emphasized that the "main effect" of the government introduc-
ing divorce would be that every citizen regardless of their attitude
to divorce would have to contribute to the State's underwriting
of it.71
Economic Interests and the Irish
The two opposing sets of arguments articulated during the divorce
debate, those by both pro- and anti-divorce forces, reflected cogent,
thoughtful ways of approaching the question at issue. The anti-
divorce arguments, however, strike as clearly more potent than
those expressed in favor of divorce. They were strong, graphic ar-
guments, vividly depicting likely post-divorce scenarios of negative
eventualities. The emphasis by the ADC on tangible, this-worldly,
economic arguments resulted in a forceful message, possibly a de-
cisive one in the debate.
The dissimilarity in the content and tone of the pro- and anti-
divorce arguments was underscored by the contrast in the opening
arguments of Garret FitzGerald and William Binchy. FitzGerald's
arguments were relatively abstract with no attention paid to the
practical implications of introducing divorce. He talked instead
about the social good, indissoluble monogamy, the right of individ-
uals to object to divorce on grounds of conscience, and the differ-
ence between his and the Catholic church's assessment of the
sociological impact of divorce. His remarks addressed social-
philosophical points rather than pragmatic considerations. Distin-
guished from FitzGerald's, Binchy's approach focused directly on
the immediate practical implications of introducing divorce. His
naming of the removal of specific legal and economic entitlements
that divorce would entail was concrete and spoke directly to peo-
ple's basic concerns with issues of economic security.
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The ADC discourse was important not only because of its con-
creteness but also because it appealed to the long-standing keenness
of the Irish for a language of economics. Economic-related argu-
ments hold a strong attraction for the Irish because, as outlined in
chapter 2, they appeal to historical preoccupations with economic
security and, in the case of the divorce amendment, addressed im-
mediate concerns renewed by the depressed state of the Irish econ-
omy at the time of the referendum. By recourse to practical,
economically grounded arguments as a way of articulating their
opposition to the amendment, the anti-divorce lobby empathi-
cally connected with the Irish people and their sensitivity to eco-
nomic issues.
The anti-divorce contention that divorce begets negative eco-
nomic effects clearly echoes post-famine Ireland's association of
marriage with economic costs. Modern divorce, its opponents con-
tended, has adverse consequences for an individual's standard of
living. The opponents of divorce were arguing that if the promise
of marriage is to provide economic security and perhaps even to
enhance people's standard of living—particularly given the fact
that for many women it is through marriage that they maintain
the social status of their parents or achieve upward mobility—
and, through succession and inheritance rights, to ensure the con-
tinuing security of the family, divorce, with certainty, yields the op-
posite effects.
The Irish had succeeded in establishing ownership of their land
and property, and the anti-divorce narrative predicted that this
would be put in jeopardy. By voting in favor of divorce the Irish
would become confronted once again with economic dispossession.
Implicit in the anti-divorce arguments was the warning that this
time, however, the material dispossession would be of their own
making.
The power of the anti-divorce economic discourse was also
grounded in a second important source, one more immediate, em-
bedded as it was in the environment of current economic crisis
highlighted by the high unemployment rate. This further enhanced
the direct appeal by opponents of divorce to the economic preoc-
cupations of the Irish, clearly highlighted by campaign posters that
read: "Jobs we want, not divorce. Vote no!" Significantly, the anti-
divorce groups depicted not only the economic costs that would be
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incurred by divorced families, but they also elucidated the eco-
nomic consequences that divorce would bring for people in general
as taxpayers. The argument posited by anti-divorce activists that
acceptance of the amendment would lead to an increase in personal
and societal economic costs was key, therefore, to concentrating
people's attention on the negative implications of divorce.
Marriage as a Lifelong Institution
In the preceding discussion I have argued for the effectiveness of the
ADC'S economic discourse as well as contended that the pro-divorce
lobby could not forcefully use economic arguments because this
would be seen as trivializing the issue of divorce. But the following
question comes to mind: should not this argument apply equally to
the ADC? The answer is contained in the second string of arguments
articulated by the ADC. These were moral cum religious objections
that spoke of the changed definition of marriage that would ensue
with the legal recognition of divorce. Although deemphasized,
these provided the ADC with legitimacy and freed them to stress the
economic and practical implications of introducing divorce.
The ADC argued that, by introducing divorce, the understanding
of marriage as a lifelong institution would no longer apply. They
stressed that the legal acceptance of divorce entailed a redefinition
of marriage. Divorce, as Binchy argued in his initial remarks,
"transforms marriage from a lifelong commitment into a revocable
contract that either spouse provided they are willing to stay long
enough apart can get a divorce. . . . once one transforms marriage
into a revocable commitment. . . marriage is no longer for life."72
Underlying the ADC'S opposition to the removal of the legal sta-
tus of lifelong marriage was their adherence to the concept of a nat-
ural right to lifelong marriage. Joe McCarroll argued that the
introduction of divorce "violates and abolishes two natural rights
of married people." He stated: "We have a natural right to marry
and marriage is lifelong. We have a natural right to a whole mar-
riage and not to a slice of a marriage. And secondly, we have a nat-
ural right to legal protection for marriage."73
So although the ADC emphasized the negative economic conse-
quences of divorce and stressed the unrestrictiveness of the specific
proposals, paralleling this, they also expressed their objection to
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the principle of divorce. Stating: "WE OBJECT TO DIVORCE ITSELF"
[emphasis in original],74 the ADC underscored its opposition to the
particular amendment at issue and to divorce in general. Accord-
ingly, it would seem that the ADC would have opposed any divorce
proposals, regardless of how restrictive they might have been. Joe
McCarroll further demonstrated the ADC'S position in an exchange
with "Today Tonight" interviewer, Pat Kenny.
KENNY: Let's get it quite clear. You're against any divorce, not just this
bill as it is drawn up. You're picking holes in this bill but your basic point
is no divorce no matter how tight, how restrictive, how conservative it
might be?
MCCARROLL: Yes, I believe that divorce is unjust.75
Therefore, while the ADC stressed the unrestrictiveness of the
government divorce proposals, it is evident that even if there was a
separation requirement of five years or longer written into the con-
stitution, it would still be opposed by the ADC. For them any pro-
vision for divorce is in itself too permissive because it violates both
the right to lifelong marriage and the right to legal protection for
lifelong marriage. Concomitant with the ADC'S opposition to the
principle of divorce was commitment to the principle of lifelong
marriage. For the ADC, the two principles were mutually exclusive:
"Divorce by definition is the destruction of marriage."76 Reinforc-
ing this position, Family Solidarity argued: "When divorce is avail-
able, the State no longer recognises or supports marriage based on
lifelong commitment. Divorce undermines the institution of mar-
riage Divorce violates the right to lifelong marriage.. . . WE
HAVE A RIGHT TO LIFELONG MARRIAGE . . . Divorce destroys mar-
riage as a lifelong commitment" [emphasis in original].77
Opponents of divorce, therefore, expressed their resistance to
any legislative or social action that would not provide the family
based on lifelong marriage with protection and support. In arguing
against the introduction of divorce, they were simultaneously cam-
paigning to maintain the state's protection of marriage as a lifelong
commitment. As William Binchy argued: "There are certain gaps
in the present law, but one thing that can be said . . . is that mar-
riage as a lifelong commitment is protected by it."78
We thus see that although the ADC argued their case against di-
vorce primarily on practical and economic grounds, it also had a
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moral objection to the principle of divorce. In this regard, the ADC
demonstrated a theological position clearly similar to that of the
Catholic church, which defines marriage as an indissoluble lifelong
commitment.79 In line with McCarroll's argument that people had
a natural right to state protection for lifelong marriage, many oth-
ers who campaigned against divorce carried placards that read
"God says no to divorce," implying that the Church's teaching on
marriage should thus be enshrined in state legislation. What the
ADC omitted to point out, however, was the fact that the Catholic
church does not demand that their theological position on marriage
be enshrined in state legislation simply because of its theological
status.
Here again, Fianna Fail's position also accorded with that of the
ADC. While Fianna Fail speakers raised objections to the specific
form and procedural details of the government divorce proposals, it
was evident that their opposition was more deeply rooted. There
was a strand to the Fianna Fail anti-divorce discourse that sug-
gested that they too were opposed to the principle of divorce. To
introduce divorce, they maintained, would be, essentially, to abol-
ish marriage. Sean Treacy, for example, stated: "For me and the
vast majority of the people I represent, marriage is a sacrament. It
is indissoluble. We accept as our credo that what God hath brought
together no man has the right to pull asunder.. . . Divorce... is
alien to the Christian way of life. . . . Marriage as a lifelong union
becomes legally obsolete.. . . Divorce destroys the concept of mar-
riage as a sacrament. It makes a mockery of marriage as a perma-
nent institution."80 Padraig Flynn similarly argued: "The Christian
ethic cannot lightly be set aside.... Introducing divorce would give
respectability to actions totally at variance with Christian ethics.
Those who facilitate actions that offend that ethic must share in the
consequences for society afterwards."81
In objecting to the principle of divorce therefore, its opponents
expressed a view of marriage that was coincidental with the theo-
logical position of the Catholic church. Once again, just as with
the economic arguments, this set of arguments was very power-
ful, since it now appealed to the other sphere of Irish life, the
Church and the tradition of Irish Catholicism. In Ireland, being
opposed to divorce is itself significant because it reaffirms com-
mitment to Catholic teaching about lifelong marriage and the
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attendant historical and cultural expectation of state support for
lifelong marriage. Specifically invoking the concept of lifelong mar-
riage and arguing against divorce on the grounds that it violates
this, opponents of divorce underscored further their empathy and
concurrence with the Irish religious tradition.
Issues of Emphasis and Tension among ADC Arguments
The ADC, therefore, put forward two powerful sets of arguments,
one speaking to economic concerns and the second speaking to
the religious values of the Irish. These were forceful arguments.
Jointly they spoke to both this-worldly and other-worldly values.
Interestingly enough, however, as I have documented, the ADC ap-
peared to emphasize the this-worldly economic arguments and de-
emphasize the other-worldly religious strand in their opposition to
divorce. This difference in emphasis was well illustrated by
William Binchy, who maintained that the position of the ADC bore
no relation to religion.
Toward the end of the campaign, when challenged by "Today
Tonight" interviewer John Bowman that the ADC'S opposition to
divorce "coincided with that of the Catholic hierarchy," Binchy re-
sponded that in objecting to divorce he was not taking a theolog-
ical, but a sociological, position. Binchy insisted that the reason he
opposed divorce was because of the "clear injustices which it
would cause to the first family," and he argued that his objection
had "nothing to do with religion."82 As he stated on "Today To-
night," he saw the religious as the sphere of the Church, while he
and the ADC were concerned with addressing the legal, economic,
and sociological implications of introducing divorce. Binchy and
the ADC thus sought to maintain differentiation between their prac-
tical economic objections to divorce and the theological arguments
of the Church.
For Binchy to try to adhere to the distinction between economic/
secular and religious arguments was understandable since pastoral
guidance is the prerogative of the Church. But, as documented
above, contrary to Binchy's claims, this distinction was not consis-
tently adhered to by him or by other members of the ADC. One
good reason for not complying with this distinction is that the re-
ligious arguments provided a powerful justification and backing
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for the secular discourse of economics. It could be argued that only
by skillfully blending the two traditions could the ADC avoid the
problems of legitimation that proved continuous for the pro-
divorce forces.
Although, as we can tell, it was important for the ADC to weave
into their discourse strands from both the secular and religious tra-
ditions, nevertheless, it was also important for them to try to keep
separate the two lines of argumentation. According to Binchy, the
ostensible reason for this was a simple division of labor between
the Church and the ADC. However, another reason relates to the
fact that moral cum religious and economic lines of reasoning make
for strange bedfellows. After all, the economic argument draws on
a this-worldly discourse of rationality, empirical facts, and evi-
dence. Objections to divorce grounded in this tradition are by ne-
cessity contingent and subject to revision in view of the available
and future data. Therefore, Binchy, the sociologist, economist, and
lawyer, would seem to have to accept the need for divorce if the em-
pirical evidence argued in its favor.
But moral objections to divorce are of a very different kind to
those grounded in sociology and economics. The other-worldly ar-
guments of religion and morality are neither contingent nor
grounded in empiricism, nor are they subject to change. One clearly
does not reconsider a moral objection to divorce as a result of a
conclusive empirical study stating that on the average people
are happier with the option of divorce than without it. Although I
do not claim that the decision to keep the this-worldly and other-
worldly arguments was a deliberate strategy of the ADC, never-
theless, it is quite understandable that things just had to happen
this way. Drawing on these two traditions clearly strengthened
the ADC'S hand, but at a price: one of contradiction if not
incompatibility.
In the final chapter, I argue that the fact that the ADC reverted to
both secular and religious arguments in its campaign against di-
vorce and the fact that this strategy was never challenged is of sig-
nificance well beyond the narrow issue of how people debate
matters of values and morality. I will show how it provides an im-
portant insight into the transitional status of contemporary Irish
society and, at the same time, sheds light on the relationship be-
tween traditionality and modernity in general.
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Marginal Themes
The discourse of the divorce campaign is significant in terms of its
focus and emphasis. The range of arguments articulated facilitate a
mapping out of the values and cultural tensions that characterize
and distinguish Irish society. But the questions that gained only
marginal attention during the course of the debate are also of sig-
nificance. Two issues in particular stand out: the notion of divorce
as a civil right and the amendment's relevance to Northern Ireland.
At first glance, these two important questions strike as the sorts of
substantive concerns that might have provided legitimation for
the pro-divorce forces. Their marginalization, however, was well-
grounded in the cultural realities of Irish society.
Divorce as a Civil Right
Importantly, as the proposer of divorce Garret FitzGerald ada-
mantly maintained that the divorce provision should be seen in its
social context, serving the social good as opposed to being re-
garded as an individual civil right. Like his counterparts on the
anti-divorce side, FitzGerald rejected the "liberal position that
there is an individual right to divorce."83 Instead he, as did William
Binchy from the anti-divorce campaign, emphasized his view that
divorce was a social question, stating: "I don't believe there is a
civil right to divorce. I believe it is a social issue,"84 a view that was
also stressed by his parliamentary party colleague, John Kelly, him-
self a professor of constitutional law.85
The DAG'S main contention throughout the debate was that di-
vorce was a necessary response to the increasing problem of marital
breakdown, and they argued that, as such, it should not be seen
simply as an individual civil right. Nevertheless, in appealing to
broad societal values of honesty, compassion, and tolerance, they
argued that a 'yes' vote was "a vote for an Irish society which cares
about social and personal suffering . . . It is a vote for the recogni-
tion of individual rights, for tolerance, for social maturity."86 Sim-
ilarly, Jean Tansey alluded indirectly to her belief in the right to
divorce, stating: "A [yes vote] is a vote for the recognition of indi-
vidual rights... . What people object to at the end of the day is the
right of people to remarry."87
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Tansey claimed, however, that those who want to legally re-
marry want to do so not because of their ideological belief in the
libertarian rights of individuals but out of respect for the serious-
ness with which Irish people regard the legal and social framework
within which the institution of marriage operates.88 In this regard,
the DAG distanced themselves from the perception that advocates of
divorce are permissive and from the media-created image that di-
vorce undermines social control. It was significant, for example,
that the DAG opened their campaign by stating that they did not
want a form of "quickie divorce or a California type divorce."89
Rather, they commended the government for introducing a "re-
sponsible procedure" and continued throughout the debate to em-
phasize the restrictiveness of the proposals.
The notion of divorce as a civil right was also mentioned by pro-
divorce politicians. Dick Spring, the leader of the Labour party, for
example, stated that in the situation of the divorce proposals being
accepted: "I believe we as a State will no longer be seen as prohib-
itive, as a State which denies its people that which other democra-
cies have regarded as a legitimate civil right."90 Some members of
the Fine Gael party also endorsed the notion of divorce as a civil
right.91 Significantly, however, this stance was more commonly ex-
pressed by minor voices in the debate. The Irish Congress of Trade
Unions (ICTU) argued that "divorce is a human and a civil right. . .
recognised in virtually all the countries of the world."92 Arguing
that its prohibition is discriminatory and sectarian, and broadening
the implications of the divorce referendum to other socioeconomic
issues, an ICTU spokesperson claimed that those who oppose di-
vorce are also "opposed to workers' rights and the right of trade
unions to defend and improve the economic conditions of workers.
They are not just opposed to divorce. They are opposed to social
progress and the emergence of a secular Irish State."94
The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) also argued that di-
vorce was a civil right. Failure to endorse the amendment, they
stated, would "endorse a society where caring and compassion
have no meaning." In a statement, the ICCL argued that "divorce is
a civil right. . . . If this amendment fails, our constitutional democ-
racy will become the clubhouse of a moral majority, where the prej-
udices of the day are labelled constitutional laws."94 Similarly, the
Workers' Party, a parliamentary socialist party, stressed that: "In a
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Democratic Republic civil divorce is a civil right for those whose
marriages have failed. It is undemocratic and intolerant to deny
such people that right. . . . YOUR VOTE IS VITAL FOR A SOCIETY
WHICH GUARDS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AS WELL AS MAJORI-
TIES" [emphasis in original].9 5
Such arguments, nonetheless, did not constitute the main thrust
of the pro-divorce case. The notion that people had a civil right to
divorce was not a key argument systematically articulated by those
directly involved in either the government's or the DAG'S pro-
divorce campaign. As I discussed in chapter 2, a language of indi-
vidual rights is not commonly used in Irish society. Consequently,
it was not readily available to proponents of divorce. The concept
surfaced during the debate, but, significantly, compared to Fitz-
Gerald, the government, and the Divorce Action Group, it was
other more marginal groups and political parties who framed the
introduction of divorce in terms of an individual civil right.
It is understandable that these organizations freely used the ar-
gument of a right to divorce, despite its marginality, since issues of
public legitimation were not their concern during the campaign.
Their more peripheral status made it less imperative that they
maintain credibility with the Irish people. Moreover, the groups
who explicitly stated that divorce is a civil right are accustomed to
speaking a specific language of rights—among others, the rights of
workers to fair wages, the right to strike, the right to justice. It was
relatively easy for them, therefore, to incorporate the "right to di-
vorce" within the discourse of rights they customarily articulate.
Northern Ireland
If divorce was introduced into the Republic of Ireland it would
make the situation there more comparable with that of Northern
Ireland, where no-fault divorce is legal.96 In light of the Republic's
constitutional aspiration to a united Ireland, one might expect that
the issue of Northern Ireland would be an important consideration
during the divorce debate. It could be argued that the passing of the
amendment in the South would send a signal to Protestants, and
indeed, to Catholics, in Northern Ireland that people in the South
were willing to make practical changes that could be seen as facil-
itating unification, even though in and of itself, divorce would not
be a catalyst for change.
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At the press conference announcing the referendum, however,
FitzGerald stated, in response to a reporter's question, that "the sit-
uation in Northern Ireland is essentially subsidiary" to the problem
caused by the scale of marital breakdown in the Republic.97 Sub-
sequently, during the Parliamentary debate on divorce, he strongly
reiterated this assertion but noted that the passing of the amend-
ment would have incidental relevance to the relationship between
North and South:
I believe that this debate has also an importance that extends outside the
boundaries of this State.... This debate, and the subsequent wider public
discussion, together with the eventual decision taken by the people of this
State, will, of course, be watched particularly closely by people of both tra-
ditions in Northern Ireland, many of whom will, I believe, be influenced to
a degree in their attitude towards this State and towards each other by the
manner in which we act in this matter. That will not be a primary consid-
eration when this matter will be put to the test. But it should not be ig-
nored either. And to the extent that electors conclude that this proposal
should be adopted on its own merits to meet the social needs of this State,
to that extent they will also be helping incidentally the relationship be-
tween North and South, and between the communities in Northern Ire-
land. At a time when the situation in Northern Ireland is so delicately
balanced this is not something we can reasonably ignore.98
Another member of the government, the Labour minister for
health, Barry Desmond, also suggested that the broader issue of
Northern Ireland was relevant to the success of the divorce amend-
ment. He argued: "Few are naive enough to believe that the intro-
duction of divorce in the Republic would persuade the Unionists to
look with more favour on their Catholic neighbours. However, in
the proposed referendum we cannot ignore the implications of a de-
cision to maintain the constitutional prohibition on divorce for our
aspiration to bring peace and stability to this island. A 'no' vote
will reaffirm the traditional view of southern society that one
moral principle of one Church, the indissolubility of marriage, is
more important than the moral principle of fundamental respect
for the rights of others, A 'yes' vote will, on the other hand, be a
vote in favour of a new Ireland with which all traditions might
identify."99
At the launching of the Fine Gael party's pro-divorce campaign,
however, its director, the foreign minister, Peter Barry, argued that
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the outcome of the referendum would have no impact on the
Northern Ireland question. Barry stated that in the event of the ref-
erendum being defeated, he doubted "that the people of Northern
Ireland would see the outcome as proof that the Republic is a Cath-
olic State for a Catholic people."100 Putting the relevance of the
Northern Ireland dimension to the divorce amendment more
bluntly, the Fine Gael parliamentarian, John Kelly, contended: "I
do not see that this matter has anything to do with the North of
Ireland. . . . The argument that we have to change the law here to
bring ourselves into line with the North or to disarm criticism
from non-Catholics or those who think this is some kind of spiri-
tual dictatorship run by the hierarchy, is wrong."101 Independent
Senator Catherine McGuinness, who is herself a Northern Protes-
tant, strongly emphasized that, to the contrary, the defeat of the
amendment would be "a blow in the face to all moderate Protes-
tants who are trying to make the Anglo-Irish agreement work . . . It
will reinforce the view that this is a society where home rule is
Rome rule."102
With this one exception, therefore, the Northern Ireland angle,
while not ignored by the pro-divorce forces, was underplayed by
them. Its relevance to the amendment was more forcefully dis-
missed by opponents of divorce. William Binchy argued that uni-
fication was a completely separate issue,103 while members of
Fianna Fail argued that "granting divorce here will not make one
whit of difference to a united Ireland."104
The issue of Northern Ireland is one of well-grounded historical
relevance to Irish and Anglo-Irish politics and continues to domi-
nate political discussions in Ireland. Some may find it puzzling,
therefore, that it was so marginalized during the divorce debate.
One way in which its omission can be explained is that, as a socio-
political issue, the "problem" of Northern Ireland essentially spot-
lights questions of minority rights.
Talking about Northern Ireland focuses attention on the prob-
lem of minority Catholic rights in the North and the problem of
minority Protestant rights in a possible future united Ireland. In the
context of the divorce debate, it can be used to indirectly remind
people that there is also a minority in the Republic of Ireland, a
minority who would like to divorce and remarry. After all, this was
what the referendum was about: the concession of the legal right to
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divorce and remarriage to those who wish to avail of it. Remarks
by the foreign minister, Peter Barry, in defending his dismissal of
the Northern Ireland dimension, highlighted this. He argued: "Be-
cause Northern Ireland was not referred to in my script, that does
not mean it is not important. In any republic concern for the rights
of a minority is extremely important. I believe myself that we have
a Republic and that I am living in a Republic. I would hope that the
government and every government would ensure that the rights of
minorities are upheld."105
But, in Ireland, just as arguments invoking individual rights do
not find ready acceptance, the same difficulties confront those ar-
guing the case of minorities. There is a preference for causes that
are seen as more broadly benefitting the family, the community, or
the larger society. Given this cultural context, many people perceive
divorce, for instance, in negative terms, as essentially granting to an
individual and to a minority, rights that take precedence over
broader societal ideals. As far as many of the Irish people are con-
cerned, while they would genuinely like to help people whose mar-
riages are broken down, and in the case of the Northern Ireland
problem, they would like to see the conflict there brought to a
peaceful resolution, at the same time, they sincerely believe that
they should not vote in favor of a proposal that, in their eyes, would
undermine a greater good—with respect to the divorce amend-
ment, lifelong marriage. Consequently, in arguing for divorce, it
was in FitzGerald's and the government's interest to deemphasize
rather than to emphasize the relevance of Northern Ireland, while
for the anti-divorce forces, its introduction as a topic would
have clouded unnecessarily their already sharply focused anti-
divorce arguments.
There is also another reason, one which might easily elude non-
Irish readers, why the government did not emphasize the impor-
tance of the amendment to North/South relations. It can be
explained by a lack of real commitment in the South to Northern
Ireland. Contrary to what many non-Irish people, particularly
Irish-Americans, may think, for the most part, the majority of peo-
ple in the Republic do not regard the unification of Northern Ire-
land as a major priority.106 The Irish Republican Army (IRA)
receives little support for its political agenda from people living in
the South, and it is likely that this minority support would be even
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further attenuated if there was a greater awareness that related to
the IRA'S agenda is the objective of a united, socialist Ireland.107
The Irish have more immediate concerns with the economic and
social issues in their own jurisdiction and those that impact on their
everyday lives. Certainly, there is no shortage of nationalist rhetoric
by politicians and others, and aspirations toward a united Ireland
are frequently articulated. But an aspiration toward a united Ire-
land is a long distance from commitment to the real costs it would
entail. It is not certain that a majority of people living in the South
would be prepared to make adjustments—economic, political, so-
cial, or cultural—as a way of accommodating, or assimilating
with, those in the North.108
Given the distance that people in the South have from the North-
ern Ireland question, therefore, it would only have further delegit-
imated the pro-divorce case of FitzGerald and the government.
Indeed, it would have been counterproductive. The Irish would
have asked, "Why should we be more concerned about the political
impact that introducing divorce would have on our relations with
Northern Ireland than with the consequences of divorce on our
own society?" As the astute parliamentarian, John Kelly, declared,
"We will run our affairs to please ourselves."109
To recapitulate, those making the case for the introduction of di-
vorce into Irish society had to accomplish two things. They had to
establish a break between the equation of state law and Catholic
morality and, at the same time, to maintain their own credibility by
not undermining the traditional approach to marriage as a lifelong
sacrament. Advocates of divorce had to establish credibility with an
electorate for a stance that was contrary to bedrock Irish religious
and cultural values. The challenge was to establish authority for a
position that was so at odds with the dominant societal ethos. They
had to argue for the acceptance of secular legislation without ap-
pearing to be challenging the prerogative of the Church to define
both private and public morality.
Precluded from relying on economic or religious arguments, the
pro-divorce lobby used a broad, intellectualized discourse. The ten-
sion in Irish society between tradition and modernity meant that
while they were trying to appeal to modern values such as the dis-
tinction between private and public morality, at the same time,
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they had to be careful not to offend the majority, who regard
marriage as a sacramental lifelong commitment. Their task was to
try to preserve a balance as they negotiated questions of their
own credibility and legitimation, their presentation as authentic
Catholics, and their arguments in support of the introduction of
secular legislation.
Discussion of the anti-divorce discourse revealed that two types
of concerns preoccupied opponents of divorce: economic, and
moral or religious. Throughout the debate, the ADC and members
of Fianna Fail who opposed divorce publicly emphasized its this-
worldly practical economic effects. At the same time, however,
they gained credibility from their other-worldly reason, their moral
objection to the principle of divorce. Jointly, their use of economic
and moral arguments was powerful because these two sets of
arguments appealed to the primary cultural concerns of the Irish:
economics and religion. A basic inconsistency, however, character-
ized the ADC'S discourse because it drew on two different tradi-
tions—evidence and doctrine—which, when juxtaposed, are
incompatible, but which, significantly, went unchallenged during
the debate.
CHAPTER FOUR
Women and the
Divorce Campaign
Can anything further be added to our understanding of the debate
by looking at the arguments from the perspective of women? We
might well expect that the inclusion of women and arguments re-
lating to them would give a different slant to the debate. After all,
there is a long tradition of seeing divorce as of special interest to
women and central to the cause of women's equality. Since the early
part of the nineteenth century, demands for divorce law reform
were prevalent among feminists in Western Europe, who saw di-
vorce as one way of giving legal protection to women's uncertain
status relative to the de facto independence of men.1 Traditional le-
gal marriage and divorce based on adultery of the wife reinforced
the patriarchal family structure of Western society and thus subor-
dinated women to the authority of their husbands. Based on the
common-law doctrine of coverture, whereby women assumed the
legal identity of their husbands, "the wife became . . . a legal non-
person, living under her husband's arm, protection and cover."2
As with other questions concerning women's equality, reforms in
the area of domestic relations were slow. In England, where the
Christian conception of indissoluble marriage prevailed, it was only
after 1857 that the modern notion of divorce as the dissolution of
a valid marriage and the right to remarry became legal.3 But, de-
spite changes in the law, the basic understanding of marriage as a
permanent union continued and was supported by restrictive di-
vorce laws. Reflecting its English common-law roots, this was also
the case in the United States.4 Before the twentieth century, there-
fore, it was common for Western families to stay together, and
"public divorce or even private separation was a rarity."5
By the turn of the century, however, most American states had
enacted divorce laws grounded in the traditional principles of fault,
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one party's guilt, post-divorce continuation of gender-based mari-
tal responsibilities, and financial compensation.6 This was the type
of divorce that prevailed until the 1960s when it was displaced in
subsequent years throughout America and Western Europe by non-
fault based divorce. With Ireland an exception, "between 1969 and
1985, divorce law in nearly every Western country was altered."7
Encompassed in much of the new divorce legislation was the ob-
jective of ensuring greater gender equality through giving each
spouse an equal share in the marital property and economic re-
sources, the interpretation of which brought forth some unantici-
pated negative consequences for women. Simply dividing the
couple's joint economic resources at the time of the divorce did not
compensate those women who had been inactive in the paid labor
force because of mothering and/or housework activities and who,
therefore, subsequently encountered a reduction in their future
earning power as a result of lost work experience and seniority.
Failure to acknowledge the cumulative economic impact of wives'
noneconomic contribution to their husbands' current and future
earning power, in addition to the fact that gender wage differen-
tials favor men, meant that, relative to their husbands, many post-
divorce women suffered a decline in income.8 In short, establishing
the principle of legal equality in divorce settlements could not over-
ride the unequal social and economic status of women in society. As
Lenore Weitzman observed, those responsible for proposing the
new laws "were so deeply convinced of the fairness of the new law
that they did not foresee how de jure equality might not result in
equity in a society lacking de facto equality."9
What was reflected in the reforms was the institutional domi-
nance of a male worldview. It was a predominantly male legal pro-
fession working with a predominantly male legislature that
formulated and endorsed the new laws, and this may well explain
the erroneous gender equity assumption.10 Absent in the formula-
tion of the divorce reforms were women's voices. Organized femi-
nist groups were not active participants in efforts to reform the
American law,11 while similarly elsewhere, in Italy, for example, the
initial attempt to introduce divorce legislation was not framed as a
women's issue.12
But these earlier divorce reforms were set in place prior to the
public impact of the second wave of feminism—the resurgence of
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women's liberation movements in the late sixties—which partially
explains the dearth of women's perspectives in the new thinking on
divorce. Irish divorce, in contrast, was proposed in the late 1980s
following twenty years of vigorous feminist organization and ac-
tivity in the West, including the formation in Ireland of various
women's organizations and the establishment of a national admin-
istrative body for women, the Council for the Status of Women. We
would thus expect the active participation of women and women's
groups in the debate. Moreover, because the Irish divorce proposals
also sought to effect gender equality and were presented as being
pro-women—it was envisaged that divorce settlements would com-
pensate wives for their non-economic contribution and also allow
women redress against deserting husbands who default on eco-
nomic obligations—we would expect women to argue vigorously
in favor of divorce.13
This was not the case, however, even though, as I discussed in
chapter 2, Irish women are actively involved in politics. More sur-
prisingly, a significantly greater number of women than men op-
posed the amendment. At the end of the campaign, 64 percent of
women compared to 46 percent of men expressed their intention of
voting against divorce.14 This was so despite majority support
among women for divorce at the outset of the debate and in pre-
vious opinion polls, where equal numbers of men and women fa-
vored divorce; in one poll, for instance, 67 percent of men and 64
percent of women agreed that divorce should be permitted in cer-
tain circumstances.15 Therefore, while support for divorce as a
whole decreased from 61 percent at the outset of the campaign to
36 percent on referendum day, something also happened during the
course of the debate to affect a gender difference in attitudes to-
ward divorce.
It was not that women were disinterested or indifferent to the
proposed change. To the contrary, many women participated in the
campaign, but they did not articulate a distinct women's agenda
regarding marriage and divorce. The participation of organized
women was limited to the Council for the Status of Women (csw).
Established in 1973 and underwritten since 1980 by an annual gov-
ernment grant, the csw represents over seventy women's organiza-
tions, encompassing all shades of political opinion and including
professional, trade union, farming, health, educational, feminist,
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social activist, and religious groups. Its main role is to provide a
central information resource for women and women's organiza-
tions and to lobby on agreed policies regarding all aspects of Irish
life. The csw is expressly committed to considering any legislative
proposals of concern to women and to representing women's views
on matters of public concern.16
Regarding the amendment, the csw welcomed the referendum
and the government's divorce proposals, stating: "The Council is
convinced that divorce legislation on the lines outlined by the Gov-
ernment will be of immense advantage to those women for whom
it will be a merciful release from the prison of a long dead mar-
riage. The Council therefore, urges everyone to vote in favour of
this referendum" [emphasis in original].17 It also emphatically re-
jected the argument that the divorce proposals would cause women
and children to suffer: "Divorce is a response to a situation not a
cause . . . . To suggest that women or children will begin to suffer if
divorce is introduced demonstrates ignorance and thoughtlessness
about the situation which already exists. It is unacceptable that
people in an unhappy marriage should be obliged to stay together
through financial pressures even if they wish to part" [emphasis in
original].18 A public meeting held by the csw two days prior to ref-
erendum day addressed the impact of the divorce proposals on so-
cial welfare and legal entitlements and countered, in particular, the
anti-divorce argument that deserted or separated women would
lose their social welfare benefits with divorce.19 The csw took issue
also with the "degrading image of women being portrayed by the
anti-divorce lobby," arguing:
To suggest that this amendment will impoverish women is untrue. Impov-
erishment of women exists because our society relegates women to a sub-
ordinate role and, in marriage, to a dependent status in which society
continues to ignore the lack of legal and economic equality which all
women should have by right... . Listening to recent statements made by
the anti-divorce lobby, one would be forgiven for thinking that all women
in Ireland are extraordinarily passive creatures, unable to sustain mar-
riages if divorce legislation exists, and who are married to men likely to
abandon them at a moment's notice.20
Importantly, however, as the sole national representative body
of the various women's organizations in Ireland, the csw did not
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engage in an activist role during the debate. Although it expressed
its endorsement of the amendment, it did not actively campaign in
its favor. It did not, for instance, organize a nationwide canvassing
campaign or lobby women through advertising or the mass media
to endorse the proposals. In short, it adopted a very low profile
during the debate.
The stance adopted by the csw during the debate, despite its
supportive endorsement of the amendment, underscored its func-
tion as an administrative organization for women's groups rather
than an active national women's lobby.21 Because of the social and
ideological diversity of its affiliate membership, it appears that the
csw does not have the de facto legitimacy to speak on behalf of all
women or to organize a national grassroots campaign in support of
a particular demand (in this case, either pro- or anti-divorce) when
a controversial question affecting women and society at large is at
stake. Consequently, although the divorce referendum represented
the first occasion in the history of the state when an issue with ma-
jor implications for women was open to resolution by public vote,
the csw did not canvass on the issue nor actively articulate the im-
plications of divorce for women.
With the csw's disengagement from active participation in the
debate and their recalcitrance to articulate publicly a cohesive po-
sition addressing women's interests and divorce, the same protag-
onists who argued the case in general, activists and politicians,
were the ones who most specifically focused on women and di-
vorce. Let us look first at the anti-divorce arguments.
The Anti-Divorce Campaign
As was the case in the ADC'S overall campaign, the main emphasis
was placed on issues of economics, with the impoverishment of
women one of the central motifs of the anti-divorce discourse.
From the outset of the campaign, the ADC'S William Binchy argued
that divorce would negatively affect married women by depriving
them of their existing marital economic rights—the right to suc-
cession, maintenance, and the family home.22 With posters stating,
"This amendment will impoverish women: Vote NO!" the ADC ac-
centuated this theme throughout the debate.23
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The ADC argued that dependents from the first marriage would
have no claim on the economic resources of the husband/father. Ac-
cordingly they would suffer a sharp decline in their standard of liv-
ing and in many instances become dependent on the state for basic
social welfare payments. In short, the ADC argued that divorce was
not a viable option for dealing with marital breakdown because it
would propel women and children into poverty, a claim they sup-
ported by drawing on evidence from other countries, for example:
"in Britain 60% of women who get a divorce go straight on to so-
cial welfare.... 88% of low income parents are women. 63% of
that 88% of low income parents are divorced women."24
Do Women Want Divorce?
Opponents of divorce did not deny that marital breakdown was a
problem in Irish society. What they took issue with was both the
alleged extent of the problem and the wisdom of dealing with it by
introducing divorce.25 The ADC contended that many deserted and
separated women themselves did not want to divorce and remarry,
nor did they favor the introduction of divorce into society.26 It was
necessary for women in other jurisdictions to initiate divorce pro-
ceedings, they argued, precisely because unlike the state provision
of welfare benefits for deserted women in Ireland, in countries
where divorce is available, filing for divorce is the only possible
way in which women whose marriages have broken down can get
financial support. Thus Bernadette Bonar argued: "At the point
where a woman seeks divorce her husband has already gone off and
left her to set up home with somebody else. And this is the only
legal channel open to her to try and get maintenance [and] the fam-
ily home.. . . But don't forget that the men just don't pay mainte-
nance to their wives. 60% of them in England go straight onto
social welfare. And in America, 85% of men, even after a court or-
der, refuse to pay maintenance to their wives."27 Also of impor-
tance, Bonar argued, was the divorced woman's loss of social
status: "Divorce . . . will take all status from the [deserted] woman.
As it is she feels she has a husband even though he is not living with
her. His position is going to be made legal and respectable and she
will be left with no hope of any sort."28
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The threat of the hopelessness of being a divorced woman, of be-
coming a "non-person," was further reinforced by the ADC'S slo-
gan, "You could be forced to divorce: Vote NO!" Specifically
targeted at women, it emphasized that divorce would allow the fur-
ther exploitation of their already vulnerable status as dependents of
their husbands. Reiterating the anti-divorce position, law professor
Mary McAleese argued that divorce would mean state approval of
"a man who leaves his wife and children so that he can be happier
with another woman."29
Gender Discrimination
While the ADC emphasized the traditional view of women as de-
pendent solely on marriage for social and personal as well as eco-
nomic status, importantly, they linked this to the structurally
unequal position of women in Irish society and highlighted the
problems caused for women as a result of sexual inequality. It was
precisely because of gender discrimination, the ADC argued, that
women needed to be protected from the consequences of divorce.
Rather than allowing themselves to be depicted as being against the
rights of women, the ADC conveyed a strong message that it was
pro-woman to be anti-divorce.
The ADC argued that because of the sexual discrimination in so-
ciety, the state's legal support for marriage as a lifelong commit-
ment was the best way in which to compensate women for the
discrimination they confronted. William Binchy argued: "There
are inequalities in society and there is sex discrimination. Divorce,
in a society where there is such sex discrimination and sex inequal-
ity in terms of opportunity, would yield a massive increase in need-
less hardship for precisely the categories that you or I would wish
to protect. The woman who is older, who has sacrificed her career
by rearing a family within the home, the woman who is younger
who has children. These two categories, studies throughout the
world have shown again and again, are the categories that have
been hit hardest by the introduction of divorce based on failure of
a marriage."30 From the perspective of the ADC, therefore, the cur-
rent unequal position of married women as dependent wives would
be undermined further by divorce because it would remove the le-
gal protection and social status offered married women.
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Fianna Fail parliamentarians echoed the ADC stress on the neg-
ative economic effects of divorce on women.31 Their education
spokesperson, Mary O'Rourke, acknowledged the suffering of
many women in broken marriages and women's changing expec-
tations regarding marriage and work. Arguing, however, that the
divorce question was ultimately about balancing the traumatic ef-
fects of marital breakdown against the stability of marriage in so-
ciety as a whole, she contended that the divorce proposals were not
"for the betterment of society,"32 a position reiterated in the Senate
by her Fianna Fail colleague, Tras Honan.33
The range of arguments put forward regarding the negative con-
sequences of divorce on women was best summarized by Alice
Glenn of Fine Gael, whose active opposition to divorce highlighted
the legitimation difficulties that Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald's
divorce agenda confronted. At the time of the referendum, Glenn
represented a predominantly working-class Dublin electoral con-
stituency and was noted for her conservatism and outspokenness
on social issues. From the outset of the debate she expressed strong
opposition to divorce, in particular to its negative consequences for
women.34 Contributing one of the most graphic arguments against
divorce, Glenn contended that: "any woman voting for divorce is
like a turkey voting for Christmas" [emphasis mine].35 This was be-
cause, as Glenn elaborated:
No account is taken of the woman who is discarded. The woman will be
the victim of this legislation, the cast aside spouse. . .. women are denied
succession rights but the position as regards family home protection is self
evident. If a husband leaves his wife and children, what family home are
we talking about? Reason would suggest that the family home is that of the
second liaison. The Constitution is to protect the family but a woman cast
aside is not a family. She becomes a non-person. She loses all protection
under the Constitution. The wife and children are diminished but the op-
posite happens to the male. He will have formed an alliance with some-
body in the workforce who is bringing in plenty of money. That is all he is
interested in [emphasis mine].36
While a crude metaphor, the meaning of Glenn's remarks was
clear and underscored the image of women as victims in need of
protection, the theme that pervaded the anti-divorce discourse as
a whole.
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It was, apparently, as evinced by the decline in support for di-
vorce among women, an effective image. Why was this anti-divorce
message so persuasive? What is it about the substance of the argu-
ments that might explain the shift in women's attitudes to divorce?
Appeal to Women's Traditional Role
The women-related themes of the anti-divorce discourse ensured
their appeal to a broadly based constituency. The arguments con-
tained themes that spoke to the values embodied by the traditional
notion of lifelong marriage, and they were also relevant to a large
segment because the economic thrust of the discourse focused on
women's objective status as "dependents." Relating to the actual
situation of the majority of Irish women, opponents of divorce
framed women's identity as being inextricably linked to marriage;
thus, a woman's status was dependent on her role as wife and
homemaker and was not related to engagement in the public
sphere. Within this framework, they argued that divorce would
mean the loss not just of economic but of social and personal sta-
tus. Divorced women would become "non-persons." Positioning
themselves on the side of women who are full-time housewives/
mothers, opponents of divorce stressed the inequities and injustices
that divorce would mean for such women by its undermining of
lifelong marriage and how, consequently, their vulnerability would
be further exploited. As Family Solidarity argued: "The family oc-
cupies a central position in society so the State has a right and duty
to watch over it and give it special care and protection. As our so-
ciety developed, marriage laws were introduced, out of compassion
and in the interest of justice, to help the weaker and more vulner-
able members of the family, the women and children especially"
[emphasis mine].37
Out of expressed concern for dependent wives and their role in
preserving the family, those arguing against divorce contended that
the State should continue to protect legally marriage as a lifelong
institution. In their view, when women depend on marriage for
economic, social, and personal status, marriage as a lifelong, irre-
vocable commitment is the only guarantee they have that their
personhood will be legitimated. In sum, anti-divorce advocates op-
posed divorce because: "Divorce takes all status away from the
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woman. . . . Women will be the victims of [divorce] .. . woman
will be the cast aside spouse.... The woman cast aside becomes a
non-person" [emphasis mine].38
Women's victimization, therefore, was a central theme in the
anti-divorce discourse. The pervasiveness of this motif extends well
beyond being just an Irish phenomenon, however. It is an image
that is also found in political debates in America. Documenting its
use among American anti-abortion activists, Faye Ginsburg notes
that the frame of women as victim fits into a long historical pattern
in which the biological, social, and cultural bases of gender differ-
ences were seen by women as the only way in which to activate sup-
port or maintain state protection for women's structurally
vulnerable position.39 As she explains: "The themes expressed by
right-to-life activists in the contemporary abortion controversy—
the dangers of male lust, and the protection of the weak against the
depredations of self-interest unleashed—are similar to concerns
voiced by women activists in America over the past two centuries.
They have been most prominent in female-led moral reform move-
ments. . . . These movements emerged with the material and cul-
tural separation of wage and domestic labor that came to be
identified as male and female arenas of activity."40 Importantly,
Ginsburg further observes that the current use of the theme of fe-
male nurturance in opposition to male self-interest is applied not
just against males, as it was historically, but also against those
women who appear to have eschewed their dependent and nurtur-
ing roles in the pursuit of non-domestic interests.41
The debate over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) has also
been construed as a conflict over women's role. Those campaigning
against the ERA claimed that its passing would mean that women
would be treated on an equal basis to men, thus delegitimating
their need for special protection. "What was at stake in the battle
over the ERA was the legitimacy of women's claim on men's
incomes,"42 an inevitable source of tension once some women
work in the labor force and some remain full-time housewives.43
Presenting women as victims, therefore, is to argue for the tra-
ditional definition of woman's role as an economically dependent,
full-time mother and homemaker. It is a paternalistic argument
that maintains that woman's "natural" nurturing role needs to be
protected from those who undermine it: economically independent
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women engaged in the public sphere; men who default on their re-
sponsibilities toward women; and "male" laws, which exploit wo-
men's vulnerability.44
William Binchy's attempt then to use the status of women to ar-
gue against divorce, was, despite the qualifications to his argu-
ment, sexist. It was not sexist because it raised the possibility of
gender differences but because no serious attempt was ever made to
distinguish which of these differences were due to temporal, cul-
tural, and historical circumstances. Equally, there was no attempt
made to come up with remedies that would alleviate the "vulner-
abilities" of women and thus set the stage for the implementation
of a non-fault based divorce. Rather, sexual inequality, his dis-
avowal to the contrary, was represented as natural, inevitable, and
a just reason for insistence on "legal lifelong marriage and women's
dependent status within it."
The forceful authority of Binchy's argument emanated, ulti-
mately, not from his acknowledgment of sexism in Irish society
but from its direct compatibility with the sexism in Irish society.
Although the theme of women's victimization has universal appeal
because of the historical subjugation of women, such an argument
would appear to have greater salience in Ireland, where the disem-
powerment of women and their economic dependence is far greater
than in the United States. In Ireland, the vast majority of married
women are dependent economically on their husbands. Only a
small number, 21 percent, are engaged in the labor force, com-
pared to 56 percent of married women in the United States and 42
percent in the European Community as a whole.45 Notwithstand-
ing their image in literature and film, which, rightly, presents Irish
women as strong characters, the centers of initiative and industry,
undaunted by cruel fate, it is no accident that they tend to be por-
trayed as holding forth only in the domestic domain.46 Reflecting
deeply embedded cultural attitudes regarding the role of women
and the remnants of structural barriers against their economic par-
ticipation, the life chances of the majority of Irish women revolve
around marriage and domesticity, an arrangement that is the ex-
pressed preference of a majority of Irish married men.47
Thus while the economic emphasis in the anti-divorce discourse
in general was powerful because of the cultural sensitivity of the
Irish to economics, its importance was further accentuated when
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the focus shifted to women. Stressing the negative economic con-
sequences of divorce for women—its exploitation and victimiza-
tion of their de facto economic dependence—was fully grounded in
the immediate economically dependent situation of women, for
many of whom legal lifelong marriage is a necessary "protection"
against their currently unequal status. The ADC arguments ap-
pealed to this reality, exploited it, and reinforced it, without ever
attempting to remedy it in an active fashion other than preserving
the status quo.
Another reason why the ADC arguments were powerful is be-
cause they reinforced the disposition advocated by the Church. The
consonance between the ADC'S arguments and the Church's teach-
ing on the indissolubility of lifelong marriage was likely to carry
greater force with women. Women's socialization, as argued by
Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan, predisposes women to
greater emphasis on other-orientation and communal investment.48
This is reinforced in Irish society by women's historical role as the
moral guardians of the family and its stability. Irish women are
thus accustomed to subsuming their personal interests to those of
family considerations. Moreover, Irishwomen's greater participa-
tion in Church activities and their greater confidence in the
Church's teaching would enhance their predisposition toward the
ADC'S emphasis on lifelong marriage.49 Here again, therefore, we
see how women's socialization and cultural experiences would have
made them more impressed by the anti-divorce message.
For Irishwomen to vote in favor of divorce, would demand their
going against powerful forces: the traditional social and economic
structures within which lifelong marriage and women's status are
embedded, the moral authority of the Church, and other-oriented
socialization patterns that find further support in Irish society be-
cause of the underemphasis on individual rights. Given the forces
that divorce was challenging then, what kinds of arguments did its
advocates articulate in making divorce seem like an attractive op-
tion for women and advantageous to their situation?
The Divorce Action Group
The main argument of the Divorce Action Group was that women
want divorce, and DAG activists repeatedly expressed confidence
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that women in particular would endorse the amendment.50 DAG in-
voked legitimacy for its case by arguing that the proposals were
supported by the various groups who have campaigned on behalf
of women's rights in Ireland. Thus Jean Tansey argued: "All of the
women's organizations who have fought for women over the
years . . . are behind this divorce legislation. And I think it is pos-
sibly because women know that within a marriage they are more
vulnerable, emotionally and financially . . . and they recognise the
need to have a right to a recognition that a marriage has failed and
that they want to have another chance."51 Taking issue with the
passive, dependent image of women presented by opponents of di-
vorce, Jean Tansey accused them of portraying "the image of
women as spineless creatures who are in marriage only because
there is a marriage certificate there, and once divorce is permitted,
that women would be rejected."52
As evidence that women favored divorce, its advocates argued
that in other countries it was primarily women who initiated di-
vorce proceedings, thus indicating their desire to be freed from the
binds of an unhappy marital relationship.53 As Tansey explained,
women favored divorce because its introduction could not possibly
make deserted or separated women worse off economically than
they were presently. Divorce, according to the DAG, would acceler-
ate and make more equitable the process whereby property and ma-
terial resources are divided. Consequently, as DAG maintained: "It
is women who are saying to us that they want to have divorce. It is
women who are deserted by men and left penniless.... This
amendment is pro-women."54
The Political Parties
In keeping with the pattern of their general stance, the politicians
supporting divorce all argued that divorce would benefit women.
Like the DAG, pro-divorce politicians maintained that because cur-
rently many deserted wives live in poor economic circumstances
and many separated women voluntarily surrender their succession
rights, the proposed divorce legislation would strengthen their eco-
nomic status.55 It was Garret FitzGerald who most forcefully ar-
gued that divorce would enhance the rights of women. In a final
statement to the electorate on the eve of polling day, he specifically
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assured women that divorce would protect their interests, and he
appealed to them to vote in favor of the amendment. FitzGerald
passionately implored:
Can we say "no" to our people whose marriages have failed? I say we must
be more generous. I ask this particularly of the women of Ireland. Over the
course of the campaign many of you have been led to believe that a "yes"
vote would be a vote against the interests of women. I guarantee you this
is not the case. The opposite is true. If it were not, I would never have been
associated with this proposal. A "yes" vote will, in fact, lead to the
strengthening of the position of wives—giving them property rights that
they do not now have in the family home.. . . A "yes" vote will give those
women and children who are presently trapped in unhappy situations a
choice. I believe they deserve this choice.56
In view of the feminist tradition of framing divorce as central to
women's equality and in light of the low profile of the Council for
the Status of Women in calling for divorce, it seems reasonable to
expect some spokeswomen to emerge as representatives of women's
interests and divorce. What was the role of women politicians dur-
ing the debate? And did any women elites, academics or journalists,
for instance, argue for divorce on women's behalf?
Women Parliamentarians
Women members of the government and other pro-divorce political
parties, as well as nonparty independent senators, all argued vig-
orously in favor of divorce. Nuala Fennell, the minister of state for
women's affairs and a long-time campaigner for women's rights,
declared that the divorce proposals would "for the first time . . .
provide a charter of rights for women in the event of marital
breakdown."57 Opening the Senate debate on divorce, she argued
that one of the central aims of the divorce proposals was to ensure
that "the interests of dependent spouses and children were as fully
protected as possible." Fennell emphasized that the proposed leg-
islation empowered the courts, in determining property rights and
maintenance payments, to recognize the relevant circumstances of
the divorcing couple and in particular, to take account of the de-
pendent wife's contribution to the family,58 while the minister for
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social welfare, Gemma Hussey, reaffirmed that women would not
lose their social welfare benefits with divorce.59
Fennell, Hussey, and others reiterated the argument of their male
colleagues that the existing domestic relations legislation was in-
adequate in protecting the rights of married women, thus enabling
divorce to enhance women's economic position. This position was
most forcefully articulated by Fine Gael back-bencher, Monica
Barnes, an active feminist and a representative from Ireland's most
liberal electoral constituency, Dun Laoghaire, the borough south of
Dublin city. Barnes drew attention to the limitations of the existing
benefits that anti-divorce advocates were arguing protected mar-
ried women. She argued:
Women... consider that the Family Home Protection Act is one of the
most important protections they have been given. People have bleated here
about the family home of the first wife of a marriage and her children.
They probably do not even realise that that Act protects a woman only to
the extent that without written consent by her the home cannot be
sold.. . . if she is not in joint ownership of the home, no matter how many
years she has given to the home and the family, legally she is not entitled to
a penny from the price of that house. Neither, legally is she entitled to any
part of the contents of the family home unless she can prove that finan-
cially and independently she paid for such property.60
Barnes highlighted the especially vulnerable economic circum-
stances of women whose marriages have broken down and who
have formed new nonlegal relationships. These were the women,
she contended, who needed to be given greater legal protection;
protection, she maintained, that would come only if the form of di-
vorce being proposed by the government was accepted. Thus she
argued: "Take the case of a deserted wife who forms a new liaison
and has a second family. As it stands at present she has no right to
support from her new partner. She cannot claim maintenance nor
succeed to his estate when he dies. The Succession Act does not en-
ter into it. She has no rights under the Family Home Protection Act.
She cannot obtain a Barring Order in the event of violence to her or
her children. If deserted she is not entitled to deserted wife's benefit
or allowance. If he dies she is not entitled to a widow's pension."61
The issue of constitutional protection for women and families
was also a major part of Senator Mary Robinson's lengthy contri-
Women and the Divorce Campaign 85
bution to the parliamentary debate. Arguing that there was an ur-
gent need for greater legislative protection and support for women
involved in marital breakdown, she, too, elaborated on the short-
comings that deserted and separated women encounter in the
present legislative situation.62 A similar stance was taken by re-
nowned family lawyer Senator Catherine McGuinness, who gave
special emphasis to women's loss of succession and other rights in
separation and nullity cases.63
Emphasizing the changing expectations and role of women in
Irish society, pro-divorce women politicians attacked the "scare-
mongering" and "anti-women" claims of the anti-divorce lobby.64
Presenting themselves as the defenders of women's emotional and
material interests, they took issue with the dependent and passive
image of women depicted by anti-divorce campaigners. In this re-
gard, they were sharply critical of Glenn's "turkey" metaphor and
denounced it as insulting to Irish women. The criticisms expressed
by Mary Harney of the Progressive Democrats typified the range of
reactions. She stated:
I reject this and feel insulted that women are treated like this in this House
[Parliament] and in this country on matters of this kind. It is degrading; it
is offensive; it is insulting to Irish women and I hope that throughout this
debate people will refrain from discussing women in this way and from
implying that this legislation will make women and children suffer more
than they have suffered over recent years as a result of the kind of legis-
lation we have.. . . Women are generally supposed to be the moral guard-
ians of all that is right and proper and, if something goes wrong, it has to
be the fault of a woman.65
Women Academics
Academics in Ireland for the most part do not actively engage in
public debates on social or political questions. The context depen-
dency of knowledge notwithstanding, a fairly strict distinction is
maintained between personal beliefs and analytic discourse. And
while some professors have a relatively high public profile, their
contributions tend to represent detached analysis rather than
dialogic exchange. During the divorce debate, as with previous is-
sues, a number of academics publicly expressed support for the
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amendment.66 Women were not at the forefront in this, however,
even though there is a vibrant women's studies community in Irish
academia. Two women law professors who were active in the cam-
paign, Senator Mary Robinson and Mary McAleese, were active
independent of their academic position and were already identified
partisans on divorce, expressing pro- and anti-divorce arguments
respectively.67
As I noted above, Mary McAleese, basically echoing the argu-
ments of the Anti-Divorce Campaign, warned women of the threat
posed by divorce to their economic status. Arguing for divorce,
Mary Robinson grounded her position in a discussion of Irish con-
stitutional law and its recognition of the inalienable and impre-
scriptible rights of the family.68 Emphasizing that family rights
come into being on marriage but are not dependent on the subsis-
tence of the marriage to continue, Robinson argued that divorce
would not terminate the family rights of spouses and children. She
acknowledged the concerns expressed regarding dependent wives'
loss of legal protection with divorce but maintained that proposed
changes in legislation and in the social welfare code should "ensure
that there will be no economic loss."69
Women Columnists
The comments of the women columnists in the national press,
Mary Holland and Nuala O'Faolain of the Irish Times and Nell
McCafferty of the Irish Press, all well-known Irish feminists and
advocates of women's rights, were distinctive for the paucity of re-
marks specifically discussing divorce and women. Out of four ar-
ticles written on the amendment by Mary Holland, for example,
only one referred to women's situation. What the columnists said,
nevertheless, spoke directly to the issue of women's inequality in
Irish society.
Nell McCafferty took a humorous approach to the divorce ques-
tion. Teasing as to what would be the story resolution of "Dallas,"
the soap opera, and the outcome of the Irish divorce referendum,
McCafferty drew out the moral message of "Dallas" and its rele-
vance to the divorce debate: "If Dallas preaches anything, it
preaches this—children come first, their mothers will be financially
taken care of, and their fathers will never desert their posts, come
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separation, nullity or divorce, even though America has no consti-
tutional provision regarding the rights of women as mothers" [un-
like the Irish constitution].
Continuing to point at Irish hypocrisy in relation to official
proclamations regarding the sanctity of motherhood, McCafferty
challenged anti-divorce campaigners "who go on about the consti-
tutional rights of mothers being under threat" to show how the
state, in line with its constitutional commitment to protect wom-
en's economic situation, would be successfully forced to pay moth-
ers for their work in the home.70 In a later article, McCafferty
called the Church's preference for nullity rather than divorce an old
"feminist solution to an Irish problem"—in practice, the abolition
of marriage and private property and collective responsibility for
child-rearing.71 So, although clearly tongue-in-cheek, Nell McCaf-
ferty forcefully communicated her disregard for the inconsistencies
in the anti-divorce platform.
The message from the Irish Times' columnists was more ambiv-
alent. Commenting on the apparent success of anti-divorce cam-
paign slogans such as "This amendment will impoverish women"
and "You could be divorced against your will," Mary Holland ar-
gued that these "were aimed at women with children who are wor-
ried not just about property but about their place in the community
generally." Without elaboration, she commented: "It tells us some-
thing desperately sad about the situation of women in Ireland to-
day that such slogans should have had a major impact on the
debate." Holland warned that the reality and implications of mar-
ital breakdown would have to be eventually confronted and that
the divorce issue, "unlike abortion, cannot be pushed out of sight
on the Liverpool boat" [one means by which Irishwomen travel to
England in order to have an abortion].72
The status of women in Ireland was explicated more bluntly by
Nuala O'Faolain, Holland's colleague at the Times. Themes evi-
dent in O'Faolain's remarks during the divorce debate were the
overemphasis in Irish society on the sanctity of motherhood and
the family and the obeisance of Irish women to the Church.73
Grounding her argument in a forceful and compassionate critique
of the economically and socially impoverished circumstances which
many married women experience, O'Faolain denounced the inher-
ent anti-woman bias of marriage and argued that divorce would be
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no better: "The great majority of women subsisting on the De-
serted Wives Allowance, or cowering behind barring orders . . .
have little to gain and much to lose by entering into the kind of
transactions the proposed divorce legislation would entail.... In
any case, divorce is about remarriage. It was marriage that did
them in the first place—marriage as a social imprimatur for having
the children. It is rearing the children that makes them powerless.
They always got less out of marriage than the blokes."
Explaining why women might be acting in their own self-interest
by opposing divorce, O'Faolain stated: "Women, particularly, are
facing the demise both of the unchallenged status of wifehood and
of the implicit security of an indissoluble marriage. They have to
have security somehow, for the years in which they bear and rear
the race. Using a man's income was never the best way of doing
this, but there aren't many other likely alternatives." O'Faolain's was
the only voice in the debate that noted that women's lives are fun-
damentally different to men's because of women's "nurturing re-
sponsibilities," a difference, she suggested, that makes "their view
of their purpose different from men's, even in ideal marriages."74
But this sensitivity to the institutionalization of gender differ-
ence was not used by O'Faolain or by others, including the Council
for the Status of Women, to demarcate systematically women's in-
terests with regard to the divorce proposals at issue. Although
women politicians and the DAG under Jean Tansey's leadership
argued adamantly that divorce would favor women, they did not
engage women in forceful, consciousness-raising discourse on di-
vorce. Nor did women academics or journalists—despite the strong
feminist credentials that can be found among both groups—advo-
cate a women's agenda on divorce.
Women, in short, did not present themselves as a cohesive bloc
during the divorce campaign.75 In a debate dominated by male
voices—both the pro- and anti-divorce platforms were led by men,
Garret FitzGerald and William Binchy, respectively—there was no
attempt either by the csw or pro-divorce activists and politicians to
organize women as a distinct constituency or to coordinate a uni-
fied women's voice that would have challenged the status quo. Or-
ganized women as an independent lobby were absent similarly
from the earlier abortion and contraception debates and from na-
tional economic debates where the interests of farmers, industrial
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employers, and trade unionists predominate. Unlike the concerns of
other interest groups in Ireland, women's interests as women seem
to get mediated, or indeed marginalized, by larger issues such as
with divorce, the greater value of the family, or with abortion, the
greater value of prenatal life. The peripheralization of women's
voices was well illustrated during the 1983 pro-life amendment de-
bate, where, from their public contributions to the debate, groups
of lawyers and medical doctors, and even the farming organiza-
tions, appeared to have a greater stake in the outcome of the ref-
erendum than did women.
The pro-divorce case was clearly hindered by the absence of an
independent activist women's group that would have moderated
the debate and raised consciousness regarding the benefits that
would accrue to women with divorce. While the message of wom-
en's equality articulated by pro-divorce advocates might ultimately
be an appealing one, it was not forceful enough to provide a coun-
terpoint to the sexist, anti-divorce arguments of Binchy and others.
For a link to be forged between divorce and women's equality, es-
pecially in light of the formidable social, economic, and moral
structures that maintain women's traditional status in Irish society,
it is not enough for a pro-divorce message to be verbalized by a few
women. Some channel through which to target women's conscious-
ness as women appears necessary.
This would entail the constitution of a clearly identified wom-
en's organization that has the authority—unlike the csw because
of the ideological diversity of its broad based affiliate member-
ship—to articulate publicly a cohesive women's rights discourse
and, as part of this, to pursue actively and systematically a pro-
divorce agenda. Such a group cannot just express support for di-
vorce; they must canvass and use campaign strategies that show
consistency with their expressed belief in the value of divorce for
women. A group that would have the organizational capability to
do this effectively cannot be expected to emerge spontaneously
once a divorce referendum is announced. Unlike the sprouting of
the Anti-Divorce Campaign, there is little affinity between Irish
values and an ad hoc organization that would emerge to challenge
the inevitability of women's dependent role.
Given the absence both of an activist women's organization and
a distinct women's agenda in the debate, coupled with the cultural
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and socioeconomic experiences of Irishwomen, perhaps it is not so
surprising that women did not vote for divorce, which, if imple-
mented, threatened, as its opponents contended, to delegitimate
women's status in the home and exploit further their dependent
"vulnerability".
CHAPTER FIVE
The Catholic Church
and the Referendum
It is both easy and tempting to try to explain the failure of the di-
vorce referendum by pointing to the Catholic church's opposition
to divorce. After all, Ireland is among the most Catholic of Western
countries, with a well-developed parish system where 87 percent of
its predominantly Catholic population attend Mass weekly and
participate regularly in other Church rituals and activities.1 Any-
one who has read James Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young
Man will have no doubt as to the fervor and the vividly this-
worldly style of Irish Catholicism.2 Yet, to attribute the demise too
hurriedly to the Church would be both simplistic and an injustice
to the genuine moral and practical dilemma with which the refer-
endum confronted the Irish bishops.
Clearly, the issue of divorce is central to the teaching of the
Church and fits squarely and legitimately in its pastoral jurisdic-
tion. As we noted in chapter 2, during the Mother and Child con-
troversy the Church did not hesitate to take a direct and forceful
role in sociomoral debates. This was particularly true of the 1940s
and 1950s, when the Church explicated the incompetence of the
state to legislate public morality. Yet the role of the Church in re-
lation to the state in Ireland, as elsewhere, became much more
complex as a result of the great watershed event in the history of
the Church, the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).3
Under the visionary guidance first of Pope John XXIII, who
died in 1963 shortly after it was convened, and then his succes-
sor, Pope Paul VI, Vatican II enabled the Church to conduct a
"fundamental reappraisal of its doctrine, liturgy and relationship to
the world."4 Cardinals, bishops, theologians, and invited lay peo-
ple deliberated in Rome concerning moral and doctrinal issues, of-
ten in open dialogic disagreement, a dissent made public by the
92 Debating Divorce
journalists who managed to circumvent the limits imposed on the
press by the Council. Sweeping in the breadth of its changes, the
impact of Vatican II is most popularly associated with transforma-
tions in Church ritual, specifically concretized by the move from
the Latin to the vernacular (native language) Mass, relaxations in
Church rules regarding penitence, and in visibly significant changes
in the dress and lifestyle of nuns and priests.
Regarding issues of church-state relations, the Council officially
endorsed the autonomy and independence of each sphere and re-
jected the notion that the Church was entitled to give Catholics spe-
cific guidance in their activities as citizens.5 It also addressed the
issue of tolerance for diverse worldviews and beliefs and noted the
importance of personal conscience and its role in informing views
on sociomoral questions such as divorce.6 Of particular relevance
to Irish society, given the dominance of the Catholic church and the
formal constitutional recognition accorded it, the Council pointed
out that even if the circumstances of one country caused one reli-
gious denomination to receive special civil recognition, the rights
of other religious communities and citizens to religious freedom
should be acknowledged and made effective.7
Responding to changing times, evinced both by the new spirit of
openness within the larger Church and the increasing moderniza-
tion of Irish society, the Irish hierarchy adopted a different form of
self-presentation and discourse. The first evidence of a shifting and
more liberal position in the stance of the Irish Church on matters of
church and state can be seen in the early 1970s debate over
contraception.8 In 1973, for the first time, the bishops publicly ac-
knowledged the distinction between secular law and Catholic mo-
rality. Stating that it did not wish to intervene in the process of
government, the hierarchy argued that, even though the two
spheres may not always coincide, it was the duty of governments to
govern and of bishops to preach. In accordance with Vatican II, the
hierarchy pronounced that civil legislation and Catholic teaching
could be independent of each other.
The Irish Episcopal Conference declared: "The question at issue
is not whether artificial contraception is morally right or wrong.
The clear teaching of the Catholic Church is that it is morally
wrong. No change in State law can make the use of contraceptives
morally right, since what is wrong in itself remains wrong, regard-
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less of what State law says... . It does not follow, of course, that
the State is bound to prohibit the importation and sale of contra-
ceptives. There are many things which the Catholic Church holds
to be morally wrong and no one has ever suggested, least of all the
Church herself, that they should be prohibited by the State."9 This
position was clearly less dictatorial than their attitude two years
earlier when the bishops stated: "Civil law on these matters [con-
traception, abortion] should respect the wishes of the people who
elected the legislators, and the bishops confidently hope that the
legislators themselves will respect this important principle."10 A
few years later, in 1978, once again in a debate over contraception
legislation, the hierarchy repeated its declaration on the distinc-
tion between law and Catholic morality and argued further that:
"Those who insist on seeing the issue purely in terms of the State
enforcing or not enforcing, Catholic moral teaching . . . are missing
the point."11
But despite the collective statements of the hierarchy affirming
the autonomy of church and state, the occasion of the "pro-life"
referendum in 1983 found the hierarchy adopting a much more
tenuous position. Both the firmness of the hierarchy's commitment
to assuming a noninterventionist stance when moral legislation was
at issue, and the consensus among the bishops regarding noninter-
vention came into question. The hierarchy's position during that
debate directly deviated from the stance of previous statements af-
firming the autonomy of law and morality.
Although the bishops stated that they recognized "the right of
each person to vote according to conscience," at the same time,
they called for a "yes" vote, which they argued would "constitute
a 'witness before Europe and before the whole world to the dignity
and sacredness of all human life from conception to death.' "12
Notwithstanding the hierarchy's collective clear-cut endorsement
of the pro-life amendment, the then archbishop of Dublin, Dermot
Ryan, dissented and went one step further than his co-bishops. In
a separate personal statement he strongly advocated that people
vote "yes" and omitted any reference to freedom of individual
conscience.13 Three days later, however, on the Sunday before poll-
ing day, the hierarchy's spokesman, Bishop Joseph Cassidy of
Clonfert diocese, clarified that the bishops were "advising [Cath-
olics] strongly to vote 'yes,' " but also pointed out that "if they
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have a conscientious conviction that they cannot vote 'yes>' then
we acknowledge, fully acknowledge, their freedom in conscience
to do that."14
The most forceful articulation of the hierarchy's noninterven-
tionist stance was seen in 1984 on the occasion of official talks
concerning the future of Northern Ireland at the New Ireland
Forum,15 where the bishops' delegation declared: "The Catholic
Church in Ireland totally rejects the concept of a confessional State.
We have not sought and we do not seek a Catholic State for a Cath-
olic people. We believe that the alliance of Church and State is
harmful for the Church and harmful for the State. . . . We have re-
peatedly declared that we in no way seek to have the moral teach-
ing bf the Catholic Church become the criterion of constitutional
change or to have the principles of Catholic faith enshrined in civil
law."16 Keeping to this line of church/state differentiation, when
legislation was enacted in 1985 extending the provisions of the con-
traception law, the joint statement of the Conference of Bishops
stressed that artificial contraception was in itself morally wrong.
Significantly, the hierarchy did not go so far as to declare that it
was thus morally wrong for legislators to enact such legislation.
Once again, however, a number of bishops, including Archbishop
Kevin McNamara of Dublin, departed from the collegial stance es-
pousing autonomy between civil law and Catholic morality and ar-
gued instead that legislators should not make a false distinction
between private and public morality but should dutifully respect
Catholic teaching.17
The hierarchy's continuing affirmation of the autonomy of
church and state represents a new departure for the Church. How-
ever, the ambivalence of the bishops in adhering to a noninterven-
tionist stance, fueled, perhaps, by the conservatism of Pope John
Paul II,18 demonstrates the inevitable tension in the Church as to its
role in contemporary moral debates. Given that both the pro-life
and contraception debates saw the Catholic hierarchy vacillating
between an interventionist and noninterventionist attitude, its dis-
position toward divorce was far from predictable. Would the
Church continue to adhere to the Vatican II model, or would it re-
vert to its traditional interventionist mode? After all, the divorce
referendum presented for the first time in history an opportunity
for the Irish people to vote in favor of legislation that was contrary
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to Church teaching. How then would the Church defend its theo-
logical stance and what sorts of arguments would it use to present
its traditional teaching in an increasingly secular society? Would it
privilege the law of God or of science?
The same year (1985) that the bishops spoke with more than one
voice on the liberalization of the contraception legislation, the hi-
erarchy issued its definitive pastoral letter on marriage and the fam-
ily, Love Is for Life. Here again the bishops reiterated the
distinction between law and Catholic teaching. They stated: "The
Catholic Church teaches that remarriage following divorce is im-
possible; but it does not follow from this alone that the laws of the
State must embody this principle. Legislators have many consider-
ations to bear in mind when they are drafting or enacting legisla-
tion. . . . We do not ask that Catholic doctrine as such be enshrined
in law. We recognise that morality and civil law do not necessarily
coincide."19
Similarly, in April 1986, when the bishops' delegation met with
Garret FitzGerald for consultations about changes in the status of
divorce, they reaffirmed their formal commitment to the distinc-
tion between law and Catholic morality.20 Testifying to how far the
position of the hierarchy on moral questions had come to deviate
from its pre-Vatican II interventionist stance, the hierarchy's
spokesman, Bishop Cassidy, emphasized that "the Taoiseach [prime
minister] had not sought the advice of the Catholic bishops on
whether or not to hold a referendum.... Nor would the episcopal
delegation give advice on a matter which was entirely a political de-
cision" [emphasis mine].21
This position was reiterated the day after the referendum was
announced. Appearing on RTE'S "Today Tonight," Bishop Cassidy
was emphatic that "the Church will not participate in the cam-
paign as such because I don't particularly like the word campaign.
Because I think it has, well, unhappy overtones. It suggests that we
will be holding public meetings and other platforms and knocking
at doors" [emphasis mine].22
Challenged by the interviewer, John Bowman, that "there are
public meetings every Sunday at which people assemble, i.e., Mass,
and the priest speaks from the pulpit," Bishop Cassidy responded
that "inevitably it would have to be part of pulpit preaching. The
pulpit will be used but not abused." But while adhering to a
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separation of church and state, the hierarchy did not abrogate its
pastoral role "to teach Catholics the truth of the faith, teach her
members what Christ taught about marriage, and to teach her
members the social and moral implications of any piece of legisla-
tion, including divorce.... We don't dictate to people. We have no
right to dictate but we have no option but to teach."23
So, while Bishop Cassidy stated definitively that the bishops
would not participate in the campaign, that politics is the domain
of politicians, at the same time, he reaffirmed their pastoral duty to
alert Catholics to the moral and social implications of divorce.
From the outset, therefore, there was clearly a tension in the hier-
archy's position between political nonintervention and pastoral
teaching. To see how this tension was played out during the debate,
let us turn first to the bishops.
Bishops
Three days after the announcement of the government's divorce
proposals the four Irish archbishops—Thomas O'Fee of Armagh,
Kevin McNamara of Dublin, Thomas Morris of Cashel, and Jo-
seph Cunnane of Tuam—issued a preliminary statement on behalf
of the hierarchy in which they reiterated the noninterventionist po-
sition. They welcomed some of the proposed changes, those, for in-
stance, that were aimed at supporting marriage, even though they
found it regrettable that "they are linked with the introduction of
a divorce law."24 Nonetheless, they continued their remarks by as-
serting that "the fundamental law of the State is a matter for the
people and it is right that the people should have an opportunity to
speak on a matter of this importance."
Later in the campaign, the hierarchy as a whole, after its sea-
sonal episcopal meeting at Maynooth College on June 11, fifteen
days prior to polling day, issued a joint statement on the referen-
dum and the specific divorce proposals. In their statement, envis-
aged by the hierarchy as providing the framework for individual
clerical preaching on the amendment, the bishops acknowledged
that legislators "have to take account of the convictions of those
who do not accept the teaching of the Catholic Church.... They
have to try to give citizens the maximum freedom which is consis-
tent with the common good." And, importantly, they emphasized
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that: "The ultimate decision rests with the people."25 At a press
conference after their meeting, Bishop Cassidy clarified that a
Catholic with an informed conscience could vote "yes" to divorce.
He explained that if Catholics made a "reflective, prayerful, con-
scientious decision"—one which would "take full account of all of
the issues involved . . . it must take into account those who will be
the inevitable casualties of divorce"26—they would not incur moral
fault. When asked by a reporter if the Catholic church was not im-
posing its views of marriage on non-Catholics, Bishop Cassidy in-
sisted that the Church did not want "a theocracy or government by
bishops and priests."27
Thus throughout the debate there appeared to be an attempt by
the hierarchy as a collectivity to adhere to the noninterventionist
stance that it espoused on the amendment. Not all of the bishops
agreed, however, that the question of making changes in the di-
vorce law was "entirely a political decision." Once again, as in pre-
vious debates, individual bishops deviated from the collegial
position. Four days after the hierarchy issued its collective state-
ment acknowledging the right of Catholics to vote with good con-
science in favor of divorce, the existence of internal dissension
within the hierarchy came to the fore. Bishop Dominic Conway of
Elphin diocese cautioned people against interpreting the hierar-
chy's statement "too loosely." He stressed that Catholics could not
vote as they liked, but, because it was a "serious conscientious de-
cision," people needed to ask if the decision was "in accordance
with the law of God."28 Following this, the hierarchy's spokesman,
Bishop Cassidy, emphasized that the original collegial statement
was emphatically against divorce and pointed out that recognition
of the right to vote according to conscience must not obscure the
fact that the bishops had offered "positive guidance" on divorce.29
Statements issued by a number of other bishops preceding poll-
ing day and read to diocesanal congregations further highlighted
intra-Church ambiguity and tension. Archbishop McNamara of
Dublin, the largest and most urban diocese, was the most vocal op-
ponent of divorce. Throughout the debate he repeatedly stressed
that the introduction of divorce legislation had no basis in Catholic
social and moral doctrine and could not be reconciled with "God's
plan for the family and society, or with God's 'no' to divorce."30
Other bishops, similarly reflecting the strong association in Irish
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society between Catholic teaching and civil legislation, found it
necessary to emphasize that voting in favor of divorce, or the sub-
sequent introduction of divorce, was contrary to Catholic moral
teaching. Bishop Diarmuid O'Sullivan of Kerry stressed that "civil
divorce and remarriage were against the teachings of Christ... if
divorce were introduced, the words 'until death do us part' would
mean in civil law 'until divorce do us part.' "31 Or, as more force-
fully phrased by Bishop Jeremiah Newman of Limerick: "Catholic
opposition to this measure rests fundamentally on the law of God
the Creator."32
The tension among individual bishops on the amendment was
clearly foreshadowed in Love Is for Life, the pastoral letter on mar-
riage issued by the hierarchy in 1985. In that document there is
continuous vacillation between compassionate understanding of
the problems encountered in modern marriage and rigid adherence
to the indissolubility of sacramental marriage. Typically, the bish-
ops acknowledged the relational and personal or self-actualizing el-
ements of marriage—"there are few things in life more beautiful
and more exalting than the experience of love between man and
woman.. . . [Married couples] grow into one another's personali-
ties."33 At the same time, however, in a more legalistic mode, the
bishops insisted that "the compassion of Jesus cannot be invoked as
a reason for departing from his teaching on divorce... . The bond
uniting married couples is a sacramental bond, coming from God
alone.... no human authority, no State or civil court can put this
bond asunder."34 Significantly, the bishops concluded Love Is for
Life with a blessing in the words of St. Paul: "We wish you hap-
piness; try to grow perfect. . . . May the God of peace make you
perfect and holy,"35 an exhortation that captures the essential ten-
sion in the Church's position. It wants people to be happy and at
peace, but ceaselessly urges them toward perfection.
Theologians
Paralleling the tension among the bishops on divorce was dissen-
sion among theologians as to the correct disposition for a Catholic
to take regarding divorce legislation. The hierarchy's noninterven-
tionist stance toward the amendment found support among those
Irish moral theologians who subscribe to the post-Vatican II prin-
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ciple of church/state autonomy and who take a personalist rather
than a legalistic view of marriage. Seeing marriage as an ongoing
dynamic relationship rather than as a rigid formal contract, they
acknowledge the validity of a moral case for divorce. Theologians
such as Sean Freyne of Trinity College invoked Vatican IPs Decla-
ration on Religious Freedom, applied it to the moral sphere, and
argued that the Church, if it is to be a living, vibrant church, must
"engage positively with the spirit of the age."36 Thus, Vincent Mac-
Namara, lecturer in Theology at Saint Patrick's College, Kiltegan,
a missionary seminary, pointed out that "while there is a Catholic
position on various matters of morality, there is not a Catholic po-
sition about the issue of enshrining them in law."37
Sharing this perspective, Maynooth moral theologian Patrick
Hannon argued that committed Catholics have options other than
necessarily opposing the introduction of divorce solely because "in
the Catholic view the truth about marriage is that it cannot be
dissolved."38 Emphasizing that a Catholic who conscientiously de-
cides to vote in favor of divorce is not disloyal to the teaching of the
Catholic church,39 he advised Catholics that when examining the
issue of divorce legislation they "should refrain altogether from
considering the problem in the light of. . . religipus beliefs and
should instead view it in terms of the requirements of . . . the free-
dom of the individual, and . . . the common good."40
Highlighting that it is not always self-evident what constitutes
the social good, Gabriel Daly, lecturer in theology at Trinity Col-
lege, noted that arguments based on the common good should not
assume that there is a priori agreement on what this means; thus it
should not be uncritically accepted that legal provision for divorce
will not serve the common good.41 In trying to serve the social
good, the question becomes not whether the state should "in all cir-
cumstances refuse to grant a civil dissolution of marriage,"42 but,
as Patrick Hannon suggested, "how best is the State through leg-
islation to cope with the fact that some marriages break down ir-
retrievably having regard to all the values at stake?"43
In contrast to these views, Irish moral theologians who are
opposed to the legislative introduction of divorce44 grounded
their objections in the "express statement of Jesus," that once a
marriage is validly contracted no human power can dissolve it. As
Denis O'Callaghan of Maynooth College suggested, divorce makes
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adultery respectable: "The Catholic Church teaches that the unions
of divorcees are adulterous, adulterous because one or other party
is already bound by marriage vows. Therefore the legislators who
introduce divorce into society facilitate adultery and give it
respectability."45
Arguing that it is fallacious to think there is a distinction be-
tween being a Christian in private belief and being a neutral public
legislator, O'Callaghan stressed that legislators are morally respon-
sible for the consequences of their decisions.46 Accordingly, as
Brian Kelly from Kimmage Manor, a seminary for the Holy Ghost
fathers, has argued, it is not permissible for any Catholic, either as
a legislator or as a voter, to "abstract from his faith when deciding
on any concrete course of action whatever."47 He posited that in
any discussion of public morality a central question is "How will
the proposed action contribute to, or hinder the realization of
God's kingdom on earth?"48 Following this perspective, therefore,
Joseph Cremin of Maynooth maintained that Catholics are "duty
bound" to vote "no" to divorce "if they wish to act as Catholics
who are loyal to their Church and its teaching."49 The question of
introducing divorce becomes a "choice between the Christian vi-
sion of life and the secular humanist vision of l ife. . . A middle
ground where we can honour our Christian principles and yet enact
secularist laws is an illusion."50 In short, as Vincent Twomey, lec-
turer in moral theology at Maynooth College, argued: "Indissolu-
bility is not merely an ideal and certainly not an unattainable ideal.
It is the necessary moral norm for marriage as discerned by the
right understanding of human sexuality and confirmed as such by
Our Lord Jesus Christ."51
Dissent within the Church
The divorce debate clearly demonstrated the dissension within the
Church regarding morality and the roles of church and state in pro-
tecting Catholic moral standards. Despite the official collective
pronouncements of the hierarchy declaring nonintervention, it is
evident that in actuality the bishops' stance was more nuanced and
equivocal. It is clear, in fact, as manifested by the contraception,
pro-life, and divorce debates that the deviation of individual bish-
ops from the hierarchy's collegial position has become a character-
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istic of the polemics surrounding the Church's position on socio-
moral issues since it first issued its public acknowledgment of the
autonomy between law and Catholic teaching.
In spite of its internal dissension, however, the hierarchy's posi-
tion during the divorce debate was distinguished in two fundamen-
tal ways. One, as a collectivity, the hierarchy maintained a much
more open stance on divorce during the campaign than that taken
a few years later by the United States Catholic Bishops on abortion.
Importantly, the Irish hierarchy, in accordance with post-Vatican II
principles of church/state differentiation and religious freedom, ac-
knowledged the right of Catholics in good conscience to vote in fa-
vor of divorce, whereas the American hierarchy adopted the more
conservative attitude of the individual dissenting Irish bishops. In a
resolution on abortion issued in November 1989, the U.S. bishops
declared that "no Catholic can responsibly take a 'pro-choice'
stand when the 'choice' in question involves the taking of innocent
human life."52
Once the American bishops took this conservative collegial
stance, some individual bishops acted on it by invoking their or-
dained power to refuse Catholic politicians who avowed a pro-
choice position access to the sacraments. Bishop Leo Maher of San
Diego, for instance, wrote to California State Assemblywoman
Lucy Killea, informing her that she could not receive communion/
the sacrament of the Eucharist because of her pro-choice stance,
while the Catholic director of an abortion clinic in Texas, Rachel
Vargas, was excommunicated by Bishop Rene Gracida of Corpus
Christi.53 More generally, John Cardinal O'Connor and auxiliary
bishop Austin Vaughan, both of New York, warned politicians that
they risked being excommunicated for their pro-choice positions.54
In Ireland, the last and only time that politicians were barred from
the sacraments was in the early 1920s during the civil war when
treaty opponents engaged in violence against the new Irish state.
The second fundamental feature of the hierarchy's stance during
the divorce campaign was that the hierarchy presented a much
more complex and ambivalent stance than did the Anti-Divorce
Campaign. Unlike the single issue, ad hoc ADC, the Church is not a
homogeneous structure. It is, as the tension and equivocality in the
Church's position illustrated, a complex institutional actor in Irish
society. And while the nuances in the Church's approach to divorce
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may indeed have been facilitated by the fact that the ADC was ex-
pressing the essential Catholic moral position on divorce, on the
other hand, its official stance accorded with the Church's own con-
tinuing acknowledgment of church/state differentiation and the au-
tonomy of law from Catholic morality.
The dissension within the Church on these questions during the
divorce campaign, however, remains interesting. What are we to
make of the dissent? And, furthermore, what are we to make of the
fact that the dissent was tolerated? After all, throughout its history,
the Church as an institution has been known for its suppression of
dissent and its censuring of bishops and theologians who depart
from strict orthodoxy.
In the last twenty years the Vatican has prohibited moral theo-
logians who have posited progressive interpretations of Church
dogma from teaching theology in Catholic universities and semi-
naries, most notably, Hans Kung for his questioning of papal
infallibility, and Charles Curran for his views on moral and sex-
ual ethics. In 1990, Archbishop Rembert Weakland of Milwau-
kee, known for his compassionate approach to the politics of
the abortion question, was prohibited by the Vatican from receiv-
ing an honorary degree from the University of Fribourg,55 while
more generally, the Vatican has also reaffirmed that theologians
should not make public their disagreement with official Church
teaching.56
What then do we make of the dissent within the Irish Church, a
collegial body for which dissent is uncharacteristic, on divorce leg-
islation? And how should we understand its acceptance of different
episcopal interpretations on an issue that is fundamental to Cath-
olic moral and social teaching?
The hierarchy's toleration of individual bishops who dissented
from the official collegial line on the amendment becomes under-
standable when we take note of two points. One, the dissent within
the Church was not over Church dogma on divorce but whether
and how this teaching should be given expression in the civil leg-
islation of Irish society. This issue of the relationship between law
and morality, while an important one, is obviously less fundamen-
tal to the Church than questions of doctrine and dogma. Moreover,
members of the Church hierarchy have individual autonomy. Al-
though the bishops constitute an institutionalized collegial body
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committed to acting as such, at the same time each bishop has suf-
ficient independence and jurisdictional license to articulate a per-
sonal interpretation of nondoctrinal questions, including one as
controversial as the role of the Church in the modern world.
Secondly, the dissension, whether it was deliberate or not, fell on
one side only. In the sociomoral debates we have discussed here, the
individual statements that departed from the collective hierarchical
position erred on the side of traditionalism. One cannot but won-
der whether statements that might have taken a more progressive
stance than the hierarchy on divorce—one, for instance, arguing
that divorce may serve the common good—would have been
equally tolerated. Giving voice to those who posited the more con-
servative view allowed the Church to equivocate: to officially em-
brace the modern view of the functional differentiation of church
and state and of the autonomy of law and morality, and at the same
time, to amplify the traditional position, an interpretation that, al-
though deviating from Vatican II thinking, was, importantly, di-
rectly supportive of Catholic dogma on the morality of divorce.
More interesting, however, to the thesis of this book is the view
that the inner dissension was the inevitable result of the Church's
grappling with its new role in society. Trying to adhere to Vatican
II principles of church/state differentiation and religious freedom
and, at the same time, attempting to execute its pastoral duty to
discuss the moral and social implications of divorce legislation, the
hierarchy can be seen as struggling to find its rightful place in an
important public moral debate. The dissension thus may be the in-
evitable outcome of what happens when a well-established institu-
tion tries to adopt a noninterventionist disposition, when for
hundreds of years it has defined its sphere of competence as extend-
ing to the political process.
In trying to find new ways in which to present traditional doc-
trine, it is not so surprising that the Church's splitting of its role
between the conflicting demands of pastoral obligations and secu-
lar expectations led to diverse perspectives being articulated. The
multiplicity of voices within the Church signified the real ten-
sion and awkwardness that the Church encountered in trying to
negotiate between teaching Catholic morality and simultane-
ously respecting the differentiated autonomy of church and state.
Confronted with the challenge of maintaining the relevance of
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doctrinal belief in an increasingly secular world that privileges
science rather than dogma, the Church, in its vacillation between
an interventionist and noninterventionist stance, thus reproduced
the individual human dilemma of "What shall we do and how shall
we live?"
Despite the sincerity of the hierarchy's avowed commitment to
nonintervention in politics, its pastoral duty to address the moral
implications of legislation meant that the bishops necessarily inter-
vened in the legislative process. The hierarchy's noninterventionist
stance thus had a certain artificiality. Yet, in a sense, this was the
only feasible way by which issues of church/state autonomy could
be resolved. From the perspective of the Church, any resolution of
the dilemma posed by the Church's intervention in public debates
had to be artificial. The execution of its legitimate pastoral role
meant that it could not but tread on the legislative process.
Secular Discourse
As we have seen, one noteworthy feature of the divorce debate from
the vantage point of Church discourse was the nuanced manner of
the bishops' arguments as they sought to maintain a noninterven-
tionist stance in the campaign while simultaneously delineating
Church opposition to divorce. But along with the subtlety of its dis-
course, the content of the message itself was significant. Adding to
the complexity of the Church's stance on the amendment was the
nature of its arguments. Unprecedented for the Irish hierarchy, it
relied heavily on secular, empirical arguments—a this-worldly, so-
ciological discourse—in articulating its opposition to divorce.
In the Mother and Child debate we saw that not only was there
no acknowledgment by the bishops of church/state autonomy or
intra-Church dissent on questions of law and morality, but, impor-
tantly, the arguments that the hierarchy used were purely religious.
The bishops authoritatively declared what was morally and so-
cially acceptable behavior, singularly based on Church teaching
and without the support of empirically grounded reasons. That
was the only legitimacy necessary.
But while the Church's use of sociological or empirically based
arguments was unheard of thirty or forty years ago in Ireland, a
significant shift has occurred since then. No longer do the bishops
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declare that it is a mortal sin to oppose the Church's social edicts.57
Complementing the change in its active adherence to church/state
differentiation, the hierarchy has increasingly appropriated scien-
tific argumentation to bolster its theological and moral teaching.
The Church's use of empirically grounded arguments first ap-
peared in its pastoral letter on abortion issued in 1975, Human Life
Is Sacred, and reemerged in the 1985 contraception debate. Paying
homage to the authority of secular reasoning, the bishops invoked
"the experience of other countries" to support their argument that
permissive contraception laws and the availability of abortion has-
ten a society's moral decline.58 Thus, with regard to abortion, in
1975 the bishops argued that "since the Abortion Act came into
force in Britain in 1967, the number of abortions notified has risen
steadily year by year, going from 25,000 in 1968 to 170,000 in
1973. The figures speak for themselves" [emphasis mine].59
In the divorce debate the hierarchy used a combination of reli-
gious and secular arguments. Importantly, however, the debate saw
the hierarchy's most extensive use to date of selective sociological
evidence to defend its opposition to divorce. In fact, the debate
clearly demonstrated a parallel process apparent in the Church's
self-presentation whereby the more the Church endorses the sepa-
ration of church and state, the more it uses secular discourse in pre-
senting its teaching. While the hierarchy specifically stated that it
would not be campaigning against the amendment, it was also the
occasion during which the hierarchy most visibly framed the artic-
ulation of its opposition to divorce within a sociological discourse.
Its substantial emphasis on empirical reasoning thus distinguished
the divorce debate as a significant marker in the evolution of the
Church's public response to controversial moral issues.
Unlike the pro-life amendment, which the bishops regarded as
"a matter of great moral seriousness" and accordingly emphasized
"the clear teaching of the Catholic Church on the sacredness of hu-
man life" and "the sacredness of human life, as created by God in
his own image" in calling for its endorsement,60 the bishops argued
that the divorce amendment should be assessed in terms of its so-
cietal consequences. Repeatedly invoking empirical evidence docu-
menting the negative effects of divorce, Bishop Joseph Cassidy, the
hierarchy's spokesman, typically contended that "divorce has very
serious consequences for society . . . once divorce is introduced it is
106 Debating Divorce
very difficult to restrict it. . . . Take a look at the evidence . . . take
a look at the evidence. Take a look at the evidence in any country
in the world. In 1983 for instance in America, there were 2.4 mil-
lion marriages and there were 1.2 million divorces. That's one out
of two. In Great Britain at the moment the figure is running two
out of every five" [emphasis mine].61 And while from a moral
standpoint the bishops emphasized the sacramental indissoluble
nature of Christian marriage,62 they related this to its social and
institutional meaning. Thus: "Divorce legislation immediately up-
turns the whole legal tradition and introduces a completely new le-
gal definition of marriage. Marriage as a lifelong union becomes
legally obsolete. A commitment for life is replaced by a legal com-
mitment to stay with one's spouse unless and until one decides
otherwise."63
Paralleling the arguments of the ADC, the bishops also high-
lighted the negative consequences of divorce for women and chil-
dren. They argued, for example, that "children are the chief
casualties and victims of divorce. There is strong evidence from
the United States and other countries that children of divorced par-
ents are prey to a cluster of psychological and emotional problems
and personality disorders. Even the danger of the divorce of their
parents produces a host of disturbed behavior patterns among
children."64 With regard to women, they argued: "There are many
indicators that divorce favours men rather than women. One Cal-
ifornia study found in 1982 that men experienced a 42 per cent im-
provement in their standard of living following divorce, while
women experienced a 73 per cent loss. . . . Divorce obviously in-
creases the number of one parent families."65
Related to these effects, the hierarchy also drew attention, as did
the ADC, to the financial costs incurred by the state resulting from
the increased prevalence of marital breakdown and divorce. Thus:
"Marital breakdown in many countries has become a massive so-
cial and national problem.... Between 1971 and 1976 the number
of one parent families in Britain rose from 570,000 to 750,000, an
increase of 32 per cent. A recognised authority on population
trends . . . has no hesitation in saying that this increase was 'due
largely to the big increase in the number of divorced lone moth-
ers'. . . . In Britain, there are now well over 800,000 one-parent
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families, with 1,500,000 dependent children. . . . These children
are now costing the Exchequer more than 180,000,000 pounds."66
The Church's use of a sociological discourse during the divorce
debate, therefore, even though it was used selectively and in com-
bination with religious reasoning, represented a major, far-reach-
ing departure for the Church. Recourse to secular argumentation
extended the relevance of the discourse not just for Catholic believ-
ers but also to include skeptical believers and non-Catholics alike.
Appropriating sociology to legitimate traditional Catholic dogma
may well hold appeal for the more educated middle classes, some
of whom, while committed to Catholicism, dismiss Catholic social
teaching as being outdated and irrelevant for contemporary liv-
ing.67 Access to a modern this-worldly anti-divorce discourse, how-
ever, enables them to rationalize their own opposition to divorce.
But while the new use of secular arguments by the Church can
be interpreted as a genuine effort on the part of the hierarchy to
accommodate to the changing needs of its constituency, it is also
hard at times not to construe these changes in rhetoric as inconsis-
tent and artificially grafted. After all, as discussed in the case of the
ADC, the use of secular arguments implies the acceptance of scien-
tific canons of evidence. The principle of science means that you are
open to all evidence, both positive and negative, and that you are
prepared to abandon theories or views that run counter to the ev-
idence. Taken to its logical conclusion, the use of secular dialogue
implies that you are prepared to argue rationally, and, if science
produces results, you are prepared to accept them.
And so the use by the Church of sociological evidence implies
that the Church would be open to revise its stance and abandon its
objections to divorce if the case provided by the social sciences was
compelling enough. But is this the case? Would the hierarchy really
be prepared to actively advocate divorce on the strength of socio-
logical arguments running counter to its morally grounded views
on the subject matter?
A truly comprehensive answer to this question is beyond the
scope of this work, as it would lead us to issues of post-Vatican II
theology. But what is true is that, even though some Irish theolo-
gians linked the question of divorce to pragmatic considerations of
the greater or lesser evil, this is a minority view. As documented,
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the bishops construe the issue of divorce as a fundamental dogma
of the Church, and therefore, not amenable to pragmatic reasoning.
While there are nuances in the bishops' approach to the question of
the relationship between Catholic teaching and civil law, this is a
separate issue. What is unequivocal is their moral position that
"for those who accept the teaching of the Catholic Church, divorce
with a right to remarry is not merely not permitted, it is impossible.
For marriage is a sacrament and the sacramental bond can not be
put asunder."68 It is doubtful, therefore, that the hierarchy would
have followed its sociological arguments to their conclusion.
After all, the Church's use of secular discourse has to be seen
against the backdrop of the bishops' self-proclaimed privileged
knowledge when it comes to issues of morality. For, as the bishops
have declared: "When the Church states her moral principles...
she appeals ultimately to the truth and love which Christ brought
into the world. She takes the Divine Teacher as her model. . . . she
speaks with the confidence that the inner force of the Christian
message will, by God's grace, and because of its sheer truth and
rightness, find an answering echo in the heart of man."69
One way of contextualizing the Church's secular discourse is to
explore the Irish people's response to it. What is striking here is
that there was, essentially, no public discussion of the Church's so-
ciological emphasis. The bishops' arguments were criticized by his-
tory professor John A. Murphy70 and their competence in speaking
on the amendment was questioned by some in the media.71 None-
theless, the sociological claims of the hierarchy were not directly
challenged during the debate either by advocates of divorce, expert
sociologists, or the daily newspaper editorials. No one questioned
the Church's dual arguments nor spoke of the incompatibility be-
tween its use of dogma and empirical evidence.
One possible explanation for the reticence in engaging the hier-
archy on its use of secular argumentation is that people were sim-
ply taken aback by the novelty of the Church's sociological
emphasis. As a relatively short debate with lots of issues being ar-
gued, the nine weeks of the divorce campaign may not have been
enough time in which to reflect on the implications of the bishops'
stance. Another interpretation, however, and probably a more com-
pelling one, is that people never really took seriously the hierarchy's
this-worldly discourse, seeing it as lacking autonomy from the
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Church's moral position. It may well be that the Church was de-
veloping a new, even more differentiated position on issues of law
and morality, but people appeared to treat its nonreligious pro-
nouncements as though they were still doctrinally grounded.
By not taking the hierarchy's secular discourse at its face value,
however, the Irish lost an important opportunity to engage the
bishops in rational dialogue on morality and the relationship be-
tween law and Catholic teaching. Without examining the hierar-
chy's reasoning and seeing what avenues this may have opened, we
are left in doubt as to the true significance of the bishops' argu-
ments and how the hierarchy would go about resolving the tension
between the various strands of its position on divorce. In the ab-
sence of an attempt to probe critically the bishops' stance, the in-
consistency between their theological and sociological reasoning
could not be explored. The hierarchy's position thus remains am-
biguous. What is unambiguous, however, is that, left unchallenged,
the two strands in the Church's discourse, its sociological and theo-
logical arguments, combined in a forceful case against divorce and,
importantly, legitimated and reinforced the parallel arguments of
the ADC.
In sum, the Church emerges from the divorce debate as a com-
plex evolving institution, one that maintains its adherence to fun-
damental points of dogma but also tries to grapple with
contemporary issues. As argued in this chapter, the tension ema-
nating from its commitment to the autonomy of church and state
coupled with its pastoral obligation to speak on the moral and so-
cial implications of legislation, leads both to dissent within the
Church and to the Church's embracing of strands of discourse that
are not necessarily compatible.
CHAPTER SIX
Newspaper Editorial Opinion
The three Irish national daily newspapers, the Irish Independent,
the Irish Press, and the Irish Times, were united in supporting the
government's divorce proposals. The consensus of editorial opinion
was that divorce was a necessary response to the problems associ-
ated with marital breakdown in Ireland.1 This position was artic-
ulated by the newspapers throughout the campaign and seemed
relatively uninfluenced by issues of circulation, economics, or read-
ers' attitudes, since it was maintained even when it became evident
that the pro-divorce case was losing popularity.
Of the three papers, it was the least surprising that the Times
supported the introduction of divorce. Founded in 1860 as the
voice of Irish Protestantism to distinguish its interests as separate
not only from those of Irish Catholic nationalists but from British
Protestants, today the Times articulates an essentially liberal and
secular perspective on current issues and events. It is not aligned
with any political party and it appeals mostly to urban, educated,
and upper middle class readers. Among the editorial guidelines of
the Times is the objective of promoting a society "free from all re-
ligious bias and discrimination" and one where "minority interests
and divergent views" can be reasonably represented.2
It was thus in keeping with the Times' editorial policy that it fa-
vored the introduction of divorce. More surprising was the pro-
divorce stance of the other newspapers, the Independent and the
Press. The Independent has the largest circulation of all the papers
and tends to espouse the ideology of big business and the free
market.3 It is generally perceived as being broadly supportive of
Fine Gael and the interests of large farmers who, along with other
rural and urban middle class readers, constitute a significant por-
tion of its readership. In the case of the divorce amendment, how-
ever, it was evident that the Independent favored Garret FitzGerald
and his divorce proposals over and against land and property
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interests, which, opponents of divorce had argued, would be en-
dangered if divorce was introduced.4
The Press was founded in 1931 by Eamon de Valera as the au-
thentic voice of what he perceived to be the values of Irish national-
ism. It remains partially in the control of the de Valera family and,
while independent of the Fianna Fail party, continues to be gener-
ally supportive of their policies. The Press appeals to rural readers,
particularly to small farmers and to older people.5 Yet, it too pre-
sented arguments clearly favoring the introduction of divorce.
While the Irish print media are fairly homogeneous in the sense
that they all subscribe to the values of democracy and capitalism,
each of the newspapers appeals to a relatively distinct type of
reader. As a small and geographically dispersed media market, the
Irish newspaper industry encounters high costs of production and
distribution and faces sharp competition from the popularity of the
British tabloid papers in Ireland. Nevertheless, the Irish papers, par
ticularly the Times, maintain a strong commitment to quality jour-
nalism and emphasize political and economic news and commen-
tary in preference to human interest and sensationalist coverage.6
As Conor Brady, an editor at the Irish Times, has suggested: "The
fortunes of Ireland's newspapers are the fortunes of Ireland itself.
Their interests are inextricably bound up with those of the na-
tion."7 Accordingly, the newspapers present themselves as speaking
on behalf of the social, economic, and political interests of the Irish,
and their editorial opinions fall within such ideological parameters.
Despite the economic and sociological constraints of the small
market they serve, the Irish newspapers have, at least since the
1950s, been characterized by a relatively strong tradition of profes-
sional independence among journalists and editors. This was evi-
dent not only during the divorce debate. Going back to the public
controversy stimulated by the Mother and Child issue, it was noted
at the time that while the then Protestant-owned Times criticized
the position adopted by the bishops, the two Catholic-owned daily
newspapers, the Press and the Independent, did not defend the
bishops' actions.8
In more recent times, the independence of the print media was
highlighted by the stance they took regarding questions of women's
equality. As with the divorce debate, they departed from traditional
values and espoused a greater recognition of the role of women in
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Irish society. During the late 1960s, the three national newspapers
instigated analysis of the unequal position of women in Ireland.
Through special "women's pages," women editors and journalists
provided critical information and commentary on discrimination
against Irish women and led the way in challenging traditional as-
sumptions that women had no role to play in the public sphere.
While the special focus on women was pioneered by the Times,
it is noteworthy that the Press's coverage of women's issues is re-
garded as having been the most revolutionary. One Irish feminist
argues: "But it was the women's page of the Irish Press and its ed-
itor Mary Kenny which for most people revolutionised the concept
of women's journalism in Ireland. After five years with the Evening
Standard in London, Mary Kenny returned to Ireland in 1969 to be
women's editor of the Irish Press. Two action-packed years of fear-
lessness in writing and speaking about what she considered to be
the ills of Irish society made her a legend in her own time. Her
name became synonymous with women's liberation in Ireland, the
cause of women always being uppermost in her mind. She alienated
herself from people in all sections of Irish society."9 There is some
evidence, therefore, that the print media in Ireland are not afraid of
taking issue with popular beliefs and assumptions.
Let us now focus on the divorce debate and see how it was that
the newspapers expressed their support for divorce. My concern is
not with the newspapers' reporting of the campaign in general but
with the editorial arguments that were articulated, including both
formal editorials and opinion pieces by regular columnists.10
A variety of themes were evident in the editorial columns of the
three newspapers. Some of the arguments put forward were di-
rectly supportive of the government's proposals; some were indi-
rectly supportive insofar as they expressed general criticisms of the
nature of Irish society and the strong association between law and
Catholicism, whereas others directly challenged the arguments of
the anti-divorce campaign.
Arguments Supportive of the Proposals
All of the newspapers acknowledged that divorce has negative con-
sequences and would have some destabilizing effects on society, de-
spite what, they pointed out, were the strong religious traditions in
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Ireland and the emphasis on family values. At the same time, how-
ever, the papers framed divorce as a necessary response to the in-
creasing pervasiveness of marital breakdown. The Times stated:
"Of course divorce brings enormous problems. The question of
where the children go, the mental distress and the emotional upset
which the breakup of a parental home brings, are evident in all
modern societies. There can be equivalent distress and mental con-
sequences when marriages are held together purely out of economic
necessity or fear."11 The Press similarly wrote: "divorce, like sur-
gery, is not something to be welcomed—it signals the formal end of
what was once a warm, happy and loving relationship. . . . divorce
inevitably leaves behind victims, bitterness and disillusionment....
To say all this, however, is not to deny that there now exists in this
State a serious situation of marital breakdown."12 In line with
Garret FitzGerald's argument, therefore, the editorials saw divorce
not as a libertarian civil right but in its broader societal context,
as the most practical way to deal with a social problem of increas-
ing magnitude.
Additionally, all of the papers stressed the restrictive nature of
the specific proposals. They emphasized that the criteria for grant-
ing a divorce were sufficiently restrictive so as to attenuate some of
the more negative consequences associated with "California style
divorce." The Press, for example, which devoted the least amount
of editorial opinion to the divorce amendment and was more re-
served about the introduction of divorce than were the other pa-
pers, clearly saw the proposals as being restrictive. It pointed out
that "the present proposal from the government at least has the
merit of being limited and restrictive. . . . The proposals put for-
ward by the government are restrictive, too restrictive some will
claim. It is a good failing—at this stage, it is right that the intention
should be to hasten slowly. The warning about opening the flood-
gates needs to be taken seriously. If there is to be divorce, then it
should be available only when it is clear that a marriage has broken
down beyond repair. A separation of five years would seem suffi-
cient evidence of that."13
Moreover, as the campaign drew to a close, Tim Pat Coogan, the
nationally known and well-respected editor of the Press, delineated
in his weekly column personal reasons why he was going to vote in
favor of the amendment. Here he emphasized the pervasiveness of
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the problem of marital breakdown, noting that "very few families
in Ireland today, my own included, remain unaffected by this sad-
ness," and he argued that "laws have to be changed sometimes to
reflect changes in society."14
The Times and the Independent similarly stressed the limited
and restrictive nature of the government proposals, and they ar-
gued that this restrictiveness would ensure that no major societal
upheaval would ensue. The Independent argued: "This is an ex-
tremely limited form of divorce, but it is divorce nevertheless. It
will certainly not open up the floodgates, because the conditions
for obtaining a divorce are so severe that only a fraction of those
looking for divorce will qualify."15 In underscoring the restrictive-
ness of the proposals, the Times criticized the government's conser-
vative approach but interpreted it as necessary to achieve the
success of the amendment. It stated: "The Government may be crit-
icised for taking an extremely conservative approach; for aiming
to build the precise and very limited grounds for possible divorce
into the Constitution itself. It is regrettable that the terms should be
so tightly drawn but it may well turn out to have been necessary to
do so in order to achieve the success of the referendum."16
Unlike the marginalization of Northern Ireland in the campaign
arguments of the government and of the pro-divorce lobby as a
whole, each of the newspapers accentuated the relevance of the fu-
ture of Northern Ireland to the debate. They claimed that a refusal
to legislate for divorce would constitute a mirror-image of the lack
of compromise by the Protestant Northern Unionists and would be
supportive of a partitionist attitude. As the Times argued: "The
truth is that everything we do in the Republic matters in the North,
and has its effects.... We have in so many ways disregarded the
North in our law-making and in our general demeanor.... A duty
lies on us all to think of others beyond our State boundaries. The
decision in this referendum will undoubtedly influence people in
the North of Ireland.... It is reasonably certain that a 'no' vote
would cause Unionists to repeat with satisfaction their charge that
Home Rule is Rome Rule."17 According to the Independent, "The
outcome of the referendum will also have a profound effect on our
relationship with Northern Ireland. If we believe in peace and rec-
onciliation . . . then we cannot escape the implications this has on
the restructuring of our laws and on society."18 Taking a sober
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view, the Press asked, "While no one would suggest that a Yes vote,
however large, will persuade hardline Unionists to see the South in
a new light, will rejection serve to bring the two parts of this island
closer together, or push them further apart?"19
In directly advocating the introduction of divorce, therefore, the
newspaper editorials stressed the practical necessity of some form
of divorce, the restrictiveness of the proposals, and the significance
of the referendum on North/South relations.
Irish Cultural Values
Spanning a broader perspective, the newspapers also commented
on the strong Catholic tradition in Irish society, and they appealed
to the Irish to embrace the values of tolerance and pluralism. Im-
portantly, the editorials acknowledged that for many people the di-
vorce question was as much religious as social. They highlighted,
nonetheless, that it was not a "sectarian issue,"20 nor was it a
church/state clash, notwithstanding that the hierarchy differed
from the government in their assessment of the social effects of
divorce.21 In this context, the soundness of Garret FitzGerald's Ca-
tholicism was emphasized. On polling day, the Times stated: "To-
day we are being asked to prove . . . that we can deal fairly with
minority rights. In this case it is not a matter of Protestant versus
Catholic, for it is evident that the great mass of those who advocate
divorce are Catholics, and led by a Taoiseach [prime minister]
whose Catholicism has never been in doubt, whose faith in the Irish
people in all its manifestations is heartening" [emphasis mine].22
In what can be seen as a way of trying to persuade Catholics and
others into the realization that Catholics could deal with the intro-
duction of divorce, the Times variously pointed out that the ma-
jority of those who advocate divorce are Catholics; that Catholics
in the North do not need legislation to keep them true to their faith;
that conservative Catholics are willing to listen to minority voices;
and that other Catholic nations have faced up to divorce.23 It was
conceded, nevertheless, that many Catholics would not be able to
vote for something they believed to be socially and morally wrong.24
The Independent noted that "in this country many deputies
[parliamentarians] have an allegiance to a Church which forbids di-
vorce" and that "many members (but not all) of the Catholic
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Church . . . will not be able to bring themselves to vote for a mea-
sure which they believe to be wrong—on moral and social
grounds."25 It challenged the entitlement of the Catholic church,
however, "to bind the consciences of the legislators—in this case
the people themselves—in their determination of this issue." Ac-
cordingly, the Independent stated: "In our view, any Catholic
should be free to support these proposals without compromising
his or her conscience, and we sincerely hope that . . . the Catholic
bishops will make this absolutely clear."26 When the hierarchy is-
sued its collective official statement regarding the referendum in
mid-June, the editorials in the Independent and the Press did not
comment on it. The Times, however, accentuating a key point of
the hierarchy's argument, stressed that Catholics were free, in con-
science, to vote "yes".27
Columnists at the Times were critical of the power wielded by
priests and bishops in influencing state legislation on divorce.
Among other points, it was argued that the "priests are the front-
line troops in preaching against the kind of change in the status of
marriage envisaged by the Government"28 and that the Catholic
bishops want the state to "play sheepdog to the episcopal shep-
herds and their Catholic flock,"29 while Mary Holland concluded
that "the Church's arguments, spoken and unspoken, will carry
considerable force."30
Nonetheless, the right of the hierarchy to articulate its social
and moral objections against divorce was accepted in the edito-
rials as being reasonable, and the hierarchy was complimented for
how it conducted itself during the debate.31 The Times even com-
mended the bishops for the cogency of their arguments,32 while at
the same time reminding them of the nonconfessional stance they
articulated on law and morality to the New Ireland Forum. The
Press and the Independent similarly commended the bishops for
the role they assumed, writing that "the Catholic Hierarchy can
take a great deal of credit for the measured manner in which they
have presented the Church's view, and other Churches too have
been constructive in their contributions to the debate,"33 and that
"in a vigorous and fair campaign waged by the hierarchy, we feel
that the Church has discharged what it considers to be its moral
duty with scrupulous adherence to the commitment its bishops
gave . . . to the Forum."34
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Maurice Hearne, a columnist who writes for the Independent,
highlighted the Church's own distinction between matters of
church and state, and he criticized his colleagues in the media for
not giving greater coverage to statements by Church officials on
this issue. Indeed, he was particularly critical of the "misguided lib-
ertarianism" of one of his co-columnists in the newspaper, Conor
Cruise O'Brien, for his belief that religion should have no role in
public affairs.35 In a second piece, Hearne further articulated the
theme of the appropriateness of the Church to pronounce on mat-
ters that are considered by it to have a moral dimension. At the
same time, however, he pointed out the need for a separation be-
tween church and state and elaborated on the positive implications
of guaranteeing religious freedom. Thus, Hearne argued that "the
Catholic Church is the spiritual home of most of the people in this
State. They have the right to expect that the laws which govern
them will broadly reflect the standards of moral behavior expected
of them.. . . [but] . . . we Catholics must realize that guaranteeing
freedom of religion and freedom of conscience for all in our civil
law guarantees our right to be Catholics, guarantees our right not
to divorce and remarry if we believe that to be wrong. [There-
fore] . . . in [voting yes] I am satisfied that I shall have in no way
compromised either my conscience or my Catholicism. Perhaps I
shall have enriched both."36
Related to this, the editorials defined the move to introduce di-
vorce as a good thing, fitting this theme into a critical commentary
on the nature of Irish society. Some of the social and cultural traits
of the Irish came in for strong criticism, well summarized by one
columnist's headline: "Tolerance is admirable but it is not our
style."37 The papers condemned the allegiance to a confessional
ethic and the commitment of the Irish to being a "deviant" excep-
tion relative to other Western societies.
The newspapers differed in their emphasis on this theme—it was
particularly evident in the Times—but an appeal to a national so-
cietal ideal was identifiable in all. In presenting this ideal, echoing
a theme of the pro-divorce lobby, they questioned the extent to
which democracy, realism, pluralism, tolerance, and maturity per-
vaded Irish society. The following excerpt from the Times typifies
the kind of statements made in this context: "Growing up can
bring strain and stress. So it is with the Republic as it faces a
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problem that most of our fellow European States have come to.
terms with: divorce... . No people can draw a curtain around itself
and maintain a static society. To some extent we all have to live and
move with the modern, complex and wicked world."38
The importance of according minority rights was also stressed.
In this context the editorials emphasized that as a nation with a tur-
bulent history and different religious traditions, Ireland should not
continue to maintain a sectarian approach to divorce legislation.
The Independent, for example, in a front page editorial on the day
preceding polling day, stated, "we feel it is our duty to point out
that we live in a pluralist nation, that our laws must reflect that
pluralism and must not be seen to reflect only the confessional ethic
of the majority in the socio-moral domain."39
Similarly, the Times and the Press exhorted the Irish people to
show their true decency, generosity, and tolerance. The Times
wrote, "It has been a decent State since its inception. . . . It has
been a decent State and perhaps an innocent one. It has also been
a generous State and the present referendum calls for an especial
turn of generosity. It is time to free us from the concept that every-
one must hold to one cultural or religious pattern."40 The Press
wondered, "will it be an Ireland of tolerance and generosity, ready
to accommodate the differing views and traditions of people of all
religions and none?.. . . is there not an obligation on all of us in the
South to be seen to be scrupulous in according . . . respect and rec-
ognition of the rights of the minority in this jurisdiction?"41
Although these arguments were different from those discussed
earlier in that they did not stress the practical need for divorce or
the restrictiveness of the government proposals, they clearly sup-
ported change. Significantly, the editorials placed the move to in-
troduce divorce in the context of praising the Irish for their
generosity and decency. While the editorials in part castigated the
Irish for their lack of tolerance, at the same time they spoke to feel-
ings of grandiosity among the Irish, suggesting that they, indeed,
are an exceptional people; exceptional not solely for prohibiting di-
vorce but, more positively, for their record as a civilized nation.
The message thus conveyed was that the Irish should demonstrate
their civility by voting in favor of the amendment.
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Arguments Challenging the Anti-Divorce Position
As well as articulating a range of both practical and idealistic ar-
guments in favor of divorce, the editorials challenged the argu-
ments invoked by opponents of divorce. They were critical of the
negative social consequences that anti-divorce campaigners argued
would follow its introduction. The Times stated: "So there was a
Celtic Twilight all along; and some of the anti-divorce campaigners
have been living in it. For they talk of a country—or rather a
State—into which the introduction of divorce will bring a variety
of hitherto non-existent evils. But if they looked at the real Ireland
in the clear light of day they would see a society as prone to social
ills as any other in Europe: poverty, crime, drug addiction, alco-
holism, class divisions, urban dereliction.... All these problems
have arisen, in a supposedly homogeneous, egalitarian society, gov-
erned by Christian moral principles. Has it occurred to those who
like to moralise that the problems can only have been worsened by
attempts to ignore them?"42
This editorial continued to undermine the anti-divorce position
by arguing that the existing problem of marital breakdown and the
absence of divorce already gives rise to many negative conse-
quences. Thus: "On the specific question of marriage breakdown:
it exists on a wide scale and must be faced up to. . . . We already
have thousands of cases of 'divorce Irish style', where the man sim-
ply packs a suitcase, goes to England and, if he wishes, obtains a
divorce there—leaving his unfortunate wife still legally married in
Ireland. We have other thousands living in their own Celtic Twi-
light, in stable and fruitful unions unrecognised by Church or State,
and beset by intense anxiety over such questions as property rights
and the illegitimacy of their children."43
The Press pointed out that, other than divorce, there are many
things the state can do to help marriages under threat, such as the
provision of counseling and conciliation services and the ameliora-
tion of the family courts system. Nevertheless, echoing the argu-
ments of the Times, it also asked: "But what can be done for those
whose marriages have broken down irretrievably and where the
partners have formed other relationships and new families are in-
volved? Many of the victims of such breakdowns are in their twen-
ties, with their whole lives ahead of them. Should they be refused
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the right to try to find happiness with another partner? Should
those who have formed stable second unions be refused the right to
legitimise their status and that of their children?"44
In particular, the editorials took issue with what the anti-divorce
lobby argued would be the negative economic effects of divorce. In-
stead, the editorial line posited was that the economic conse-
quences of divorce had to be an improvement over the existing
financial circumstances of those whose marriages have broken
down. The Independent, for example, argued that economic rights
would be enhanced with divorce: "In view of the proposals being
made [in regard to succession rights] it seems to us that the rights
of the first family, far from being adversely affected will in fact be
considerably enhanced when set against the existing circumstances
of dependent spouses and children of marriages which have irre-
trievably broken down."45 Similarly, the Times stated: "The spec-
ter of dispossession, while departed husbands invest new, young
wives with the worldly goods due to a first wife and family, is a
powerful argument. But how real is it? Can the circumstances of a
divorced wife be any worse than so many of those who now suffer
in the shadow of Irish marriages which have ceased to exist in all
but name? Deserted wives whose husbands provide no mainte-
nance for them while running a new home elsewhere; deserted hus-
bands whose meagre wages are insufficient to provide adequately
for young families; spouses who have calculatedly stripped what-
ever family assets exist."46 Dick Walsh, the political editor of the
Times, framed his criticisms more sharply. He argued: "To many of
those who own property—and in most cases, the property is
land—women are still the means by which the family line is main-
tained and, with it, the grip on the family's property. And where
our old hunger for land has been succeeded by jealously guarded
ownership, fear of losing the land is a potent weapon. The anti-
divorce campaigners have seized it and are wielding it with zest.
Playing on the fears of some and the greed of others, the argument
is both crude and false."47
The editorials also criticized the anti-divorce campaigners' use of
statistics in presenting their case. In particular, they challenged the
comparative framework adopted by opponents of divorce, arguing
that the societies compared were cultures dissimilar to Ireland. The
Independent, for example, stated that "it is disingenuous to ignore
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the experience in Italy, an overwhelmingly Catholic country . . .
where divorce rates have not risen.... In Spain, another Catholic
country . . . the demand has been far less than anticipated. There
has been a similar experience in Northern Ireland where divorce
was introduced";48 while the Times asked, "can anybody argue
that Malta, Paraguay (ruled by a vicious dictator) and Argentina
(where change is possible under the courageous new democratic
Government) rank among the happiest countries?"49
Finally, although the editorial commentary did not focus specif-
ically on women and the implications of divorce for their economic
and social status, one editorial in the Times, remarking on the con-
duct of the divorce debate, noted that much of the terminology
used was "demeaning of women, as if they were chattels."50 John
Healy, a columnist with the Times, similarly denounced opponents
of divorce for targeting women's fears, noting, "Fifty-one per cent
of the constituency are women.. . . They have been treated to the
politics of fear.... It costs nothing to vote—and if there is a lin-
gering doubt about the legal or financial effect of divorce a 'No'
vote will put things beyond yea or nay. It protects their own mar-
riages and self-interest is a strong interest."51 In challenging the
anti-divorce case, the editorials thus took issue with the sociologi-
cal and economic thrust of the arguments articulated by opponents
of divorce.
Evaluation of the Discourse
The preceding discussion is based on a comprehensive and exhaus-
tive review of all twenty-eight editorials and twenty-three column
pieces on the amendment featured in the national newspapers dur-
ing the divorce debate. Although the fervor differed from one pa-
per to another, the editorial opinion was consistently pro-divorce,
from reaction on April 24 following the government's announce-
ment of the referendum to polling day on June 26. This was true of
the more urban and liberal Irish Times, and true for the Press and
the Independent, which have a greater rural and more conserva-
tive readership.
It was also true of the daily provincial newspaper, the Cork
Examiner, where a review of its seven editorials on the amend-
ment found the paper acknowledging the restrictiveness of the
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proposals. While it did not call for the endorsement of the amend-
ment, it emphasized the personal nature of the question and, call-
ing for a reasoned debate, encouraged the electorate to make an
informed decision on all aspects of the issue.52 It was also signifi-
cant that weekly provincial newspapers, even in electoral constitu-
encies that overwhelmingly rejected the amendment, did not argue
against divorce.53
It was clearly the case, therefore, that the national papers, all
with a substantial rural readership, actively encouraged divorce
and while the provincial press did not advocate it, neither did they
actively oppose it. And although the national newspapers had am-
ple opportunities to revise their editorial stance in favor of the sta-
tus quo as opinion polls indicated declining support for divorce,
none of them did so. In the case of the amendment, it was clear that
the print media's commitment to societal change superseded eco-
nomic considerations favoring an editorial line more in accordance
with the traditional, and what turned out to be the majority, view.
In this context it is also important to remember that the na-
tional, Dublin-based newspapers were far from being out of touch
with grassroots thinking and attitudes around the country. The ur-
ban/rural divide in Ireland, while an interesting one—it is more ap-
propriately thought of roughly in terms of east of the Shannon
(modern)/west of the Shannon (traditional)—is not similar to the
urban-rural divisions characteristic of some other Western societ-
ies. In a country that, after all, has a population of only three and
a half million people, the boundaries are less well defined, with a
significant portion of those who reside in Dublin and other urban
areas themselves coming from rural backgrounds. And, as voting
trends on the amendment indicated, support for divorce was evenly
split within Dublin as well as not showing a significant difference
between urban (47 percent) and rural (42 percent) areas.54
While Dublin-based, each of the newspapers has a nationwide
circulation, thus keeping them sensitive to the interests and con-
cerns of various constituencies. One further way in which the na-
tional papers keep in touch with grassroots sentiment is through
regular reports from around the country, demonstrated during the
divorce debate by the Times, which featured reporters' "note-
books" detailing attitudes and opinions from different counties.
Of all the papers, the one most closely linked with rural interests
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is the Independent; yet it was clearly committed to the passing of
the amendment.
That the national newspapers argued in favor of divorce, there-
fore, confirms the expectation that in Ireland, as elsewhere, the mass
media articulate a modern, secular voice.55 The stance adopted by
the newspapers on divorce highlights once again the complexity
surrounding the divorce issue in Ireland. On the one hand, the
Church and the Anti-Divorce Campaign argued against divorce
substantially on sociological grounds, whereas the national print
media unequivocally endorsed change. And, as we shall see in the
next chapter, television, while it tried to probe both sets of argu-
ments, inadvertently appeared to favor the status quo.
Clearly, the issue of the impact of the print media in shaping
people's attitudes on the amendment is beyond the scope of this
study. Although the duration of the debate saw a significant de-
crease in support for divorce, it may well be that more people
would have voted against the amendment had the newspapers not
adopted the unequivocal pro-divorce stance that they did. Any as-
sessment of the influence of mass media on attitudinal or behav-
ioral change has to take account of a wide range of dynamically
interrelated variables and the sociohistorical context within which
the media operates.
What is within the realm of this book, however, is an attempt to
contextualize the arguments of the print media. How radical or
nontraditional was the editorial stance? Were the editorials suffi-
ciently forceful to shift moral opinion? Or was there something re-
strictive or constraining about the discourse that limited its power
to convince people to go against Irish traditional values and vote
for divorce?
One way of providing such a context for understanding the
reach of the editorials is to consider the arguments articulated by
one Irish columnist, Conor Cruise O'Brien. Internationally known
writer, former government minister, self-declared agnostic, and di-
vorced, O'Brien writes a weekly column for the Independent.56
During the divorce campaign he wrote two forceful critiques of the
Catholic hierarchy's position in which he directly challenged the le-
gitimacy of the hierarchy to teach on the morality of marriage and
divorce: "My basic objection to what you have to say is that you
don't know what you're talking about. I don't mean that abusively
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or petulantly; I mean it literally. You are a group of celibates, as-
suming yourselves to be authorities on married life: the condition
which you are unanimous in having rejected for yourselves
personally."57 And O'Brien suggested further that the traditional
antipathy of the Church toward sexuality still existed even though
now it was disguised. He argued:
Traditionally, the attitude of the Irish Church towards sexuality has been
one of morose suspicion, bordering on downright hostility. It is no longer
a la mode for Churchmen to expose such feelings publicly, but the tradi-
tion was so strong, and entered so deeply into the training of the priest-
hood, that it would be surprising if the feelings associated with the
tradition had altogether vanished. Now in terms of that tradition, the sex-
ual aspects of marriage are inherently distasteful: weaknesses of the flesh,
consequences of the Fall. . . . People don't talk like that anymore, do they?
No indeed, but the fact that they don't talk like that anymore doesn't nec-
essarily mean that they have stopped feeling like that. I wonder what you
feel about that? You never tell us what you feel, of course, only what you
think and what you think we should think [emphasis his].58
In a later article, O'Brien raised questions about the waning
spiritual authority wielded by the hierarchy over Catholics regard-
ing moral matters. Underpinning his remarks was the contention
that contrary to the Church's official position emanating from Va-
tican II, the Irish hierarchy did not recognize the autonomy of
church and state, did not believe in tolerating religious freedom,
and were under siege by modernity. O'Brien argued that the bish-
ops were making recourse to the coercive apparatus of the state as
a way of enforcing Catholic morality. The thrust of his argument
was that "if Catholic lay people will not do your bidding, of their
own free will, they must be made to do your bidding, by the secular
courts and police. And if the civil and criminal laws of our Repub-
lic should be changed, in such a way that they cease to be available
for the enforcement of your particular teaching on divorce, then
you predict every manner of moral disaster for our people, helpless
as they will then apparently be before the inroads of the permissive
society" [emphasis his].59
O'Brien concluded by drawing parallels between the stance
adopted by the hierarchy during the divorce campaign to that of the
bishops regarding Charles Stewart PameH's liaison and his fall
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from political grace in the final years of the previous century:
"Your tune still runs: 'You must decide according to your con-
science. But we are the people who can tell you what your con-
science ought to be telling you.' "60
As these quotations demonstrate, O'Brien sharply attacked the
position of the hierarchy on divorce and, more fundamentally, chal-
lenged their legitimacy to have an informed opinion on marriage or
to speak publicly on such matters. Clearly, however, the forceful-
ness of O'Brien's arguments would have been deflected by his mav-
erick status in Irish society; they were the sorts of arguments the
Irish people would have expected him to articulate.
But where O'Brien's remarks are very useful is in contextualizing
the tone and arguments of the other editorial and column opinions.
Whereas O'Brien's discourse was provocative and challenging, the
other arguments were comparatively tame and deeply grounded
in the prevailing cultural norms. His was the only opinion that was
in any way radical; the kind of discourse we can imagine to have
been forceful enough, if taken seriously, to shake deeply entrenched
moral views. In comparison, the rest of the media analysis stayed
firmly embedded within societal expectations and standards of
what could be critiqued.
Yet, it is quite understandable that the editorials lacked the rad-
ical fervor of O'Brien. It is clearly not the role of the mainstream
media to be revolutionary or to challenge existing social or cultural
paradigms a la Cruise O'Brien. The jarring, provocative, and dis-
turbing features of O'Brien's columns derived from his meta-
analysis and criticism of Irish society and the Catholic church. But
such meta-analysis is not what regular newspaper editorials are
about. Media narratives crystalize, probe, and at times extend our
views, but they rarely dismantle the values and meanings current in
any given society. When we pick up a daily newspaper we do not
expect to confront revolutionary fervor; we anticipate rather a con-
tinuation of "business as usual" or the "normalcy" of daily life.
This clearly tempers the role of mass media as promoters of radical
shifts in public opinion, particularly on such bedrock cultural is-
sues as divorce. The arguments of O'Brien attest to that.
There is no doubt, however, as to the sincerity behind the edi-
torials of the three national newspapers in arguing for the adoption
of divorce and for rational evaluation of the arguments involved.
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Their message of liberalism, pluralism, and modernity came across
loud and clear. But what was the impact of this message? Did it
sway people to vote for divorce? It may well have. Despite the re-
jection of the amendment, the editorials may have had some impact
in preventing the level of support from slipping further. But they
may also have had the opposite effect. Paradoxically, the print me-
dia's progressive pro-divorce message may have fostered compla-
cency. Assuring people that they live in a modern, decent state
where the secular media take a liberal stand on traditional moral
issues, the editorial discourse may have served as a safety valve for
the articulation of antitradition sentiment, but at the same time
not been forceful or radical enough to challenge that tradition and
thus tempt people into using the privacy of the polling booth to en-
dorse change.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Television's Framing
of the Debate
In this chapter, I turn to television's coverage of the divorce de-
bate, and specifically focus on RTE'S preeminent current affairs
program, "Today Tonight." I will bring to life some of the real
drama and immediacy of the divorce debate and explore how it
was that RTE dealt with the regulatory constraints of impartiality,
objectivity, and fairness that apply in Ireland, as in other Western
broadcast environments, to television's coverage of controversial
public issues.1
Anchored by four well-known broadcasting personalities, all of
whom have careers independent of the program,2 "Today Tonight"
programming, in the words of media sociologist, Mary Kelly, "has
come to play an accepted and central role as a major source of in-
formation, comment and communication about Irish society."3 Au-
dience ratings consistently rank it as the most popular current
affairs program on either radio or television, and its varied audi-
ence, drawn from all sectors of Irish society, frequently comprises
one-third of all Irish households.4
Broadcast twice weekly for forty minutes during prime time, at
9:20 P.M. following the main evening news, "Today Tonight" pro-
vides critical, hard-hitting, investigative journalism on current po-
litical, economic, and social issues. In terms of scope, content, and
format, it would be most closely approximated in American televi-
sion by ABC'S "Nightline with Ted Koppel," though "Today To-
night" has a more significant time slot and, with four anchors, less
emphasis is placed on any single one of the individual interviewers.
A typical "Today Tonight" program focuses on one or two current
topics and is broadcast live without an audience from the television
studios located at RTE'S Dublin headquarters. It is usual for "Today
Tonight" to present a background filmed report on the question at
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issue, followed by a panel discussion or one-to-one interviews rep-
resenting partisan and expert opinion.
During the divorce campaign "Today Tonight" transmitted eight
programs on the amendment, five of which were ranked in the top
three most watched of all television programs for their respective
broadcast week.5 Beginning on April 23 with live transmission of
FitzGerald's press conference announcing the referendum and sep-
arate studio interviews with William Binchy and Garret FitzGerald,
until it concluded with a program that sought to elucidate nation-
wide popular opinion on divorce two days prior to the referendum
(June 24), "Today Tonight" tried to present a variety of viewpoints
on the issues raised by the amendment. Thus, departing from its
usual format, two of the programs on "Today Tonight" were "out-
side broadcasts" featuring audience participation and a panel dis-
cussion on divorce, one broadcast from the Great Southern Hotel
in Galway (June 3) and the other from the Imperial Hotel in Cork
(June 10). Another program featured a discussion by a panel of pol-
iticians representing each of the parliamentary parties (May 22),
while at the outset of the debate, the views of individual politicians
and a number of committed partisans were presented (April 24).
Let us now turn to one such program and see how it was that
"Today Tonight" broached the divorce question. What kinds of
questions did the interviewers ask, and how did they cope with the
responses offered? For my analysis, I focus in some depth on one
"Today Tonight" program in which the two main protagonists,
Garret FitzGerald and William Binchy, were interviewed.
On June 17, nine days prior to the referendum, "Today Tonight," in
the fifth of its eight programs on the amendment, pitted the argu-
ments of the two main players in the debate against one another,
presenting separate one-to-one interviews with William Binchy and
Garret FitzGerald.6 Introducing the program, the authoritative
voice of "Today Tonight" anchor/interviewer and political science
professor, Brian Farrell, demarcated the oppositional poles on the
amendment, stating in his customarily clipped tone: "William
Binchy puts the case for a 'no' vote in next week's referendum. The
Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, argues for a 'yes' vote to allow
limited civil divorce."7 After a brief summary of the background to
the referendum, a reminder of the content of the government's
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specific divorce proposals, and an update on the latest opinion poll
findings, John Bowman interviewed William Binchy and was fol-
lowed by Brian Farrell interviewing Garret FitzGerald.
The Challenge to the Anti-Divorce Case
John Bowman, an interviewer with a self-assured manner, began
the interview suggesting to William Binchy that the gap in support
for the amendment, while narrowing, was still wide. Disagreeing,
Binchy replied that, in addition to the polls, he found significant
support for the anti-amendment position from his canvassing ex-
perience around the country, and he rejected Bowman's challenge:
"Aren't you preaching to the converted at these meetings?" stating,
"the trend is clearly downwards and the reason why that trend is
going downwards is the arguments have been listened t o . . . . This
is not restrictive divorce and it will involve injustice to the first fam-
ily." Then asked by John Bowman about "accusations of scaremon-
gering," Binchy rejected this and elaborated that the practical
economic implications of divorce were "indeed scary."
Importantly, Bowman then asked Binchy: "Are you against di-
vorce itself absolutely or are you against the terms of this proposed
amendment?" To this Binchy replied, "Well, if somebody can show
me a divorce law that can work and adequately protect the first
family and children, I would be in favour of it." In turn, Bowman
challenged: "But does the present situation protect the first wife
and family? The absence of law can also lead to a lack of protection
for individuals." Responding, Binchy conceded the point but then,
negating his hypothetical support for divorce that would protect
women and children, went on to argue that "one thing that can be
said about the present law is that marriage as a lifelong commit-
ment is protected by it."
This point was pursued by John Bowman, who contended that
lifelong marriage is not protected "since marriage doesn't last for a
lot of people. Second liaisons are set up and second families are set
up." Nonetheless, to this question and in the subsequent exchange,
Binchy persisted: "Marriage as a lifelong commitment is protected
by the law to this extent that those who enter marriage find that
that commitment is supported in the area of maintenance pay-
ments . . . succession rights. If one has the right to remarry, that
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means the right to establish a second family, and the reality of life
is that, unfortunately, if a man enters into a second family, his sal-
ary doesn't increase, doesn't double. It is just one salary . . . and
the one salary has to cover two families."
BOWMAN: But that is so in the present situation where in the absence
of legislation second liaisons are set up and the first spouse may be
abandoned.
BINCHY: No, the whole point about the thrust of the present law is that
the present law protects and aims to protect and actually seeks to protect
the first wife in those circumstances by protecting her maintenance, her
family home, and her succession rights . . .
BOWMAN: But what about the right of the wife who is abandoned now?
She might also aspire to the right to remarry, to seek happiness in a sec-
ond legitimate union. Aren't you denying, isn't your lobby denying her
that right?
BINCHY: NO. The situation is that those who marry in the sense of en-
tering a lifelong commitment bind themselves by that commitment...
BOWMAN: But the marriage may have evaporated. It isn't there. The
husband has gone off to Australia with another woman. Hasn't she the
right to seek a second legal union?
BINCHY: Well if one says in isolation that a particular person, take a
deserted wife . . . or indeed a battered wife . . . where our sympathy would
go out in those circumstances to the individual concerned. One then has
to say could one introduce a law that would cover that type of case and
exclude the undeserving case where, let us say a deserting husband or a
wife-battering husband sought a divorce. . . . in no country in the world
has there ever been a successful attempt to separate what one could call
deserving from undeserving cases. Even the notion of a deserving case is
difficult to define. But the interesting thing to notice about this amend-
ment is that whatever attempts one might imagine that could be made to
distinguish between deserving and undeserving cases, this amendment
doesn't do so at all. This amendment would allow a deserting husband, a
wife battering husband, a husband who leaves the home for no good rea-
son . . . the right to obtain a divorce and remarry against the wishes of the
other spouse.
From this issue, Bowman then moved to the question of nullity
(a civil or ecclesiastical procedure that renders an existing marriage
void on the grounds that it was not validly contracted), but, here
again, as the following dialogue demonstrates, Binchy gained the
upper hand.
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BOWMAN: What about nullity? Part of your group suggests that nullity
is the answer. Now other critics say that nullity is a fiction, a cop-out. It
suggests indeed to the children of that first liaison that they are illegiti-
mate, that the marriage never existed.
BINCHY: Right. Well, of course, part of our group does not suggest that.
Our position on nullity—
BOWMAN: Spokesmen for your group have suggested that.
BINCHY: NO, John, that is not so. That has been said by those who are
putting forward the divorce argument. That has not been said in fact by
those on our side.
This exchange then led John Bowman to suggest that the ADC was
in conflict with the Catholic church.
BOWMAN: SO you're critical of the nullity provisions presently from the
Catholic church?
BINCHY: Oh, no. That's not the position at all. There is such a concept
as nullity which operates in respect of marriages that are invalid from the
start. There is such a provision in Irish law, in State law . . .
Binchy's response here brought forth an elaborated exchange be-
tween Bowman and Binchy on the validity of the concept of nullity.
The exchange clearly underscored the difficulties that "Today To-
night" interviewers had in penetrating Binchy's arguments and, in
particular, the difficulties they encountered in adequately respond-
ing to his legal articulateness.
BOWMAN: In what sense are they invalid?. . . . If the state recognizes
that there was a marriage, however inadequate, however poor, there was
a marriage.
BINCHY: Well John, if a brother married his sister because let's say in
circumstances where a child was adopted and they weren't conscious of
that, you would agree that the marriage was not a valid marriage. If a per-
son aged fourteen years went into a marriage that marriage would not be
a valid marriage.
BOWMAN: But it would have been a marriage. If they had children....
it would have been a marriage.
BINCHY: It would be a marriage but it wouldn't be a valid marriage in
any country in the world . . .
BOWMAN: But there would be cases, for instance, where there was a
marriage, where there was a Church annulment, where there were children
and where there would be second liaisons blessed by the Church. Now in
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Irish law such liaisons are bigamous. Shouldn't the Gardai [police] be in
there arresting them?
BINCHY: No. I think you wouldn't send the Gardai in there.
BOWMAN: But this is the anomaly of the present time.
BINCHY: No, the anomaly . . . I think you are misunderstanding really
the position on the ground in terms of nullity . . . There is widespread lack
of appreciation . . .
BOWMAN: But the grounds are different.
BINCHY: NO, in fact, the grounds are not different. That's the interest-
ing thing. There is complete misunderstanding about this . . .
Following this, John Bowman moved the discussion from his
earlier question about the difference between the Church and the
ADC on nullity to the similarities between the ADC and the Catholic
church on the question of divorce. Importantly, he asked Binchy
whether the ADC'S view coincided with the Catholic church.
BOWMAN: In this campaign does your view coincide with that of the
Catholic hierarchy?
BINCHY: Well, I think the appropriate person to ask that to would be a
spokesman for the hierarchy. If I read the Catholic statement of last week
correctly, I think it is 100 percent against divorce on the social issues—
When Bowman persisted that the hierarchy also stated that Cath-
olics could vote "yes" in good conscience, Binchy replied: "That's
true. That's on the theological question. . . . Now I, of course,
would only speak on the social data and the sociological area."
John Bowman continued, however, "Aren't the arguments that you
are putting forward in a way perfect for those who consider them-
selves Catholic and who want to have a lifelong marriage.. . . But
aren't you attempting to impose them on society at large?" to
which Binchy responded: "Well, I think that's a mistake, frankly,
John. I think that the arguments I would make against divorce and
the implications of this amendment are in terms of the injustice, the
clear injustice which it would cause to the first family.... It has
nothing to do with religion" [emphasis mine].
The interview then turned toward its conclusion with a discus-
sion of the implications of the defeat of the amendment on North-
South relations and to the role of the judiciary in granting divorce.
Again, with these questions, John Bowman was not able to match
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Binchy's argumentative style and command of the issues, well illus-
trated by the authoritative way in which he dealt with Bowman's
challenging questions on the North:
BOWMAN: But if you are moving towards a constitution which we
would hope would be applicable to the whole island of Ireland, are you
saying that there should be no divorce anywhere in Ireland?
BINCHY: No, absolutely not. That certainly would not be my position
because—
BOWMAN: Why not?
BINCHY: Because I am not addressing the position north of the border.
I am addressing the position in this country, which is south of the border,
the twenty-six counties.
BOWMAN: But isn't that partitionist then?
BINCHY: NO, John, because I will be quite happy to tell you my views
on a united Ireland and how I would feel that the question of North/South
relations would be resolved in the area of divorce. I'd be delighted to tell
you my views but, that is, I would suggest to you, for another program.
BOWMAN: But the constitution has Article Two and Three in it as well.
Surely our whole aspiration, our whole political culture, is also one to en-
compass Northern Ireland if possible?
BINCHY: Well, if you ask me my personal views on the question of
North/South relations, the kind of society that I would like for North/
South relations, I would like to see a federal society in this country in
which the values of those in the North would be reflected in the laws of
those in the North, the values of those in the South would be reflected in
their laws. But that, I would suggest to you, is a comment on my view of
the question of the unification of this country rather than the social ques-
tion which is what the voters will be voting on on the twenty-sixth of June.
As demonstrated by this interview, Binchy was asked several
challenging questions. Importantly, John Bowman attempted to
explore the inconsistencies in the ADC'S agenda—the current anom-
alies presented by Irish law and, more significantly, the denomi-
national nature of the ADC'S position. Binchy's preemptive style,
however, and his tendency to redefine the questions asked did not
allow for an in-depth exploration of these key issues. His forceful
style was all the more significant given that he was featured on
"Today Tonight" several times during the debate; unlike Garret
FitzGerald, who was interviewed twice, Binchy appeared on five of
the eight programs.
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Binchy's presentational style was also adopted by other ADC
spokespersons. Interviewing the ADC'S Joe McCarroll, "Today To-
night" presenter Pat Kenny similarly tried to penetrate the ADC'S ob-
jection to the principle of divorce. But, as with Binchy, McCarroll
too was able to deflect attention to the economic effects of divorce.
KENNY: Let's get it quite clear. You're against any divorce, not just this
bill as it is drawn up. . . . your basic point is no divorce no matter how
tight, how restrictive, how conservative it might be.
MCCARROLL: Yes, I believe that divorce is unjust.... The most impor-
tant clause is the one that was included about adequate provision for
women and children... . Now that means that if a person had no money
at all when they divorced their wife and children... .8
In sum, the ADC'S case as it was presented on "Today Tonight"
appeared free of any ambiguity or contradiction. Forcefully reiter-
ating a set of linear arguments, Binchy framed the anti-divorce po-
sition in simple, straightforward, concrete terms and was able to
stifle any suggestion that it might be otherwise.
The Challenge to the Pro-Divorce Case
After a preliminary question to Garret FitzGerald, "Why do it
[hold a referendum] and why now?" Brian Farrell, in his no-
nonsense style, challenged FitzGerald that he had changed his mind
regarding the effects of divorce. Farrell said, "You're saying to the
Irish people vote 'yes>' and nine years ago . . . you were the person
who said divorce is bad for children, you were saying that econom-
ically, biologically, women are vulnerable if you introduce di-
vorce?" On the defensive, FitzGerald replied that he had been
misquoted and what he had said was that, as is still the case: "I
don't believe, contrary to other people whom I respect, that there is
a civil right to divorce. I believe it is a social issue." Pursuing this
issue, Farrell asked: "What about the argument of those who are
opposed. . . . if you introduce divorce you change the whole nature
of marriage for everybody, not just for that minority, and secondly,
that in terms of these people you are not making their life neces-
sarily any easier, because, after all, some may not want a divorce;
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it may be forced upon them?" Responding, FitzGerald argued that
"the situation is not quite" as depicted by Farrell. FitzGerald ex-
plained: "On the question of [divorce] being forced upon them, for
a great majority of the people concerned the choice will either be a
joint one or one acceptable to both. There will be some cases of
disagreement, but remember, that in such cases the partner who
doesn't want the divorce, who says the marriage hasn't failed, who
believes that there is a chance of reconciliation will put that case to
the judge. And unless the judge is satisfied that that partner is
wrong and that the marriage has failed . . . constitutionally, a di-
vorce cannot be given."
FitzGerald was then challenged by Farrell that divorce brings
about negative economic effects. "What about," Farrell asked,
"the rights of the first family, that after all, and there is evidence in
virtually every country where divorces occur, families are hit, fam-
ily finances are hit?" In reply, FitzGerald pointed out how the form
of divorce proposed would improve the financial situation of wives
and elaborated that it would give them economic compensation for
their contribution to the marriage. Farrell further challenged him,
saying, "But couldn't one argue that all of these extra protections
could be brought in by legislation without ever introducing di-
vorce?" FitzGerald replied that "there is a constitutional doubt
about whether you can without changing the constitution."
The other question relating specifically to the proposals referred
to their unrestrictiveness. "Your opponents have said that the fail-
ure line you are adopting in regard to divorce . . . is less restrictive
than that available anywhere else in the world. Floodgates?" Farrell
asked. Responding that "well, of course, that's absolute nonsense,"
FitzGerald continued by emphasizing the restrictiveness of the di-
vorce criteria. Farrell's rejoinder to FitzGerald's elaborated re-
marks, however, was to suggest the possibility of a loop-hole in the
criteria as had been suggested by a prominent anti-divorce member
of FitzGerald's cabinet. "What about the point of your cabinet col-
league, Mr. Cooney, who says that couples will be coercing the
courts to give them divorces?"
This exchange then facilitated an easy transition to a central
theme highlighted by "Today Tonight" throughout its coverage
of the debate, that of conflict and divisiveness. Underscoring the
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intracabinet and intraparty divisions regarding the amendment,
Farrell, showing his academic sense for political intrigue, won-
dered, "But if, Taoiseach, if all your points of view are so reason-
able, if they are so pervasive, if it's so much in the public interest,
how come you could not persuade your cabinet colleagues in
total to go along, and your party colleagues?" When FitzGerald
responded that the question of divorce was one of individual
conscience and therefore he accepted individual politicians' deci-
sion not to support the amendment, Farrell then challenged him,
saying, "Isn't this whole referendum going to be, isn't it al-
ready, very divisive? Haven't we seen a division between urban
and rural people, between young and old, between those who are
very much committed to the concept of living in a society with
an overwhelming Christian ethos and those who seek some other
kind of society?" FitzGerald argued that the latter division didn't
exist because "the vast majority of our people are practicing
Christians who believe that marriage is indissoluble. But there
is a minority of people who don't have that conviction that in
special circumstances they should abstain from a further mar-
riage. . . . And the question is are we willing to cater for that mi-
nority." In turn, Farrell suggested, "Wouldn't those who are
opposed to your proposals say that what you are doing is you're
catering for a very small minority by introducing divorce which
will expand that minority?"
This exchange led to the accentuation of another theme of con-
flict, that of church/state divisions. FitzGerald invoked the experi-
ence of divorce in Northern Ireland in order to illustrate his point
that the extent of divorce in a society depends on its values, say-
ing, "It is true that in countries very unlike ours, countries where
you do not have the vast majority of the people practicing Chris-
tians, certainly divorce has tended to expand . . . But . . . I know
from ecclesiastical sources in the Roman Catholic church that
while divorce exists in Northern Ireland and there are quite a large
number of divorces, amongst Catholics in Northern Ireland there
are very few divorces." Farrell, however, reminded FitzGerald,
and the audience, that he was at odds on this point with the Irish
Cardinal, Thomas O'Fee: "But you're quoting anonymous ecclesi-
astical sources. Now, the highest ecclesiastical source in the Roman
Catholic church . . . tonight he is speaking about the plague of di-
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vorce. He's saying, here we are, four hundred and fifty years after
the Roman Catholic church was prepared to break with England
on the basis of a royal divorce, here you are proposing to intro-
duce divorce."
In response, FitzGerald once again distinguished between his
personal belief in indissoluble monogamy and his role as a legisla-
tor to cater to the needs of people in the society, an argument that
was challenged by Farrell, who said, "Equally isn't there a balance
of judgment here that some people would say that you may be seek-
ing the pluralist society, you may end up with a permissive soci-
ety?" FitzGerald rejected this claim by again referring to the low
rate of divorce for Catholics in Northern Ireland and by empha-
sizing the restrictiveness of the divorce procedure being proposed.
In response to this, Farrell alluded to another division in Irish so-
ciety, an economically based one, pointing out, "But you've em-
phasized the difficulty, you've emphasized the involvement of the
courts and the involvement of the lawyers. Doesn't that add up to
saying that this is a procedure which really is for the middle classes,
only for those who can afford it?" The interview concluded with
Farrell raising the political impact of the possible defeat of the
amendment and equating the outcome of the referendum with
FitzGerald's political future. "If you lose this referendum," Farrell
said, "what effect is that going to have on you politically? At least
politically embarrassing?"
In this interview with FitzGerald we see the main themes that
characterized "Today Tonight's" campaign coverage as the inter-
viewers asked several questions challenging the validity of the pro-
divorce case. As is well illustrated by this exchange, "Today
Tonight" emphasized the divisiveness regarding divorce, the unre-
strictiveness of the proposals, and their economic costs. It was the
stress on conflict and divisiveness, however, that constituted the
primary frame of the representation of the debate as presented by
"Today Tonight."
Already in the first program broadcast on the referendum, John
Bowman, interviewing FitzGerald, repeatedly confronted him with
the "deep divisions" within his own party and highlighted this by
quoting statements from dissenting members of his parliamentary
party. Although FitzGerald reiterated his acceptance of party mem-
bers deviating from support of the amendment on account of
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personal conscience, Bowman wondered about "party members
campaigning against party policy" and stressed that during the
campaign "we are going to get two Fine Gael voices."9
For its part, "Today Tonight" ensured that the audience/elector-
ate did hear two Fine Gael voices during the campaign, featuring,
for example, Alice Glenn, the outspoken dissenting Fine Gael par-
liamentarian on its second program.10 In two further programs,
Brian Farrell alluded to the "great deal of dithering on the part of
Fine Gael" and the "division in the ranks of the government,"11
while the final program preceding the referendum featured Fine
Gael's chairperson being challenged by "Today Tonight" reporter,
Gary Agnew, that his nonparticipation in the campaign was con-
trary to party policy.12
"Today Tonight" also emphasized interparty conflict. Again, in
the first program, John Bowman suggested to FitzGerald that he
could be accused of making a "political football" out of the divorce
campaign by not trying to reach full agreement with Fianna Fail on
the divorce proposals before publishing them.13 In three subsequent
programs, "Today Tonight" drew attention to the "neutral" strat-
egy officially adopted by Fianna Fail, even though many of its
spokespersons, including those who appeared on "Today To-
night," articulated an anti-divorce stance, thus reinforcing the
interparty divisions on the amendment.14 During one program,
Brian Farrell commented on Fianna Fail's "strategic opposition"
by observing that this was "the first time on any major issue facing
the Irish people in the last fifty years that Fianna Fail did not have
a position."15
Nevertheless, despite the official nonparticipation of Fianna Fail
in the debate, "Today Tonight" included a Fianna Fail representa-
tive in three of its programs.16 It is arguable, indeed, that "Today
Tonight" legitimated the party's contradictory stance during the
campaign by featuring Fianna Fail members on its anti-divorce
panels. This strategy, however, further enabled "Today Tonight" to
highlight the interparty political divisions as well as the conflicts
between pro- and anti-divorce campaigners and thus fit well with
its conflict motif.
Farrell's remarks to FitzGerald accentuating his deviation from
Church officials on divorce also fit a broader pattern whereby
"Today Tonight" emphasized the Church's opposition to the gov-
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ernment's proposals and to divorce in general. From the beginning
of the campaign, "Today Tonight" highlighted church/state divi-
siveness and the "confusion about the moral responsibility for con-
scientious, practicing Catholics" with regard to voting.17 It was
apparent that the underlying assumption of "Today Tonight" was
the traditional view that the state should support and reinforce
Church teaching. Accordingly, it presented the government's at-
tempt to introduce divorce as oppositional to this.
At the government's press conference announcing the proposals,
"Today Tonight" reporter Una Claffey asked FitzGerald whether
he was aware of what role the Catholic church would assume in the
campaign. When FitzGerald replied that it was a matter for the
Church to express its theological and sociological views to its own
members, Claffey pushed FitzGerald to know whether the Catholic
church "will involve itself in an actual campaign against the
referendum."18 Later that same evening during his studio inter-
view, FitzGerald was once again asked about the Church's involve-
ment in the campaign. In a tone of challenging definitivity, John
Bowman stated, "Presumably the Church will oppose this . . . they
have said so from the beginning."19
In several programs, the "full, outright opposition of the Cath-
olic Church" to the government's proposals was mentioned by
"Today Tonight" interviewers,20 with Pat Kenny insisting to pro-
divorce activists that they would "be up against priests in the pulpit
every Sunday pointing out the moral . . . and the sociological im-
plications of divorce."21 In its campaign review program, "Today
Tonight" reiterated the points of difference between church and
state on divorce. Featuring an excerpt from an interview with the
hierarchy's spokesman, Bishop Cassidy, the hierarchy's mistrust of
the proposals was once again underscored when Una Claffey
asked, "The Taoiseach [FitzGerald] has given guarantees that [a
liberalization of divorce criteria] will not be the case. Do you not
accept that?" Bishop Cassidy replied, "I accept the word of the
Taoiseach, but even the Taoiseach, with due respect, cannot foresee
what a future Oireachtas [Parliament] will do."22 The theme of
church/state conflict thus extended the focus on political conflict,
as "Today Tonight" appropriated the range of divisions brought to
the fore by the amendment and used them to challenge the legiti-
macy of introducing divorce.
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Evaluation of the Framing of the Debate
Although I have considered here just one episode of "Today To-
night," the exchanges quoted demonstrate rather compellingly that
the hard-hitting journalism was intended to penetrate aggressively
the arguments of the protagonists in the divorce campaign. In fact,
"Today Tonight" probed the two sides much more than did the
print media, who, despite their strong endorsement of divorce, did
not refer to the inconsistencies in the anti-divorce discourse. Fur-
thermore, it is clear that "Today Tonight" attempted to conduct it-
self in an impartial manner. And yet, it is also true that what
resulted from the coverage was a reproduction of the conflict and
inequalities that characterized the debate as a whole. Focusing on
government dissent and highlighting pro-divorce fragmentation,
"Today Tonight" underscored the narrow base of institutional sup-
port for the proposals and appeared to do more damage to the pro-
divorce position, despite its efforts to maintain impartiality.
Why was this? What might account for the undermining of the
pro-divorce case? To understand the framing of the debate by "To-
day Tonight" we have to consider the regulatory environment in
which it operates. Like in other Western societies, broadcasters in
Ireland are bound "in a matter of public controversy or a matter
which is a source of current public debate, [that] information, news
or a feature presented about it, is presented . . . objectively, impar-
tially and . . . fair to all interests concerned."23 This, essentially, en-
joins broadcasters to provide a balanced representation of an
inherently unbalanced reality.24 During times of sensitive moral or
political debate, precisely when feelings of partisanship run high
among the public, broadcasters are constrained to represent impar-
tially the questions at issue.
Obviously there are different ways of trying to achieve impartial
coverage. One way is to adopt a behaviorist approach using objec-
tive criteria such as equal time and equal representation. Another
way is to take a more subjective interpretation that aims to achieve
greater substantive completeness by, for instance, allowing more
time for more complex arguments. Throughout the debate, "Today
Tonight" was acutely aware of its regulatory constraints—all the
broadcasters with whom I spoke emphasized their professional
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commitment to fair coverage—and it sought to maintain impartial-
ity in several ways.
Departing from its customary recourse to expert opinion, "To-
day Tonight" did not interview either a sociologist or an economist
on any of its programs, despite the frequent references to sociolog-
ical and economic data. And despite the frequent references to the
post-divorce experience in England and America, neither was an
"expert" familiar with the post-divorce experience or culture of ei-
ther of these countries interviewed. When I discussed the absence
of such interviews with "Today Tonight" personnel, anchor/
presenter Brian Farrell stressed that in any campaign situation,
"Today Tonight" has to be careful in ensuring that no "set-up"
pieces are featured because they might indirectly favor one side.
For the same reason, no "human interest" background material
was included, based, for instance, on personal experience of deser-
tion or separation, nor was there a report documenting the social
or economic consequences of marriage breakdown in Ireland.25
"Today Tonight" thus excluded experts and background reports as
a way of eliminating potential sources of bias in its coverage of the
campaign, and it was also careful to balance pro-divorce politicians
with those opposed to the amendment.26
But because such strict standards of impartiality were adhered
to by "Today Tonight," the representation of the two cases came
across very differently and very unequally. It is quite understandable
that, when confronted with such a tense debate, "Today Tonight"
favored objective, behaviorist standards, but this led to a variety of
problems. "Today Tonight" immediately ran into the problem of
an unequal number of groups and spokespersons on the two sides.
Thus the same individual spokespersons from the ADC appeared
more frequently than did individual pro-divorce spokespersons.
Reflecting the greater organizational cohesiveness of the ADC and
the organizational differentiation of the pro-divorce lobby, William
Binchy was featured on five programs, and a second anti-divorce
spokesperson, Joe McCarroll, appeared on three, whereas key pro-
divorce people such as Garret FitzGerald and DAG chairperson Jean
Tansey each appeared on only two of the eight programs transmit-
ted. Similarly, nobody from the DAG was interviewed in the televi-
sion studio on a one-to-one basis, whereas from the ADC, William
Binchy was interviewed alone twice and Joe McCarroll was
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featured alone once.27 Consequently, while the audience was ex-
posed to a range of different pro-divorce spokespersons, Binchy
achieved greater exposure because of his repeated individual ap-
pearances on behalf of the ADC. This raises the possibility that
Binchy's recurring appearances perhaps enhanced his legitimacy
and identifiability with the audience, and thus strengthened the ap-
peal of the anti-divorce message.
"Today Tonight" was itself concerned about Binchy's greater
exposure. Midway through the campaign, as a senior broadcaster
told me, "Today Tonight" "tired of interviewing Binchy," asked to
interview Des Hanafin, the ADC chairman, instead. The ADC re-
fused this request, and "Today Tonight" decided then not to fea-
ture any representative from the ADC on the planned program.
Reviewed at a routine meeting of an RTE steering committee spe-
cifically established to monitor RTE'S coverage of the campaign, the
decision by "Today Tonight" was overruled, RTE executives feared
that charges of partiality would be incurred if Binchy, as the ADC
representative, had not been included on the same program that
was to feature pro-divorce speakers. "Today Tonight" broadcast-
ers, therefore, could not do anything to circumvent the ADC'S deci-
sion to have Binchy as their primary spokesman, underscoring the
fact that, during controversial debates, in addition to the routine
organizational and economic constraints, broadcasters' profes-
sional autonomy is further curtailed by statutory regulations.28
More important, however, adoption of behavioral criteria by
"Today Tonight" did not allow for differences in the unequal na-
ture of the opposing arguments. Journalistic preoccupation with
themes of conflict meant that "Today Tonight" found the govern-
ment a much easier target than the ADC. The range of dissenting
opinions openly acknowledged by FitzGerald facilitated broadcast-
ers' use of frames of conflict. Constituting better—that is, more
dramatic—television, "Today Tonight" interviewers were well
able to exploit the divisiveness and conflict caused by the initiative
to introduce divorce.29
The preference "Today Tonight" showed for themes of conflict
was accentuated by the fact that in the case of the divorce cam-
paign, FitzGerald was presenting something new; in arguing for
the introduction of divorce, he was arguing for societal change.
Binchy, on the other hand, was defending something that was
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already well embedded in the culture. In arguing for change, Fitz-
Gerald put forward complex views, but, as abstract arguments,
they were easier to dispute than the straightforward concrete ar-
guments of William Binchy and the ADC. In sum, the pro-divorce
discourse, both in terms of its complexity and its divisiveness, was
much more accessible to dramatic journalism than was the anti-
divorce case.
But if, as we have seen, behavioral criteria do not result in im-
partiality, then what can broadcasters do? If they use other means,
such as incorporating expert analysis or allowing more time in
which to flesh out complex arguments, they run a greater risk of
incurring charges of partisanship from aggrieved parties. There-
fore, while subjective criteria might be more successful in capturing
the complexity of the issues raised by controversial debates, objec-
tive criteria have the advantage that they seem, at least on the sur-
face, to be less biased. As we have seen with coverage of the divorce
debate, however, using objective standards of impartiality, "Today
Tonight" reproduced the conflicts and inequalities of the campaign
and in doing so inadvertently undermined the pro-divorce case. Ul-
timately, the representation of the debate by "Today Tonight"
shows the great dilemma that broadcasters encounter, no matter
how great their commitment and sensitivity to impartiality and
fairness, in presenting controversial issues in a substantively bal-
anced manner. And, finally, it also illustrates the futility in thinking
that legislative requirements mandating objectivity can override
successfully the differentiated complexity and inequalities that in-
here in controversial public issues.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Values in Tension
In modern times, from the secularization of marriage and the in-
troduction of restrictive divorce to the no-fault divorce reforms of
the 1960s, the evolving emphasis on marriage as a contract has par-
alleled economic rationalization. For most Western societies, there
was a processual inevitability between changes in the economic,
political, and moral domains. Cultural modernization was virtu-
ally an invisible process with a trend toward increasing seculariza-
tion evident only retrospectively. Changes in modern divorce law,
occurring in circumstances that did not require constitutional
change and electoral approval, were achieved independent of public
debate. Framed primarily by legal and political elites, there was lit-
tle discussion of cultural considerations and implications.
Ireland, for various reasons, is different. Rather than liberalizing
its marriage law, it took the opposite path and in 1937 proclaimed
a constitutional ban on divorce. Ireland's cultural exceptionalism
can be traced to its colonial history and the peripheralization of the
Irish economy, which resulted in the retardation of Ireland's eco-
nomic development. It also reflects the special status of the Cath-
olic church in Ireland, which, as well as being a source of moral
guidance, is a symbol of national identity. A "natural" progression,
therefore, did not occur in Ireland between economic and cultural
change. While economic rationalization took effect from the late
1950s, in the moral domain, Ireland in the late 1980s still resem-
bled a traditional society as indicated by its prohibition of divorce
and abortion and the restricted availability of contraception. Cul-
tural change and the question of divorce thus became a matter of
deliberate and self-conscious decision-making as the Irish sought to
define what values they wished to privilege.
The idea behind this book has been that analysis of this delib-
erate engagement in moral discourse would provide insight into is-
sues of values and morality in Ireland as well as into how people in
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general deal with morally charged questions. This is particularly so
since the Irish debate took place in the 1980s, a moment in which
the ideology of rationality and progress was being reevaluated and
challenged in the West. Compelling claims that societal fragmen-
tation is the twin of secularization and empirical findings locating
the negative consequences of divorce pose a strong challenge to pre-
viously accepted assumptions regarding the desirability of
modernity.1 In this final chapter then, I will first summarize the
central points that emerge from analysis of the Irish debate and
conclude with some thoughts on the tension in values between tra-
dition and modernity.
The Multifaceted Nature of the Discourse
Our exploration of the arguments put forward during the divorce
debate has illustrated the complexity of the discourse and the var-
ious strands and frames of reference that surrounded discussion of
this morally charged question. What stands out is the range of dif-
ferent perspectives that was articulated. This study reemphasizes
the fact that in order to understand public dialogue one has to look
at it from a variety of perspectives, since what is emphasized in the
discourse and what is presented as being important changes as ac-
tors, venues, and stages change.
Newspaper editorials, for example, conveyed the idea that there
was solid, widespread support for divorce. All three national dai-
lies—the Irish Independent, the Irish Press, and the Irish Times—
argued that divorce was a necessary response to the increasing
incidence of marital breakdown, and, delineating numerous rea-
sons why the amendment should pass, they urged their readers to
vote "yes." Appealing to the decency of the Irish people, the edi-
torials argued for a pluralist society that would recognize minority
interests and, emphasizing the restrictiveness of the proposals,
maintained that divorce would not cause societal upheaval.
Also favoring change, trade unionists and socialist politicians
framed their support for divorce in the language of individual
rights. Arguing that the right to divorce is a universal and basic
civil right, they contended that its denial was undemocratic, dis-
criminatory, and sectarian. This rights discourse on divorce was in
many ways similar to the language of individual rights that per-
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vades American moral debates. But unlike the situation in the
United States, however, in Ireland a discourse of individual rights is
not commonly used; it is found only in particular cultural pockets.
Consequently, the notion of a "right to divorce" was, in fact, chal-
lenged by Garret FitzGerald and other prominent advocates of di-
vorce, who instead framed the issue in the context of the social
good. And while some pro-divorce activists referred to the right
to divorce, it was never really a theme of their campaign. The in-
accessibility of an individual rights discourse, however, severely
restricted pro-divorce campaigners' ability to reach a broadly dif-
ferentiated public with a commonly shared abstract notion that,
once in use, has a very practical and well-understood meaning.
Ambiguities in the Church's stance during the debate gave lie to
popular assumptions that the Catholic church bears all responsi-
bility for the cultural peculiarities of the Irish. Not only did the
bishops declare their official nonparticipation in the campaign, but
they acknowledged that Catholics in good conscience could vote in
favor of divorce. But, in expressing its pastoral views on the amend-
ment, the hierarchy, in addition to its moral reasons, gave substan-
tial emphasis to selective sociological data delineating the negative
effects of divorce and thus framed its theological opposition to di-
vorce within a secular framework. However, rather than being
exploited by pro-divorce activists or the Irish people, the Church's
secular voice went unchallenged during the campaign. The Church's
dual arguments, therefore, paralleled and reinforced the ADC'S prac-
tical, empirical arguments as well as the other-worldly, moral cum
religious objections that shadowed the ADC'S economic discourse.
One could well believe from some of their pronouncements that
neither the Church nor Fianna Fail were involved in the debate at
all. But, despite their official nonparticipation in the campaign, the
contribution of both was significant. As well as articulating oppo-
sition to divorce, their well-organized respective "machines" pro-
vided an important campaign infrastructure to the canvassing
efforts of the Anti-Divorce Campaign. It facilitated the communica-
tion of the anti-divorce message at the local grassroots level, allow-
ing arguments against divorce to be differentially presented in view
of the specific concerns and interests of the different communities.
Unlike the print media, which emphasized arguments in favor of
divorce, television highlighted the crisis and conflict stimulated by
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the divorce initiative. Broadcasters' preferences for drama and dis-
sension led "Today Tonight," a program renowned for its critical
journalism, to emphasize the fragmentation in the pro-divorce
ranks and the divisions within the government and Garret Fitz-
Gerald's party on the amendment. Notwithstanding its efforts to
maintain impartiality, "Today Tonight" reproduced the conflicts
and inequalities of the campaign, and, adhering to a behaviorist in-
terpretation of objectivity, its coverage seemed to undermine the
pro-divorce case.
All of the players in the cast of the Irish divorce debate, there-
fore, presented various strands of argumentation, ones that were
not always consistent or coherent. Neither simple or straightfor-
ward, the discourse included a range of nuanced and often polar-
ized arguments.
Concrete Discourse about Lofty Issues
Since the 1940s and 1950s there has been a shift in the discourse
used in sociomoral debates in Ireland. Most discernible in the state-
ments of the Catholic hierarchy, post-Vatican II arguments have be-
come more this-worldly, suggesting, perhaps, that people want to
adopt a stand grounded in pragmatic reasoning rather than in faith
or dogmatic assertion. This study affirms that while issues of values
may be abstract and philosophical, arguments for and against them,
especially those that appear to be effective, tend to be grounded in
very concrete realities. The defeat of the divorce amendment may
well be attributed to the ADC'S this-worldly discourse—its mun-
dane, prosaic, concrete arguments about economics and the basic
flaws in the design of the proposed legislation. On the surface at
least, the anti-divorce position was couched in concrete terms. Al-
though that is not all that went on, the ADC, as we saw, emphasized
the practical, down-to-earth consequences, not the moral or social
philosophical implications of introducing divorce.
The ADC'S pragmatic and economic arguments were solidly
grounded in Irish cultural and historical realities, which have made
economic security a priority concern. A central theme of Irish his-
tory, the motif of economic dispossession, is enhanced in contem-
porary times by the downturn in the Irish economy and the
reemergence of unemployment and emigration as primary social
148 Debating Divorce
problems. In emphasizing the economic costs of divorce, therefore,
the ADC spoke to a basic cultural preoccupation with economic in-
terests and to the status of married women, the majority of whom
are economically dependent on marriage.
In contrast, FitzGerald's discourse was very different. Compared
to Binchy's pragmatic economic discourse, FitzGerald's argument
that divorce would serve the social good and his invocation of the
notion of indissoluble monogamy sounded abstract, hollow, intel-
lectual, and detached. The pro-divorce arguments were removed
from everyday realities and, relative to those of the ADC, seemed
downright esoteric. Unable to rely on an economic discourse or to
use practical notions of individual rights, advocates of divorce were
unable to demarcate clear-cut, straightforward reasons for favor-
ing divorce. While FitzGerald's and the pro-divorce message as a
whole was reasonable and well-intentioned, it lacked a concrete
base. The sort of practical discourse that is necessary to challenge
social and economic arrangements was demonstrated by trade
unionists who couched the right to divorce in concrete terms com-
parable to the well-understood right to work.
Clearly, it would be an injustice to see the Irish divorce debate
purely in terms of economic arguments, just as it would be an in-
justice to see the American abortion or Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) debates in a similar light. In all cases, questions of morality,
traditional values, and gender relations are, to a greater or lesser
extent, at issue. Nevertheless, what is true is that on the most ap-
parent level, these debates in both Ireland and America had a very
concrete character.
A central theme in the anti-divorce discourse was: Who bene-
fits? Whose economic interests would divorce serve? The cultural
and moral significance of introducing divorce legislation was, ap-
parently, reduced to a question of economic allocation. Partly at
issue in the ERA debate were concerns about the costs of paying
women equal pay for equal work if the amendment was enacted.
Those who opposed ratification wondered who would provide the
additional money necessary if the gender wage differential was
eliminated.2 As with the Irish divorce debate, the ERA controversy
raised fundamental questions about spousal economic responsibil-
ity and the dilemma of converting nonmonetary domestic activ-
ity into quantifiable rewards. Similarly, alongside arguments of
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individual rights to privacy and reproductive choice, one of the
frameworks within which the ongoing American abortion debate is
couched is whether taxpayers should underwrite the costs of abor-
tion for low-income women.
The cost-benefit criteria of economic analysis thus seem to pro-
vide a readily accessible framework for dealing with the complexity
of lofty moral principles. While I do not want to claim that moral
issues become reduced to questions of material interests, yet, in a
world that privileges rationality, nonmaterial values seem to be more
easily dealt with if couched in economic language. The discourse of
economics thus provides the contemporary metaphor for values.
Toleration of Contradictory Discourse
The debate on divorce was a heated one characterized by the ex-
change of polarized arguments. But, although argumentation was
at the center of the debate, the main protagonists seemed willing to
embrace quite contradictory strands of discourse. This was illus-
trated particularly well in the case of the arguments of the ADC and
the Church. As I documented, both the ADC and the hierarchy re-
lied heavily on secular reasoning, emphasizing the empirically
grounded, negative economic and sociological consequences of di-
vorce. But they also expressed adherence to the principle of lifelong
marriage and thus opposed divorce on moral grounds.
To use a distinction borrowed from the philosopher of science
Imre Lakatos,3 it could be argued that the hard core objections of
the ADC and the Church to divorce were grounded in moral and
religious doctrine. These were the immutable objections, those not
susceptible to argumentation. The positive heuristic used by the
ADC and the Church, the set of reasons and arguments grounded in
empirical evidence, was couched in the contingent realms of eco-
nomics and sociology. On the basis of their dual approach, the ADC
and the bishops were able to draw force from two powerful, yet in
many ways antithetical, traditions—those of religion and social sci-
ence—which when juxtaposed in the case of the divorce question
were clearly in tension.
The logic entailed in the this-worldly social scientific argument
is that if there is empirical evidence indicating that divorce has pos-
itive effects, then those who subscribe to the empirically grounded
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claims should be prepared to reevaluate their position. With eco-
nomics as the criterion for assessing whether or not divorce should
be introduced, the decision is one grounded in evidence and empiri-
cism. Prior to knowing the evidence, one can equally favor or op-
pose divorce, but once new evidence becomes available this should
have a significant bearing on one's disposition. The "tyranny of
facts," for better or worse, is what empirical discourse is all about.
This is not so in the case of other-worldly, moral cum religious
arguments. If you adhere to a moral position then whether you fa-
vor divorce or not becomes a matter of doctrine, and doctrine is not
amenable to empirical validation. If morally one is opposed to di-
vorce in principle, then no amount of empirical evidence in its favor
can change your mind. Accordingly, regardless of how restrictive
the form of divorce proposed or how few its guaranteed economic
costs, those who oppose divorce in principle must oppose divorce
in any form. It should be clear, therefore, that one cannot argue
against divorce with any degree of consistency using both empirical
and moral grounds. The two types of arguments, to paraphrase
Ludwig Wittgenstein, pass one another by.4
What is of particular interest here is that the tension in the
Church's and the ADC'S strategy of drawing their arguments from
two quite incompatible traditions was tolerated throughout the
campaign. It was never addressed or challenged. Reflecting perhaps
that the Irish were simply taken aback by the rationality of a dis-
course they expected to be primarily moral and dogmatic in char-
acter, this reticence may also say something important both about
Irish society and, more generally, about the broader question of
how issues of values are debated in modern societies. This tension
and its acceptance also prefigures the tension between tradition
and modernity, a theme to which I shall return in the second part
of this chapter.
The case of the Irish. From the narrower Irish perspective it is im-
portant to note that, despite the tensions, economics and religion
together constitute the bedrock of Irish culture. The Irish world-
view invokes both traditions simultaneously. It is a view in which
traditional other-worldly and modern this-worldly values are em-
braced side by side. This worldview and the tension it embodies is
crystalized by the divorce debate itself. It is well illustrated by the
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fact that a divorce referendum was held in Ireland, that economic
and practical arguments were the primary reasons articulated by
those who opposed divorce, and that the amendment to introduce
divorce was defeated. Highlighted by this is the dynamic, dialecti-
cal relationship, if you will, in the way in which religious and eco-
nomic values hit off one another in Irish society but then coalesce
into a unified force.5
The dialectical relationship between religion and economics is
also illustrated by the predicament of the pro-divorce activists. Ar-
guing for legislation that posed a possible challenge to the religious
tradition impinged on their ability to use an economic discourse,
since one validated the other. So, while the pro-divorce lobby used
economic arguments, it did so cautiously and in defensive response
to the economic arguments of its opponents. The ADC and the
Church, on the other hand, were free to use economic arguments,
because at the background to their economic objections to divorce
was moral opposition to the legal dissolution of lifelong marriage.
The divorce debate also exemplifies how economic discourse be-
comes liberated from religious strains. This was illustrated in partic-
ular by the secular this-worldly arguments of the Catholic hierarchy
during the debate. Rather than simply declaring their disapproval
of legislation as they did in the 1940s and 1950s, the hierarchy at-
tempted to adhere to a noninterventionist approach where issues of
legislation and Catholic teaching interface, while at the same time
expressing its views on the moral and social implications of the
proposed changes. As we saw in the divorce debate, the hierarchy
did not officially campaign against the introduction of divorce, but
in executing their pastoral obligations the bishops articulated their
reservations about the proposals. What was especially new and sig-
nificant about the hierarchy's discourse was its heavy reliance on
sociological and economic arguments. But the move toward secular
arguments was only partial, however, since religion still appeared
to be needed in the background to provide legitimation.
Reasoning about values in contemporary times. The tension be-
tween the two strands of discourse, religious and economic, is not
a uniquely Irish phenomenon, although it may be accentuated in
the case of the Irish. What is at issue here is the fundamental ten-
sion in how people argue about values, and this applies equally to
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Ireland, the United States, and all other societies. Values are so fun-
damental and so deeply embedded that for the most part they are
not consciously acknowledged; they are the cultural bedrock or the
"givens" of a society.
Ultimately, values and moral or religious beliefs are beyond rea-
son; "values are irrational, thus undebatable via rational discourse
and the rules of logic."6 We cannot rate the greater validity of one
value compared to another. Normative judgment cannot be sup-
ported or refuted in accordance with scientific criteria. We can
evaluate the greater efficiency of the means used to achieve a cer-
tain end, but we cannot rationally decide whether the objective
itself is worthwhile. Science is meaningless, as Max Weber, follow-
ing Tolstoy, told us, because "it gives no answer to the only ques-
tion important for us: "What shall we do and how shall we live?"7
Nevertheless, we live in a world where reason is paramount. How
then can we defend and argue about values when they are "incom-
prehensible" and "rationally indefensible?"8 One way to deal with
questions of values in a rational society is to split off the two
realms—the hard core of immutability from the positive heuristic of
contingency—and draw on both, but simultaneously keeping them
apart. This is what opponents of divorce did when they buttressed
the hard-core religious objection to divorce with the this-worldly
reasons of economics and sociology. This strategy clearly proved
very effective but at the price of inevitable contradiction or slippage.
What is significant, nonetheless, is that the Church and the ADC
were able to exploit the premium on rationality and empirical ev-
idence in today's society by using empirical evidence to argue
against divorce. And, importantly, they used this secular discourse
to challenge the very idea of progress represented by rationality,
which, increasingly, is being challenged by the cumulating empiri-
cal evidence demonstrating the negative consequences of divorce
and other modern phenomena. Conservative groups, therefore,
who are committed to particular moral views can now draw on ra-
tional evidence to argue against the rationalization of morality.
The Call for Divorce as Paradigm Shift
While, for many Western societies, divorce was the result of an al-
most invisible process as cultural change followed on the heels of
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economic rationalization, this wasn't true of all European coun-
tries. Strongly Catholic societies similar to Ireland such as Italy,
Spain, and Poland, all, unlike Ireland, have divorce but, signifi-
cantly, in each case divorce was introduced in circumstances of so-
cietal upheaval.
Catholicism and the link between church and state has played a
historically dominant role in Spanish politics,9 with the Church
and Catholicism serving as "the principal ideological pillars"10 of
General Franco's revolutionary fascist dictatorship. Conventions
and laws restricting divorce and other rights, which had been es-
tablished in the Church-backed 1881 civil code, reemerged during
Franco's authoritarian rule.11 After Franco's death in 1975,
feminist-led campaigns for the reform of laws prohibiting contra-
ception and divorce and, subsequently, abortion rights took hold.12
Popular revolt against Franco, which was also, in part, a revolt
against the Church-supported laws his regime enforced, helped fa-
cilitate the legalization of divorce in 1981 and, in 1985, abortion.
"Progressive" legislative changes in Poland also coincided with
the disruption of a prevailing social and political order.13 With the
imposition of communism after the Second World War, the Cath-
olic church became associated with an obsolete capitalist regime.
Attendant on this, its teaching was also regarded as obsolete for the
new social structure, at least by those in power, the Communist
party elite, who introduced permissive divorce and abortion laws.
And, paradoxically, although Poles used their Catholicism and par-
ticipation in church ritual as a way of showing their defiance
against the communist state, they also readily availed themselves of
state-sponsored divorce and abortion services, even though this
was contrary to Church teaching.14
The path taken by Italy is somewhat different. Until the 1970s
when reforms took place, the laws in Italy regarding divorce, abor-
tion, and contraception dated from the fascist period of the 1930s.
An explanation of the "delay" in the occurrence of reform would
seem to be grounded in the intricacies of Italian political culture.
Notwithstanding Mussolini's exaltation of woman as heroine and
the transmitter of Italian greatness, Fascist policy, supported by
Church teaching, was aimed at repressing women's participation in
the public sphere.15 Italian women managed to remobilize in the
late 1960s, however, at the same time that major economic changes
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were occurring in Italy and when demands for social reforms were
taking place in other Western societies. Dissatisfaction with both
the Left and the Right stimulated a vigorous Italian women's lib-
eration movement, which supported the male-initiated divorce re-
forms and subsequently campaigned for changes in the abortion
and rape laws.16
Despite strong and persistent opposition to such reforms by both
the Church and the Christian Democratic party, the campaigns
were ultimately successful, with the existing restrictive divorce law
liberalized in 1974 and abortion legalized in 1978. Therefore, al-
though religion is a highly salient force in Italian politics, it is tem-
pered by Italians' opposition to the legislative remnants of Fascism
and by their increasing disapproval of the alignment of the Church
with the Christian Democratic party. Because Italians believe that
one can simultaneously be both a "good Catholic" and a "good
communist," popular majorities of "good Catholics" support
ideas, such as divorce, that are opposed by the Church.17
It is clear from our very brief review that in each instance di-
vorce was introduced into these Catholic countries in the wake of
some societal disruption. The end of the Franco regime in Spain co-
incided with moves to legalize divorce and abortion, while the im-
position of communism in Poland brought about the formal
establishment of secular laws that were contrary to Church teach-
ing. The changes in Italy, although they did not coincide with the
end of Fascism, can be seen in part at least as opposition to its leg-
islative and cultural remnants. One way in which to deal with a
cultural lag, therefore, or with issues of traditional morality, is to
effect change through a dramatic break with the existing authority
structures represented either by the state or the church or both.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn intro-
duced the notion of a paradigm, an overarching set of postulates
that serve to provide meaning or a backdrop for ordinary scientific
activity.18 Since a paradigm provides an overarching worldview for
the scientific community, it tends to remain stable until it is over-
thrown in scientific revolutionary time by an incommensurable ri-
val. One way to appreciate the task of the pro-divorce forces in
Ireland is to see them as promoting, to use Kuhn's terminology, a
paradigmatic shift, and one in nonrevolutionary times to boot.
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The attempt to introduce divorce in Ireland took place in a soci-
ety in which the relationship between religion and politics, church,
state, and people, was a remarkably integral one, representing a
deeply grounded consensual affirmation of Ireland's identity as
a special Catholic nation. Unlike the European Catholic coun-
tries, the Irish did not have to contend with internal revolutionary
Fascist or Communist regimes, and their secession from British
domination was achieved through rebellion rather than through
revolutionary force.19
Moreover, unlike most other European countries, Ireland also
was spared the tragedy of World War II.20 Demonstrating, in part,
its independence as a national entity distinct from Great Britain,
Ireland remained neutral during the war.21 But, while it was spared
the atrocities of the war, it was also deprived of the postwar soci-
etal renewal and restructuring that took place. It did not get to ex-
perience the new social patterns that emerge during wartime: the
expansion of women's entry to the paid labor force, for example,
and the long-term implications of this both for women and for the
society as a whole.22 The changes that occurred in Ireland at this
time—rural depopulation, for instance—were "grounded in the
dynamics of the country's post-independence history,"23 and thus
lacked the same potential for sweeping societal change as that
which the total disruption of war brings.
Comparing Ireland with other European Catholic countries,
therefore, puts the Irish case in perspective and shows the enormity
of the task faced by FitzGerald. It also highlights the inevitable ten-
sions in the pro-divorce discourse. On the one hand, FitzGerald
and other advocates of divorce had to be innovative, challenging,
bold, and nontraditional, but on the other, they had to be con-
cerned with issues of legitimation. They had to argue for change
without the aid of a postrevolutionary new order. How do you ar-
gue for change and still maintain credibility within the prevailing
structures of meaning and discourse? FitzGerald's attempts to push
for a distinction between the public and private spheres and for a
new definition of the social good, which was autonomous of Cath-
olic morality, can be seen in this context.
In arguing for the introduction of divorce, its advocates were
confronted with the problem of trying to gain legitimacy for an
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agenda that directly challenged the tradition of Irish identity as
Catholic. The very idea of wanting to introduce divorce was con-
trary both to Catholic teaching on the indissolubility of marriage
and to cultural values that expect that Catholic teaching should be
supported by civil legislation. Advocates of divorce thus had to
convince the electorate that they were in fact, "good Catholics," as
FitzGerald tried to do from the outset by reiterating his personal
commitment to indissoluble monogamy, and, at the same time, they
had to convince people that it was necessary to break the ties be-
tween legislation and Catholic morality.
The problem and the enormity of the task of implementing a
shift in values, particularly in societies where it is not accompanied
by "upheaval," is, I hope, clear by now. While it is not impossible
to effect change in the absence of societal disruption caused by rev-
olution, war, or some other force, it makes the task more compli-
cated and enables various anomalies to develop.
Far from being a uniquely Irish problem, an even stronger case
of intracultural anomalies is provided by Switzerland. A much
more economically advanced society than Ireland, the economic
changes set in motion by its earlier industrialization enabled Swit-
zerland to achieve a highly rationalized economy, internationally
distinguished for its banking and manufacturing power. Like Ire-
land, Switzerland is also a homogeneous society with a relatively
tranquil history that has precluded internal revolutionary wars or
participation in World War II. And just as Ireland can boast of be-
ing the "Island of Saints and Scholars," the Swiss pride themselves
on their special status as a center of global diplomacy.
It may not be accidental, therefore, that greatly at odds with its
economic and international reputation, the anomaly in Swiss soci-
ety was in the domain of women's rights. Swiss women were not
allowed to vote at the Federation level until 1971 and in two re-
gions could not vote at the cantonal level until as recently as
1988.24 Similar problems and paradoxes are also illustrated by re-
cent events in Belgium. Before Parliament's liberalization of the
1867 abortion law could be enacted, King Baudouin I, declaring
that he as a Catholic could not in good conscience sign legislation
permitting abortion, had to abdicate power for a day so that the
law could take effect without his signature.25
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Comparative Issues
I will highlight two examples of cross-cultural issues, describing
how the issue of women's rights is similarly framed in two different
societies and how the Catholic church as an institution assumes dif-
ferent roles in different societal contexts. It is significant that, when
it comes to questions of gender and women's rights, some of the
Irish arguments find interesting parallels in the American context.
Appeals to the notion of women as victims is a case in point, a
theme evident in the Irish divorce debate and one that also charac-
terizes contemporary American debates. Whether arguing against
divorce, abortion, or women's equal participation in the work-
force, all of which are seen by their opponents as exploitative of
women, the rhetoric of women's victimization is invoked in at-
tempts to restrict women's independent status and their liberation
from domestic dependency. Argued by those who want to maintain
traditional gender roles, and often with men in the vanguard, the
motif of women's victimization is a sexist and exclusionary argu-
ment used to perpetuate the idea that women are naturally and in-
herently unsuited to certain social roles.
Whereas the women's victimization motif shows how the same
arguments are used in Ireland and America, also of interest from a
comparative perspective is the different response of the Catholic
bishops in the two countries to relatively similar moral issues. The
stance of the Irish bishops regarding divorce compared to the
stance of the United States Catholic bishops on abortion shows
how the same institution can behave differently in different coun-
tries. In spite of the strong tradition in America of a separation be-
tween the spheres of church and state, the American Catholic
hierarchy appears of late to be taking a more interventionist ap-
proach with legislators on the abortion issue.26
For the first time in the history of Irish society the divorce
amendment challenged a fundamental doctrinal position of the
Catholic church, an institution accustomed to having its moral and
social teaching enshrined in the constitution and laws of the Irish
State. When confronted with this unprecedented occasion, the hi-
erarchy stated that it would not campaign against divorce, and,
while it expressed its sociological and theological objections to di-
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vorce, it also acknowledged the right of Catholics in good con-
science to vote for the amendment. And while some bishops took a
more conservative line than others, neither the electorate nor the
politicians whose initiative it was to propose the amendment were
in any way threatened that favoring divorce legislation would pre-
clude them from being considered good Catholics.
Adopting a much more conservative stance than their Irish co-
bishops, on abortion, American bishops not only warned Catholic
politicians of the dangers of "going to Hell" for their pro-choice
views but some went so far as to excommunicate Catholics for their
position. The response of the American Catholic hierarchy to the
ongoing abortion controversy may suggest that the Church as a
whole is gradually becoming more conservative as the Vatican un-
der Pope John Paul II seeks to recoup its greater centralized author-
ity, which was attenuated somewhat in the wake of the Second
Vatican Council and its acknowledgment of religious freedom. Or,
it may simply illustrate that the American Church is different from
the Irish one, thus underscoring the different forms the universal
Catholic church assumes in different sociocultural contexts.
Limited Power of Media Regarding Moral Discourse
The dynamic processual relationship between mass media and
readers or audiences is a complex one, and this seems to be espe-
cially the case when it comes to moral questions. In the case of the
Irish divorce amendment, the national print media were all clearly
and consistently pro-divorce. The only deviation was arguments by
Conor Cruise O'Brien, someone who was even more radical than
his media colleagues and provocative in pushing for change. Yet the
majority of people voted against the amendment. While the shift in
public opinion might have been greater had the newspapers not
been so unequivocally in favor of change, the fact remains that the
editorial arguments were not able to sustain the support for divorce
evident at the outset of the campaign.
It is clear, however, that moral choices are qualitatively different
from commodity choices. Moral claims are not as easily evaluated
as consumer promotional claims. Worldviews and values that have
been inculcated over generations are not likely to be influenced by
a spate of media articles in the same way that opinions on political
candidates or consumer goods might be. For one, where moral
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questions are concerned, people are more likely to seek guidance
from traditional institutions such as church or family than from the
mass media.27 And even though the media articulates a secular and
often critical perspective on cultural values and social relations,
this is not, nor is it expected to be, a revolutionary voice. Encoun-
tering the same problem of legitimation as does any other group
who wants to argue for change, the power of the media to inform
moral choices clearly recedes in comparison to authoritative moral
institutions such as the Church.
Importance of Communicative Style
We started our summary with the simple but important point that
discourse on moral issues is complex and multifaceted. It has to be
studied from a range of different perspectives in order that the var-
ious strands of argumentation put forward by different players and
in different contexts can be appreciated. I want to end this sum-
mary with an equally simple and important observation. Discourse
about moral values may well be lofty matter, but, nevertheless, its
effectiveness and impact is still anchored in issues of primacy, cha-
risma, exposure, and agency. Questions of legitimacy extend be-
yond the themes of discourse to the credibility, leadership, and self-
definition of the speakers.
While as Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald had national legiti-
macy, in the circumstances of the divorce debate, arguing as he was
to introduce divorce, his credibility was under question. In con-
trast, William Binchy, who until the divorce debate was a relatively
unknown public figure, presented as the more compelling speaker.
Aside from the nature of Binchy's discourse, his charisma was en-
hanced by the focus, clarity, and precision with which he articu-
lated the ADC'S arguments, compared to FitzGerald's seemingly
abstract and convoluted manner.
The organization and choice of spokespersons is also important.
This takes on increased significance in light of the reliance on tele-
vision to act as a conduit of arguments to the public domain. From
the Irish debate and television's representation of it using objective
criteria of impartiality, it is clear that a group arguing for a par-
ticular agenda is at a greater advantage if it is represented by one
primary spokesperson than by a range of speakers.
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Also relevant to the successful outcome of a public campaign is
the issue of who sets the agenda. The person or group who succeeds
in taking the initiative in establishing the salient questions at issue
as opposed to defending arguments put forward by others is,
clearly, at an advantage. This was highlighted by the economic dis-
course of William Binchy and the ADC. Although the ADC was in
the initial position of responding to the government's proposals, it,
not Garret FitzGerald and the pro-divorce lobby, succeeded in
framing what became the central questions in the debate. They
were also able to set the agenda on television both with their eco-
nomic discourse and with William Binchy's superior competence
over the "Today Tonight" interviewers in discussing legal points.
Finally, who is perceived as agent and the importance of this in
establishing control over the discourse was also demonstrated by
the role of organized women in the debate and their absence as ac-
tivist issue definers. Women cannot rely on others to present their
interests but need to define and defend their interests themselves.
With the pervasiveness of such themes as women's victimization
and the ever-present threat of a backlash against women's indepen-
dence, the importance of organized women counterarguing and
affirming their emotional and intellectual strength assumes greater
urgency. Women need to maintain constant vigilance against en-
croachments on their rights, because once they lose gained ground—
as when reproductive laws are deliberated, for instance—it be-
comes very difficult to reclaim lost rights. Unless women, whether
they are Irish or American, engage actively in public discourse
against encroachments on their autonomy, it is likely that the theme
of women's victimization will continue to be argued by those who
wish to maintain women's traditional status and the structures that
uphold that dependence.
Tradition and Modernity
Viewing modern society as uniquely different from previous forms
of social organization, sociologists have explained social change in
terms of a linear process of societal development, arguing, as does
Reinhard Bendix, that modernization "refers to all those social and
political changes that accompanied industrialization in many coun-
tries of Western civilization. Among these are urbanization,
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changes in occupational structure, social mobility, development of
education."28 Clearly linking changes in social relations and the so-
cial structure to industrialization, economic rationalization, and
economic progress, modernization theorists, although not Marxist
in conceptualization or intent, suggested a direct, inevitable, and
almost natural relationship between economic transformation and
social development. Thus Neil Smelser defined the structural
changes associated with economic development, saying, "with re-
spect to technology, there is a change from simple and traditional-
ized techniques toward the application of scientific knowl-
edge; . . . . In agriculture, the change is from subsistence farming
toward commercial production of agricultural goods. . . . In eco-
logical arrangements, there is movement from the farm and village
toward urban centers" [emphasis in original].29
Openness to the spiral of changes stimulated by industrialization
became the hallmark of modern societies and distinguished them
from traditional societies, where, it was argued, economic, social,
and cultural change was resisted because of the supremacy of reli-
gious, familial, and noncontractual values.30 Although the degree
of "economic backwardness" of a given country was recognized as
significantly affecting the nature of its industrialization and subse-
quent development,31 nevertheless, it was still maintained that as
backward economies gradually embraced industrial technology,
the constitution of their social structure and culture would con-
verge along lines already established in other modern societies.32
In short, modernization theorists posited an immanent, atempo-
ral pattern of synchrony between the economic and cultural
spheres of society. Moreover, as well as postulating synchrony, the
modernization thesis also had an evaluative component, conceptu-
alizing modernization as desirable, progressive, and superior to tra-
ditional forms of social organization. With a premium placed on an
ever-expanding rationality, tradition, or delayed modernization,
was seen as retrograde.
From this perspective, Ireland presents as an interesting devia-
tion and challenges the thesis of synchronic modernization. While
it has a modern economic and social structure, traditional values
continue to be institutionalized in the cultural sphere as demon-
strated by the prohibition of divorce and abortion. Ireland, there-
fore, is an unevenly modernized society.33 As a peripheralized
162 Debating Divorce
colonial economy, it did not experience industrialization and did
not undergo economic change when other Western societies were
in the process of industrializing. Post-independence nationalist sen-
timents seeking economic self-sufficiency further retarded its eco-
nomic development until the late 1950s, almost one hundred years
later than the apex of industrialization in America and most of
Western Europe. Nevertheless, once economic rationalization and
growth did occur, in a relatively short span of time, Ireland, as dis-
cussed in chapter 2, presented many of the economic and social
characteristics associated with modernization. Although compara-
tively poorer than other Western countries, it is a modern, econom-
ically developed, urbanized, consumer society with high levels of
participation in education, politics, and mass media.
And yet, at the same time, directly challenging the synchrony
postulated by the modernization thesis, Ireland's economic and so-
cial modernization is not matched by cultural modernization. Its
prohibition of divorce and abortion and the affirmation of the val-
ues that their absence represents demarcates Ireland as a traditional
society and highlights its cultural deviation from other Western
countries. This is the interesting anomaly presented by Irish society
and its continuing prohibition of divorce despite having a modern
economic and social structure.
Modernization theorists, however, could well explain this puzzle
by framing the absence of divorce as a historical lag.34 It could be
argued that just as Ireland experienced a lag in economic develop-
ment relative to other Western societies, the absence of divorce may
also be seen as a temporary setback. Delayed economic modern-
ization may account for the attendant delay in cultural rationaliza-
tion. In this reasoning, the absence of divorce is simply a cultural
lag that will eventually be resolved once divorce is enacted. Indeed,
it can be argued that the move to introduce divorce and the holding
of the referendum in themselves constitute evidence that Ireland is
on its way to full modernization and an integration of the eco-
nomic and cultural spheres. It would be tempting then to conclude
this book by equating the failure of the divorce referendum with a
missed opportunity by the Irish to become a fully modernized so-
ciety. On this view, the rejection of divorce is certainly aberrant and
may be seen as regressive. Individual autonomy, a core value of mo-
dernity, is clearly restricted in Irish society.35
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But we can imagine also another ending to our story. As we re-
call, an essential aspect to the modernization thesis was the as-
sumption that increased rationality and progress was desirable if,
in fact, not synonymous. In light of this then, let us consider the
social reality that the Irish confronted as they deliberated on the
divorce question. Crucial here is the fact that the divorce referen-
dum occurred in the late 1980s, a time when the desirability of mo-
dernity and the equation of rationality with true progress is
challenged with empirical evidence to the contrary.
In its range and scope, modernization, clearly, has brought many
unprecedented benefits for individuals and societies: economic
prosperity, progress in scientific and technological knowledge and
its impact on medical and other spheres, extensive participation in
education, increased leisure time, and appreciation of nonmaterial
values and quality of life issues. At the same time, however, the cu-
mulation of evidence documenting a broad range of societal prob-
lems, including ever-widening gaps in economic equality both
within and between nations and ecological disruption and environ-
mental damage, challenges the superiority of instrumental reason,
the hallmark of modernization.
Confronted with the mixed consequences resulting from an em-
phasis on economic growth and individual autonomy, the implica-
tions of modernity are being subjected to greater critical scrutiny.
Unlike at the turn of the century or in the 1960s when the more
progressive divorce legislation was introduced, what was particu-
larly relevant to the Irish divorce debate was evidence that the
stress on progress and rationality has led to anomie, fragmentation,
meaninglessness, and the absence of clear, communal values.
Importantly then, because of the lateness of Ireland's modern-
ization relative to other Western societies, its deliberations on di-
vorce occurred in a context in which the effects of modernization
were already known.36 Whereas Ireland's economic development
began at a time when the "positive" characteristics and effects of
economic modernization were already well in place in other West-
ern societies, evidenced by high standards of living, disposable
personal income, and the glamour and sophistication of a con-
sumer lifestyle, the divorce amendment was introduced at a time
when some of the "negative" effects of divorce have been docu-
mented and the premises of cultural modernization as a whole are
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being challenged. For all its creative potential, modernity and the
autonomy of the individual has clearly come at the price of societal
fragmentation and "human dislocation and suffering."37 To some,
divorce may not seem such a good thing, or, at best, it may seem
that its overall value to individuals and society is ambiguous.
This then is the context in which the Irish confronted the ques-
tion of whether or not to introduce divorce and complete the pro-
cess of societal modernization. While strands of anti-modernism
have always been a feature of modernizing societies,38 the context
and timing of the referendum gave the Irish good grounds for being
wary of divorce, the exemplar of cultural modernization, "as a
threat to an existing pattern of meanings and1 values."39
Given this background, therefore, Irish opposition to divorce
may be seen not as a temporary lapse on the road to fully fledged
modernization but rather as an innovative, postmodern way of
dealing with the threat of anomie and cultural fragmentation. In
the same way that postmodern architecture combines stylistic ele-
ments of various eras, the Irish rejection of divorce may also be
seen as an attempt to create an alternative solution, one that by se-
lectively upholding traditional values alongside economic and so-
cial modernization sustains at the same time the coherence to life
associated with tradition. Rather than introducing divorce and
then having to confront its costs, the Irish, it could be argued,
chose, more or less consciously, to formally retain the values un-
derpinning lifelong marriage. Not convinced about the benefits of
modernity, progress, and rationality, in this scenario, that the Irish
voted against divorce can be construed as a more or less deliberate
attempt to preserve the cohesiveness of private and social life.40
On this second view, the "Irish solution" to the issue of divorce
with its forged juxtaposition of culturally disparate elements may
be seen as anticipating things to come. As other societies grapple
with the conflicts, tensions, and the legacy of modernity, they too
may find that some sort of previously unanticipated mix of eco-
nomic rationality alongside the retrieval of the remnants of tradi-
tion may prove to be the response necessary to stave off increased
public dissatisfaction with the costs of rationalization.
Whether we construe the divorce debate from a modernist per-
spective as a lost opportunity by the Irish to integrate economic
and cultural development and achieve parity with the rest of the
Values in Tension 165
Western world by introducing divorce or, in postmodern terms, as
an innovative way of preempting societal anomie, ultimately, de-
bates about moral issues do not occur in a vacuum. Whichever way
we construe the debate, its outcome had a direct and tangible ef-
fect, whether positive or negative, on the lives of all the Irish peo-
ple. While the retention of certain traditional values might provide
solace and comfort for those at the center, the majority who oppose
divorce and value the conflation of private and public morality, for
those at the margins—in particular, those who seek legal recogni-
tion of a failed marriage or of a new relationship, or those who
cannot afford a costly legal separation or foreign divorce—it is the
retention of an obsolete, regressive, and essentially hurtful way of
dealing with marital breakdown. But such a trade-off, perhaps, is
inevitable when debates focus on the negative consequences of
modernization, without, at the same time, fully confronting the
negative consequences of tradition.

APPENDIX A
Marriage Breakdown
in Ireland
The constitutional ban on divorce in Ireland has not prevented marriage
breakdown. Significant numbers of people experience the breakdown of
their marriage even though, in keeping with the official view of the sanc-
tity of marriage and the family, this was not officially recorded for many
years. For the first time in the history of census taking in Ireland, the 1986
census gathered information on the de facto as opposed to the de jure sta-
tus of the ever-married population. Statistics showed that approximately
37,245 people were separated, which represented about 6 percent of the
total number of marriages contracted. More women (22,607) than men
(14,638) reported being separated, and the majority of separated women
were between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four and live in the Dublin
area. (Census '86: Summary Population Report Ireland, vii-viii)
Foreign Divorce
In the absence of Ireland's own divorce provision, there is some recogni-
tion of foreign divorces. Prior to legislation enacted in 1986 (the Domicile
and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act), a wife's domicile was dependent
on her husband's, and consequently a foreign divorce was only recognized
if both spouses were domiciled in the country in which it was granted. The
current situation means that a foreign divorce is recognized if either spouse
was domiciled in the country in which it was granted.
Legal Separation and/or Civil Annulment
Couples whose marriages break down and whose economic circumstances
allow them may make recourse to the Irish judicial system in order to se-
cure a judicial separation or a civil annulment or, independently of the
courts, to make a private separation agreement. A judicial separation, was,
up until revisions in the law in 1989, fault based, requiring that the de-
fendant be guilty of either adultery, cruelty, or unnatural practices. A ju-
dicial separation removes the obligation on the plaintiff to live with his/her
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spouse, but it does not dissolve the marriage, and consequently neither
party is free to remarry. Importantly, the Judicial Separation and Family
Law Reform Act, 1989, permits the equitable division of the separating
couple's assets, including the family farm, at the time of separation.
With a decree of nullity, a marriage is rendered void under the grounds
of lack of capacity, nonobservance of formalities, and absence of consent at
the time of, or antecedent to, the marriage. Events and experiences after
the marriage are relevant only if they can be shown to point to defects that
were already present at the time of the marriage. If a marriage is annulled,
the individuals involved are treated as if they were never married. Accord-
ingly they are free to remarry, the parties lose succession and maintenance
rights regarding each other's estates, and, prior to the enactment of the Sta-
tus of Children Act, 198^ children of annulled marriages were declared il-
legitimate thus losing any legal entitlement to their parents' estate.
In addition to the options of judicial separation and civil nullity,
spouses who choose to separate also have the option of making a separa-
tion agreement, which is legally valid without the expense of going to
court. Such an agreement does not affect the validity of the marriage, and
the separated parties are not free to remarry. Few whose marriages break
down, however, apply either for a judicial separation or for a civil nullity.
Between 1973 and 1983, for example, there were 339 petitions to the High
Court for a judicial separation and 145 nullity petitions (see Report of the
Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown, 132-33).
Ecclesiastical Annulment
More popular than a legal separation or a civil annulment is for couples to
seek an ecclesiastical annulment. These are granted by a tribunal of the
Catholic church under canon law. An annulment may be granted under
one of three broad categories: (1) because of an impediment, such as im-
potence, because of having been underage at marriage, or because of the
existence of a previous valid marriage; (2) because the proper formalities
were not observed—the marriage did not take place before a properly au-
thorized priest in the presence of two witnesses; or (3) because the consent
was defective (Catholic Press and Information Office, 1986). A church an-
nulment says that a valid marriage between the couple never took place—
the marriage is nullified—and, accordingly, those granted a Church
annulment are then free to (re)marry within the church. In many cases,
however—up to three-quarters—the nullity decrees issued by the Church
are subject to a "vetitum" which prohibits one or both of the partners
from (re)marriage. The Catholic hierarchy estimates that less than one half
of one percent of all marriages in the Catholic church in Ireland are de-
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clared invalid. Between 1976 and 1984 there were 5,885 applications for
ecclesiastical annulments, of which 828 were granted, (ibid., 11-12). Nul-
lity applications are clearly increasing. For the statistical year November 1,
1985 to October 31, 1986, the total number of applications for nullity re-
ceived was 733. Of a total of 189 decisions, 164 cases were given a nullity
decree and 25 were denied. In 163 cases a "vetitum" was imposed on one
or both parties (see Irish Catholic Directory, 1987, 349). For the statistical
year November 1, 1989 to October 31, 1990, the total number of appli-
cations for nullity received was 1,043. Of a total of 250 decisions, 216
were given a decree and 34 were denied. In 192 cases a "vetitum" was im-
posed on one or both parties (see Irish Catholic Directory, 1991, 351).
Many of the nullity applications submitted are not admitted to a formal
investigation because they are subsequently withdrawn, because they lack
a prima facie ground of nullity, or because the tribunal may lack legal com-
petence to try the case.
The regulation of marriage in Irish society gives rise to an interesting
anomaly related to the fact that more Church annulments than civil an-
nulments are granted. Some of those who receive a Church annulment but
who do not have a civil annulment subsequently (re)marry in Church. In
Irish law a marriage that takes place before a priest or pastor is considered
a legally valid civil marriage. Accordingly, individuals who have received a
Church annulment and who (re)marry in Church simultaneously contract
a valid civil marriage that is recognized by the state. But because the state
does not recognize church annulments, one or both of the partners, as
the case may be, by contracting a second civil marriage, commit bigamy.
The state tends to turn a blind eye to this, however, by not prosecuting the
guilty parties. Nevertheless, from a legal point of view, the state recognizes
only the first marriage of the parties to the second marriage. Consequently,
the partners in the second marriage would not have succession rights to
each other's estate, nor, if this union in turn broke down, legal entitlement
to maintenance or deserted spouse's benefits.
State Protection of Women in Marriage
Despite the fact that the constitution pledges to guard the family with spe-
cial care and states that mothers will not be obliged by economic necessity
to work outside the home, it does not include any directives as to how this
should be achieved. Within marriage, for example, a spouse is not required
by the constitution to maintain economically the other spouse or the chil-
dren of the marriage. It was only through legislation enacted in 1964 (the
Succession Act) that married women's succession rights were legally rec-
ognized. The relevant legislation provides that if a spouse dies without
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leaving a will, the spouse remaining can claim all the estate if there are no
children and two-thirds of it if there are children, with the children claim-
ing the remainder. Even if a will is made, the legislation states that the
spouse and children always have precedence over any others named in the
will. Under the Married Womens Status Act, 1957, a wife can apply to a
court to have her interest determined in any property held by her husband
or held jointly.
State Protection in the Case of Marital Breakdown
While the legal protection of women in marriage may present as more rhe-
torical than practical, their protection in the case of marital breakdown is
even more precarious. Desertion of one spouse by the other is the most
common form that separation related to marriage breakdown assumes in
Ireland. Yet, up until 1970, deserted spouses did not have any economic
protection. Then, a means-tested allowance for deserted wives was intro-
duced. In 1973, a deserted wife's benefit was also instituted, which applies
to deserted wives if either they or their husbands have made sufficient so-
cial welfare insurance payments prior to the desertion. If a deserted wife is
receiving any maintenance payments from her husband and if she is under
forty and has no dependent children, she is not eligible to receive desertion
benefits. Moreover, the legal entitlements apply only so long as the deserted
wife is not cohabiting with a partner and so long as the deserting spouse
did not have "just cause" for leaving. In 1986 there was a total of 10,610
women receiving a state social welfare payment for deserted wives (see ta-
bles 8.31 and 8.34, Ireland: Statistical Abstract, 1986). It is noteworthy
that under the Social Welfare Act, 1989, in part as a response to the plight
of the deserted husband that was highlighted by the divorce referendum
debate, a means-tested allowance for all lone parents was introduced.
Research on the social characteristics of deserted wives who receive the
deserted wives social welfare payment provides an interesting snapshot of
who these women are (Ward, 1990). The majority of the recipients were
under forty years of age; their average age at marriage was 23.2 years
(with that of their husbands 25.1 years, both of these figures being below
the national average), and for almost half of them, die separation occurred
within seven years of marriage. Eighty-five percent had dependent children
living with them, and 35 percent of these had three or more children. The
majority of deserted wives came from a poor socioeconomic background.
Twenty-five percent were married to unemployed men, 22 percent to
skilled manual workers, and 20 percent to unskilled or semi-skilled work-
ers. Only 3 percent were married to farmers, and 9 percent were married
to professional/managerial men (ibid., 48-9).
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Other legislation has also been enacted in recent years to help redress
some of the economic losses attendant on marriage breakdown. In 1976,
the Family Home Protection Act was the first piece of legislation intro-
duced into Ireland that was designed to give some protection to a spouse
who had no proprietary rights in the property in which she/he lived. This
law ensures that the family home and its contents may not be sold, leased,
or mortgaged without the written consent of both spouses. A deserted or
deserting spouse, therefore, cannot sell the family home without the con-
sent of the other spouse. Prior to the passing of this act, it was possible for
the spouse who solely owned the property in which the family lived—the
husband, most usually—to sell, lease, or mortgage the home without the
consent of the other spouse. In practice, this meant that wives in particular
were vulnerable to their husbands' decision to sell the home without pro-
viding the family with alternative accommodation.
Legislation (the Family Law [Maintenance of Spouses and Children]
Act, 1976) also enables one spouse—the wife, most usually—to receive
maintenance payments if it can be shown that the other spouse has failed
to provide proper maintenance for the spouse and any dependent children
of the marriage. In deciding whether to issue a maintenance order, the
court takes into account the income, earning capacity, property, and other
financial resources of the spouses as well as their financial responsibilities
and imposes on the defaulting spouse a court order requesting compliance
with a specified income payment to the dependent spouse and children on
a regular basis. Until the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act,
1989, no maintenance order could be made for the support of a spouse
who had deserted and continued to desert the other spouse. The court also
had the discretion to deny an order to the applicant spouse if that spouse
had committed adultery (see Ward, 1990, 2-5).
At the same time as a wife applies for maintenance, it is also com-
mon for her to apply to have the husband barred from the family home
(ibid., 27). This is enabled by The Family Law (Protection of Spouses and
Children) Act, 1981 whereby a barring order may be granted to one spouse
that excludes the other spouse from entering the family home. This is is-
sued if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the barred spouse
poses a threat to the physical safety or welfare of the applicant spouse or
to the children.
Aside from desertion benefits, therefore, there are a number of avenues
open to people whose marriages have broken down, which they can pursue
in order to receive some economic compensation from their spouse. The
cost of legal proceedings, however, is suggested as being a deterrent to peo-
ple seeking a remedy for their problems through the courts. While there
is a free civil legal aid scheme in operation since 1980, its means-tested
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criteria and the tendency for offices to be located only in large urban cen-
ters means that for many people, particularly poorer people in rural areas,
professional legal advice is inaccessible. For those who are granted main-
tenance orders, the low amounts of money awarded and the high rate of
default on payments means that "a large majority of wives granted main-
tenance orders cannot be assured of either an adequate or a secure income.
Many of them and their children will end up dependent on social welfare
eking out a minimal existence. Unless the wife had independent means or
secures employment, long-term reliance on state support seems an inevi-
table consequence when couples separate" (ibid., 46-7).
Therefore, despite the formal provision of legal entitlements to deser-
tion and other forms of maintenance payments, their implementation and
the actual benefits that result appear to fall short of the economic needs of
many of those whose marriages break down, most particularly economi-
cally dependent women.
APPENDIX B
Divorce and the
Protestant Churches
Catholic/Protestant divisions in Ireland are not just confined to Northern
Ireland. A small minority of Protestants—3.4 percent—live in the Re-
public. What then was the position of the Protestant churches on the
amendment?
Unlike the Catholic church, all the Protestant churches accept the need
for civil divorce as a response to the problem of marriage breakdown. They
maintain a much clearer distinction between private morality and public
legislation. Accordingly, they oppose the constitutional ban on divorce
even though, like the Catholic church, their theological teaching proclaims
the lifelong nature of marriage. As Bishop Walter Empey of Meath and
Kildare diocese stated on "Today Tonight" the evening following the an-
nouncement of the referendum, "We do not marry divorced persons, but
we feel that divorce is a response to marital breakdown ("Today Tonight,"
Apr. 24).
The divorce debate coincided with the annual General Synod of the
Church of Ireland (the Anglican church) and with the annual Presbyterian
General Assembly. Both churches used the opportunity presented by their
respective meetings to express publicly their support for the form of di-
vorce proposed by the government. Robert Eames, the primate of the
Church of Ireland, argued that, with the escalation in the number of mar-
riages breaking down, divorce with the right to remarry was necessary.
Stressing the Church of Ireland's commitment to the sanctity and stability
of marriage and the family, he emphasized that there was no conflict be-
tween the church's advocacy of the sanctity of marriage and providing
couples with an opportunity to end the human misery they may encoun-
ter through a complete failure of their marriage (Irish Times, May 21,
1986, 1,6).
Against a backdrop of ongoing vigorous ecumenical relations between
the Catholic hierarchy and the Church of Ireland, the Church of Ireland
Archbishop of Dublin, Donal Caird pointed out that the divorce referen-
dum should not be seen as a contest between itself and the Catholic church
but as a difference in their social philosophies (Irish Times, May 15, 1986,
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7). Its official newspaper, however, the Church of Ireland Gazette, criti-
cized the absolute opposition of the Catholic church to the amendment.
Other Church of Ireland bishops reaffirmed the distinction between
church discipline on marriage and state legislation as a response to marital
breakdown, with one, Bishop Empey of Meath and Kildare, arguing that
no one church had a monopoly on morality: "we have to nail the lie that
permissiveness flows from the Church of Ireland" ("Today Tonight," May
22, 1986).
Presbyterian ministers pointed out that their church had "a long tradi-
tion of recognising divorce as a last resort" and argued that divorce was a
civil right that should be available to all citizens (Irish Times, June 6,1986,
8). In sum, for Protestants, as stated by the Irish Council of Churches, a
representative body of all the major non-Catholic denominations in Ire-
land, although divorce should not be an "easy option," the state has a duty
to legislate for the irretrievable breakdown of marriage (Irish Press, June
11, 1986, 4).
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Notes
Epigraph: Max Weber [1919], "Science as a Vocation," 152-53.
ONE Introduction
1. See Glendon, 1987, table 2: "Grounds for divorce in Nineteen Coun-
tries," 68.
2. In England, for example, a mutual consent divorce is available only after
a two-year separation, and a unilateral divorce is available only after a five-year
separation period. France requires six years' and West Germany three years'
separation in the case of unilateral divorces. Additionally, similar to the Irish
proposals, each of these countries also has a "hardship" clause, which allows
the courts to dismiss a petition if the divorce would cause exceptional hardship
(Glendon, 1987, 68-75).
3. The poll was conducted at the end of April by the Market Research Bu-
reau of Ireland (MRBI) in association with the Irish Times, in which it was pub-
lished on May 5, 1986 (See table 1). An KSllSunday Press poll published on
May 11 similarly indicated that, excluding don't knows, 58 percent were in
favor of the amendment.
4. After 1983 pro-divorce opinion wavered somewhat, ranging from 42 per-
cent to 52 percent, and at the beginning of 1986, support again passed the ma-
jority threshold with 52 percent of those polled favoring the ban's removal.
These figures are taken from various MRBI polls. The 52 percent figure comes
from the MRBI poll published in the Irish Times, Feb. 2, 1986. In addition to
the question regarding the removal of the divorce ban, pollsters also asked
whether their interviewees favored the introduction of divorce in certain un-
specified circumstances. When this question was first asked in 1983,66 percent
agreed, and by February 1986, 77 percent of those surveyed stated that divorce
should be permitted in certain circumstances. (See MRBI, Apr. 1986, chart E.)
5. The 1986 Census, not available at the time of the referendum, was the
first in Ireland in which information on ever-married persons was collected on
the basis of de facto rather than de jure marital status. Of a total of 37,245
people who were separated, representing 6 percent of the ever-married popu-
lation excluding the widowed, 54 percent had some form of legal or other sep-
aration; 31 percent were deserted; 12 percent had a divorce from another
country, and 3 percent had annulled marriages. See Central Statistics Office,
1989a, vii-viii. Prior to the 1986 Census, official estimates of marital break-
down were based on 1983 Labour Force survey data, which suggested that 37.5
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thousand people were separated. One indirect indicator of the incidence of
marriage breakdown in Ireland is the number of women receiving Deserted
Wife's Benefit: In 1986 it was 6,165, whereas in 1982, it was 3,416 (Central
Statistics Office, 1989b, table 8.31).
6. 62 percent of the electorate voted on the amendment. An MRBi/Irish
Times poll published on the day before the amendment indicated that exclud-
ing don't knows, 45 percent intended to vote in favor and 55 percent to vote
against the amendment (See table 1).
7. See Max Weber's essay "Science as a Vocation" [1919], and his discus-
sion of social action, 24-26, in Economy and Society.
8. See in particular Alexander, 1983; Schluchter, 1979, 1981; and Sica,
1988.
9. See Bellah et al., 1985; Sennett, 1978; and Lasch, 1979, for discussions
of the impact on individuals and society of the rigid separation of the public
from the private spheres of life in American society.
10. The first quote is from Riane Eisler, 1977, xiii. She argues that "In es-
sence, our laws determine how we may or may not relate to other people. . . .
in their explicit or implied definitions, laws also help determine how other peo-
ple shall view us, and even how we shall view ourselves" (ibid.). The second
quote is from Glendon, 1987 10. Glendon adopts a cultural approach to un-
derstanding abortion and divorce in Western law. Drawing on the work of the
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, Glendon argues that different legal systems dif-
fer in the "stories they tell," the "symbols they deploy," and the "visions they
project" (8). Lawrence Stone's (1990) history of divorce in English law simi-
larly demarcates the relationship between changes in societal values and
changes in the law on marriage and divorce.
11. See Kelly, 1984.
12. Max Weber [1904] 1949, 81-84, discusses this in his essay " 'Objectiv-
ity' in Social Science." He states: "In the method of investigation, the 'guiding
point of view' is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual
scheme which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their use, how-
ever, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as
much here as elsewhere. For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who
seek the truth" [emphasis in original].
13. See Paul Rabinow's (1977) personal reflections regarding the problems
encountered by researchers as outsiders studying a culture different from their
own. Following Paul Ricoeur, he defines the problem of hermeneutic under-
standing as "the comprehension of the self, by the detour of the comprehension
of the other. . . . The self being discussed is perfectly public. . . . it is the cul-
turally mediated and historically situated self which finds itself in a continu-
ously changing world of meaning" (5-6).
TWO Irish Cultural Themes
1. See Hayes-McCoy, 1976, for an extensive discussion of the Tudor Con-
quest of Ireland.
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2. The proportion of Catholic land fell from 59 percent in 1641 to 22 per-
cent after the Cromwellian settlement to 14 percent after the Williamite war
(Corish, 1985, 123).
3. Beckett, 1966, 159.
4. Corish, 1985, 123.
5. See Maureen Wall's review of the penal laws. Catholic land ownership
fell to about 5 percent under the provisions of the penal code (Corish, 123).
6. Corish, 1985, 124.
7. Ibid. 131.
8. Ibid. 130-31.
9. Ibid. 161.
10. Ibid. 192-94; Inglis, 1987, 135-38.
11. Inglis, 1987, 166; Corish, 1985, 226.
12. Corish, 1985, 232.
13. Ibid.
14. In particular, see the survey research findings of Maire Nic Ghiolla
Phadraig, 1977; Breslin and Weafer, 1985; and Mac Greil, 1977. Mac Greil
(454) notes that: "There is sufficient evidence to indicate a relatively high
degree of authoritarianism among the respondents. . . . The scores for 'pro-
establishment' and 'religious fundamentalism' subscales are particularly high,
which seems to indicate a highly conservative and religiously "dogmatic" type
of mentality." A more general discussion of Irish legalism is also presented in
Inglis, 1982, and Inglis, 1987,14-32. For a good discussion of issues of law and
morality in Irish society from the perspective of a political philosopher, see
Clarke, 1985, particularly 60-68 and 112-35.
15. Gallagher, 1981, 715.
16. Bel I ah et al. (1985) provide the most interesting discussion of the cen-
trality of a discourse of individual rights in America. Also, Glendon (198^ 38,
134) argues that "the right to privacy, which is so bound up with individual
autonomy and isolation, has become one of the most absolute rights known to
the American legal system. . . . In American constitutional law . . . the ex-
pressed rights to individual liberty and equal treatment are dominant."
17. Although the Civil Rights Association established in Northern Ireland
in 1967 was forceful in bringing world attention to the discrimination against
Catholics in the North, it is not customary for people in the Republic to artic-
ulate arguments regarding their entitlement to certain civil rights.
18. Most Irish people can probably relate a personal story documenting that
the reason for their achievement in some sphere of their lives was attributed by
somebody to the power of God or prayer. An example of this is provided by the
well-known and popular Irish radio and television personality Gay Byrne in his
recent autobiography. In recounting the joyous reaction of his mother to his
brother's success in landing a clerical position in Guinness's brewery, which at
that time was unprecedented for a Catholic, Byrne states that his mother
dropped to her knees praising God (1989, 26).
19. For example, 72 percent of the Irish think that adoption of an EC charter
of fundamental social rights is a "good thing" (Eurobarometer Trends 1974—
1990, table B19).
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20. See Hechter, 1975, and Crotty, 1966 and 1986, for an extensive discus-
sion of the impact of colonialism on Irish economic development.
21. Crotty, 1966, 29-30.
22. See the discussions in Kennedy, 1973, 19-40; and Crotty, 1966.
23. Crotty, 1986, 47-48.
24. Kennedy, 1973, 88-89. 82 percent of holdings were under fifteen acres.
25. Lee, 1973, 11-12, 16-18.
26. Beckett, 1966, 336.
27. Ibid. 343.
28. Kennedy, 1973, 27.
29. Lee, 1973, 2-3.
30. Ibid. The number of holdings decreased from 691,202 in 1841 to
570,338 in 1851 (Beckett, 1966, 348). About 7 percent of farmers had leases.
The rest were tenants from year to year, holding their farms on a verbal agree-
ment with their landlords, which could be ended by either side with six months'
notice. For a general discussion of the Irish economy immediately after the
Famine, see Lee, 1973, 1-35; Lyons, 1973, 34-70; and Beckett, 1966, 336-75.
31. Whyte, 1966, 6-23.
32. Beckett, 1966, 407. The terms of repayment were 3.25 percent per an-
num over sixty-eight and a half years. See also Lyons, 1973, 218-19. After Irish
independence, the Land Act (1923) provided for the Land Commission to com-
pulsorily purchase all land still owned by landlords.
33. Inglis, 1987, 193-94; Corish, 1985, 192.
34. Lee, 1973, 4.
35. Kennedy, 1973, 139-72.
36. Ibid. 145-47.
37. Ibid. 151.
38. Ibid. 149-54.
39. There is much anecdotal and literary evidence about the workings of the
dowry system in Ireland. It is generally accepted that the formal dowry system
ended around the late 1940s. The anthropologist John Messenger (1969), how-
ever, states that this practice was still to be found in the Aran Islands, off the
west coast of Ireland, in the 1960s. Messenger states: "Numerous factors are
weighed by the representatives of the future spouse before a match is consum-
mated. Uppermost in the minds of the relatives of the man is the size of the
dowry that the woman will bring to the marriage" (70).
40. Kennedy, 1973, 155.
41. Lee, 1978, 39.
42. Lee, 1978, 37.
43. O'Tuathaigh, 1988, 149.
44. Brown, 1985, chapters 1-5. Other comprehensive accounts of the early
decades of the Irish state can be found in Lyons, 1973, part 3A, chapters 1 and
2; and in Lee, 1989, chapters 2-4.
45. Boylan et al., 1988, 162.
46. I am paraphrasing a defining speech of de Valera's broadcast on St.
Patrick's Day, 1943. For its full text see Lee, 1989, 334.
47. See Whyte, 1980, 60; and Brown, 1985, chapter 4.
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48. This is a popular claim of Irish folk-politics. For corroborating aca-
demic acknowledgment, see Lee, 1989, 334.
49. This famous radio speech of de Valera's was broadcast to the United
States on St. Patrick's Day, 1935. Printed in the Irish Press, March 18, 1935, 2.
Brown (1985) quotes this, 151. For a biography of de Valera, see Earl of Long-
ford and Thomas P. O'Neill, 1970. Eamon de Valera. Importantly, his biogra-
phers comment that: "In all that concerns faith and morals he [de Valera]
might fairly be called docile. In such matters he was prepared to accept unre-
servedly the teaching of the Church.. . . For all his acknowledged piety he
could never be defined as a clerical statesman" (xxii).
50. See Whyte, 1980, 60.
51.1937 speech of de Valera broadcast on Irish Radio and relayed to Amer-
ica explaining the provisions of the constitution. Published, on its forty-ninth
anniversary, in the Irish Press, June 24, 1986, 9.
52. Grogan, 1967,171. See also Whyte, 1980, and Keogh, 1986, for an anal-
ysis of the Catholic influence on the constitution.
53. Article 44, Section 1.2, until it was deleted in 1972, stated: "The
State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Ro-
man Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great majority of
the citizens."
54. Article 41, section 1, and section 3, subsections 1 and 2.
55. Constitution of Ireland, 1937. Article 41, section 2, subsections 1
and 2. Article 40 recognizes personal rights, but these refer to property
and reputation.
56. Inglis, 1987, 188, 187-214.
57. See Manning, 1978, for a discussion of women in post-independence
Irish politics, and for an account of Irish women's suffrage, see Cullen-
Owens, 1984.
58. The marriage bar was repealed in 1973 although teachers were exempt
from this as of 1958.
59. Since the Act of Union, which in 1801 imposed the union of the Irish
parliament with that of England into the United Kingdom, Irish couples seek-
ing divorce could petition the House of Lords at Westminster. As of 1879 two
procedures had to be followed: (1) a common law separation granted by the
High Court, and (2) a private parliamentary divorce bill had to be approved,
which settled property and financial matters and provided for the right to re-
marriage. This was the situation the newly independent Irish government in-
herited in 1922. The Upper House of Parliament, the Senate, was the equivalent
of the British House of Lords except it did not have the same restrictions or
regulations on bills. See Fanning, 1983.
60. A comprehensive discussion of this is provided by John Whyte, 1980.
See chapters 2 and 4-10 especially.
61. See Whyte's (1980) detailed discussion, 120-302, and Fanning, 1985.
62. Letter from Archbishop McQuaid to John A. Costello, April 5, 1951,
summarizing the objections that they had already communicated to the Fianna
Fail government. Quoted in Whyte, 1980, 143.
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63. Letter from the Bishop of Ferns, James Staunton, who was the secretary
to the hierarchy, to Prime Minister John A. Costello, October 10, 1950. Pub-
lished in Whyte, 1980, 424-25.
64. Fanning, 1985.
65. Letter from Archbishop McQuaid to Prime Minister John A. Costello,
April 5, 1951. Published in Whyte, 1980, 446-48.
66. Kennedy, 1973, 95.
67. For a good review of this period, see Brown, 1985, 241-311.
68. See Peillon, 1982, 156-64.
69. Brown, 1985, 242. Michael Hout (1989, 1) compares the changes that
took place in Ireland between 1959 and 1973 to the "kind of economic miracle
now associated with Southeast Asia." However, as O'Hearn (1990, 604) re-
minds us, Ireland, along with Spain, Greece, and Portugal, "are all poor re-
gions of the European periphery with a standard of living far below the rest of
the continent."
70. As well as Brown, 1985, for an extensive discussion of these changes, see
the essays in Litton, 1982, and Clancy et al., 1986.
71. Rottman and O'Connell, in Litton, 1982, 67.
72. Sexton and Dillon, 1984.
73. For example, between 1971 and 1983, support for retaining the consti-
tutional ban on divorce decreased from 79 percent to 47 percent (MRBI surveys,
various years).
74. An instance of this is provided by a 1972 referendum in which 84 per-
cent of the electorate who voted endorsed the removal of the special position of
the Catholic church from the constitution.
75. Gardiner, 1988, 14. In the national election of November 1992, women
won 12 percent of the parliamentary seats.
76. MRBI, 1987a, table 1C/1. Fogarty et al., 1984, however, paint a some-
what different picture, finding that 43 percent of women compared to 58 per-
cent of men are "interested but not active in politics" (table 35d).
77. For instance, the Women's Political Association is a non-party volun-
tary organization founded in 1970. With branches in Dublin and around the
country, it organizes seminars on women and politics, and canvasses for
women electoral candidates.
78. See, for example, the data in Fogarty et al., 1984, tables 17b, 21e, 22e,
and 34d.
79. Fogarty et al., 1984, tables 34d and 17b.
80. In 1983, 32 percent females compared to 26 percent males, and in 1987,
32 percent females to 22 percent males expressed support for Fine Gael. No
significant gender difference is apparent in support for the other parties. See
MRBI, 1983, table 9; MRBI 1987b, table 5.
81. See Rose, 1975, for a brief overview of the women's movement in Ire-
land, and Levine, 1982, for a personal account.
82. For example, women are not specifically represented in government or-
ganized national wage agreement discussions, unlike the farmers, the trade
unions, and the employers' federation, who are considered social partners.
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83. My argument here disagrees with Beale's claim that it was "the wom-
en's movement which articulated most forcefully the arguments for individual
freedom and personal choice" (1987, 13). Since the late 1960s, the Irish courts
have recognized the right of married women to contraception, interpreted as
part of a right to marital privacy; the right of women to serve on juries; the
right of a mother to the custody and care of her illegitimate child; the right of
women to independent tax assessment from their husbands (see McMahon,
1985; and Robinson, 1978). Much of the initiative for employment equality
and anti-discrimination labor force legislation in the 1970s, including the es-
tablishment in 1977 of an Employment Equality Agency in Ireland, came from
the EC.
84. McGee v. Attorney General, 1974. The case was argued by Mary Rob-
inson, currently the president of Ireland. As a young senator, Mary Robinson
was involved in introducing a number of bills, beginning in 1970, that aimed
unsuccessfully to decriminalize contraception, and she has played a major role
in initiating and leading debates in Ireland on contraception and divorce.
85. The Health (Family Planning) Act, 1979, section 4 (1) b (ii).
86. This was how Charles Haughey, then the minister for health responsi-
ble, described the new legislation.
87. The Health (Family Planning) (Amendment) Act, 1985. Nonetheless,
contraceptives can still be bought only at a recognized medical establishment.
What this means in practice is that supermarkets, record stores, and college
campus shops, for instance, cannot sell condoms.
88. The Health (Family Planning) Act, 1979, section 10.
89. Riddick, 1990, 6. On his visit to Ireland, Pope John Paul II singled out
the abortion question for special attention. See The Pope in Ireland, 1979, 80.
90. See Cooney, 1986, 61-71, for a description of the politics of the pro-life
amendment referendum.
91. The amendment, Article 40.3.3, reads: "The State acknowledges the
right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right of the life of
the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its
laws to defend and vindicate that right." O'Carroll (1984) discusses the argu-
ments articulated during the pro-life amendment debate.
92. In the American context, Kristin Luker (1984, 234) argues that: "Pro-
life activists.... want a human life amendment to the Constitution (or a fed-
eral law) primarily in order to make a moral statement about abortion and only
secondarily in order to prevent all abortions in practice."
93. In a subsequent referendum in Ireland in November 1992, the majority
of the electorate voted to overturn the information restrictions and to uphold
the right of a woman to travel abroad for abortion, while reaffirming opposi-
tion to the legal provision of abortion in Ireland. Every year, thousands of Irish
women travel to England for abortions. In 1989, for example, official British
statistics indicate that 3,721 Irish women had abortions performed. For a dis-
cussion of abortion-related events in Ireland see Riddick, 1988, and 1990.
Jackson (1983) provides an interesting review of the history of "backstreet
abortion" in Ireland.
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94. See, in particular, the text of an address delivered by FitzGerald in 1976
and published in the Irish Times, April 29, 1976, 10. Following the RTE radio
news interview with FitzGerald in September 1981 in which he reiterated this
view, FitzGerald's commitment to effecting pluralism became popularly known
as his "Constitutional Crusade."
95. Ireland's budget deficit constituted 8.3 percent of the Irish gross na-
tional product in 1986. Less than ten years earlier, in 1977, the deficit was 3.6
percent of GNP (Ireland: A Directory, 420)
96. For comments critical of Irish materialist values see, Lynch, 1989, 139-
53; Daly, 1982; Lee, 1973, and 1989, especially 522.
97. Eurobarotneter Trends 1974-1990, tables B26 and B27. The EC index
is for the ten member countries, excluding Spain and Portugal, who joined
in 1985.
98. Eurobarometer Trends 1974-1990, table B26.
THREE Arguing about Divorce
1. The most prominent government dissenter was the minister for Edu-
cation, Patrick Cooney, who represented Longford/Westmeath. The junior
agriculture minister, Paul Connaughton, from Galway East, and two promi-
nent Fine Gael backbenchers, Alice Glenn of Dublin Central and Oliver J.
Flanagan of the midlands (Laois/Offaly), were also outspoken against the
amendment. Both Glenn and Flanagan also opposed in 1985 legislation liber-
alizing the availability of contraception. Some other Fine Gael parliamentari-
ans, while not publicly dissenting, did not actively campaign for acceptance of
the amendment.
2. The DAG has a branch in all of the Dublin electoral constituencies, in all
of the constituencies in the East and Midlands, in two of the nine constituencies
in the Northwest, and in seven of the thirteen most southerly constituencies.
Overall, its paid membership is 1,000 people, and at the time of the referen-
dum, it had only one full-time paid employee, DAG'S chairperson, Jean Tansey,
joined DAG in 1984. She is an experienced campaigner having being involved in
the Anti [Pro-Life] Amendment Campaign, the Labour Women's National Ex-
ecutive, and the Council for the Status of Women.
3. The ADC'S organizing committee had nine members in all. Two of these
were women.
4. At the time of the referendum, Binchy was also research counselor to the
government-sponsored Law Reform Commission.
5. McCarroll has also written a book on divorce (1985). Bonar is a mem-
ber of Family Solidarity and is also chairperson of a conservative group called
The Responsible Society. She actively favored the pro-life amendment and later
opposed the 1985 contraception legislation. Other members of the ADC orga-
nizing committee were Michael Lucey, the chairman of Family Solidarity,
whose wife was one of the main spokespersons in the "Women Doctors for
the [Pro-Life] Amendment" group and later became president of the Society
for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC); Jerry Collins, the PRO for
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Family Solidarity, who was active in the pro-life amendment campaign; and
John O'Reilly, who is the secretary of The Responsible Society.
6.While Family Solidarity was launched to the public in 1984, it held its
first meeting in the fall of 1983. In an interview in the Irish Times (Dec. 14,
1984, 11), Family Solidarity's chairman, Michael Lucey, stated: "I have good
reason to believe that the embryo of Family Solidarity predated the [pro-life]
amendment." While Family Solidarity is officially a group independent of the
pro-life movement, many of its founding patrons were active pro-amendment
supporters. As well as opposing contraception, divorce, and abortion, Family
Solidarity opposes government economic policies that in its view, discriminate
against families. Its membership is constituted by people from both urban
and rural backgrounds and from the middle class and working class socio-
economic categories.
7. Although the political parties have branches at the local level, often two
or more per parish, the members of these branches, especially in the rural areas,
were not enthusiastic about campaigning for acceptance of the amendment, as
many members themselves opposed divorce. This appeared to be particularly
true for Fine Gael. Even those who favored divorce did not want to alienate
supporters of their party who were opposed to divorce but overall were gen-
erally favorable to Fine Gael. Consequently, the pro-divorce campaign as a
whole tended to be orchestrated from the national headquarters of the com-
ponent groups in Dublin and did not have the same energy or resources in-
vested in it as a normal general election would have.
8. Fianna Fail parliamentary party statement, Apr. 25, 1986.
9. Fianna Fail party political broadcast, RTE, June 23, 1986. Two well-
known Fianna Fail parliamentarians who spoke in favor of divorce were
Charles McCreevy, a deputy from Kildare, and David Andrews of Dublin.
10. FitzGerald's press conference was broadcast live on RTE'S flagship
current affairs program, "Today Tonight," April, 23, 1986. I taped and sub-
sequently transcribed all of the "Today Tonight" programs relating to the
amendment.
11. Between March 21 and April 7, 1986, Prime Minister Garret Fitz-
Gerald and the minister for justice, Alan Dukes, held separate discussions
with the leaders of all of the churches in Ireland—Catholic, (Protestant)
Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Quaker—and the Jew-
ish Community. Their views were sought on various aspects relating to mar-
riage, separation, and divorce. Earlier, FitzGerald had defended his decision
to seek consultations with religious leaders, stating: "The necessity for such
consultations is . . . self-evident in view of the role of the Churches in the sol-
emnization of marriage.... It would be quite improper to seek changes in
the law without seeking the Churches' views on the matter. . . . The correct
procedure is to consult with the Churches as this is a matter on which Church
and State are intimately linked" (Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, Feb.
18, 1986).
12. The Protestant Church of Ireland recognizes the civil provision for di-
vorce as a "last resort" in dealing with the problem of marital breakdown.
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It reaffirmed this at its annual Synod in 1984. In contrast, the Catholic Church
opposes divorce on both theological and social grounds.
13. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 14, 793.
14. Interviewed by Pat Kenny, "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
15. Quoted in the Irish Times, June 13, 11.
16. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 14, 793. See similar remarks
expressed by other Fine Gael members, in Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eire-
ann, May 14, 953 (Mary Flaherty), and 1054 (Liam Skelly).
17. FitzGerald's press conference, "Today Tonight," Apr. 23.
18. Interviewed by Brian Farrell, "Today Tonight," June 17.
19. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1380.
20. Ibid., May 14, 856.
21. Stated by him on "Today Tonight," June 10.
22. Interview by John Bowman, "Today Tonight," Apr. 23.
23. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1380.
24. FitzGerald's press conference, broadcast by "Today Tonight," Apr. 23.
The full text of the government's statement of intent with regard to marriage,
separation, and divorce was published in the Irish Times, Apr. 24, 6.
25. Pat Kenny, "Today Tonight," asked this question. Featured on its trans-
mission of Apr. 23.
26. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1390-91.
27. Alan Dukes, "Today Tonight," June 3.
28. Reported in the Irish Times, May 26, 1. Emphasis mine.
29. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 15, 1271-72.
30. Reported in the Irish Independent, June 16, 9. Emphasis mine.
31. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1462.
32. Jean Tansey, "Today Tonight," June 3.
33. "Today Tonight," June 19.
34. "Today Tonight," Apr. 23.
35. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
36. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 19.
37. Ibid.
38. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," May 22.
39. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
40. ADC press release, May 9.
41. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
42. ADC press release, May 9.
43. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 20, 1659, 1706; May 21,
1756.
44. Ibid., May 20, 1737-38.
45. ADC press release, May 9.
46. One of the characteristics of the anti-divorce activists during the cam-
paign was a tendency to emphasize the factual and empirical basis for what
they were arguing. As well as directly using empirical evidence, they also ar-
gued that they did not have a campaign "strategy." Rather, as Joe McCarroll
stated ("Today Tonight," May 22), "We have only one [campaign strategy]
186 Notes to Pages 50-54
and that is information." Bernadette Bonar ("Today Tonight," Apr. 24), also
stated: "I have no doubt that when [the Irish people] hear the facts, and let me
repeat, when they hear the facts, and I hope they get them properly from both
sides, that the people . . . will reject the amendment."
47. William Binchy interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 19.
48. ADC press release, May 9.
49. Padraig Faulkner, (FF), Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May
14, 927.
50. Ibid., 826. Another Fianna Fail parliamentarian, Sean Treacy, also in-
voked the image of Frankenstein in highlighting the negative effects of divorce.
Quoting what Lord Campbell, the person who first introduced divorce into En-
gland in 1857, had to say about its results: "I have been sitting two days in the
divorce court and like Frankenstein, I am afraid of the monster 1 have called
into existence. There seems some reason to dread that the prophecy of those
who opposed the change may be fulfilled by a lamentable multiplication of di-
vorces and by the corruption of public morals." Treacy continued by appealing
to those who wish to see divorce introduced to "beware the monster they are
creating and which they cannot control" (ibid., May 15, 1102-1103).
51. The full text of this statement was printed in the Irish Times, May
21,4.
52. This was the phrase he used when interviewed on "Today Tonight,"
Apr. 24.
53. ADC press release, May 9.
54. Ibid. The ADC also argued that divorced parents would lose their con-
stitutional rights with respect to the rearing of their children. Binchy argued
that the current "constitutional protection towards the family in the rearing of
children and the education of children would be removed entirely," a conse-
quence that he suggested had been overlooked by the government (interviewed
on "Today Tonight," Apr. 24). The ADC contended: "Divorced parents would
lose all their constitutionally protected rights to provide for the religious,
moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children" (ADC press
release, May 9).
55. Quoted in the Sunday Tribune, June 22, 9.
56. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 19.
57. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 10.
58. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 17.
59. ADC press release, May 9.
60. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 17.
61. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 3.
62. ADC press release, May 9.
63. William Binchy, interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 3.
64. Bernadette Bonar, interviewed on "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
65. ADC press release, May 9. Emphasis in original statement.
66. Joe McCarroll, interviewed on "Today Tonight," May 22.
67. ADC press release, May 9.
68. Similar remarks to those expressed by Woods were reiterated by other
senior members of Fianna Fail (FF). For example, see Rory O'Hanlon, "Today
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Tonight," May 22; Michael O'Kennedy, "Today Tonight," June 3; and Padraig
Flynn, "Today Tonight," June 19. For further evidence of the legal/economic
arguments, see also the contributions by FF members to the Parliamentary de-
bate, especially, Padraig Faulkner, May 14, 923-25; Sean McCarthy, May
15, 1081; Noel Treacy, May 16, 1397-98, and Seamus Kirk, May 16,
1418-19.
69. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 14; 823-25.
70. Ibid., 825.
71. Ibid., 828.
72. "Today Tonight," Apr. 23.
73. "Today Tonight," Apr. 24. McCarroll also reiterated this argument,
"Today Tonight," June 10.
74. ADC press release, May 9.
75. "Today Tonight," May 22.
76. ADC press release, May 9.
77. Family Solidarity, 1986, 4.
78. Interviewed on "Today Tonight," June 17.
79. The ADC were going further than the Catholic hierarchy, however, in
explicating a demand that the state, on theological grounds, provide legal pro-
tection and support for lifelong marriage.
80. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 15, 1099-1102.
81. Ibid., 1241. See also Michael Barrett, (FF), Parliamentary Debates, Dail
Eireann, May 21, 1938.
82. "Today Tonight," June 17.
83. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16; 1380-81.
84. FitzGerald interviewed by Brian Farrell, "Today Tonight," June \7, and
Binchy, interviewed by John Bowman, "Today Tonight," June 17.
85. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1363-64.
86. Jean Tansey speaking at a DAG press conference, May 21. Reported in
the Irish Times, May 22, 7.
87. Jean Tansey, reported in the Irish Times, May 22, 7; and featured on
"Today Tonight," June 3.
88. "Today Tonight," June 19.
89. Excerpts from DAG'S first press conference were transmitted by "Today
Tonight," Apr. 24.
90. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 15, 1091.
91. See, for instance, David Molony, ibid. May 15, 1132, 1232; and Bernard
Allen, ibid., May 16, 1451.
92. The ICTU is a national federation that acts as an umbrella group for
trade unions and has been formally committed to removal of the ban on di-
vorce since 1982. Remarks by Donal Nevin, the general secretary of the ICTU,
reported in the Irish Times, May 20, 1; Irish Independent, June 5, 9.
93. Remarks by Patricia O' Donovan, legislation and equality officer of the
ICTU. Reported in the Irish Times, June 11,6.
94. Reported in the Irish Times, June 25, 8.
95. This quotation is taken from its campaign literature on the divorce
amendment. The goal of the Workers' Party is to create a democratic, secular,
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socialist republic based on the unity of workers in the North and South of
Ireland.
96. In 1978 the Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Act brought the
divorce legislation in Northern Ireland into line with that operating in England
and Wales, which in 1969 removed the fault clause.
97. Press conference broadcast by "Today Tonight," Apr. 23.
98. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1391.
99. Ibid., May 15, 1323-24.
100. Reported in the Irish Times, May 30, 1.
101. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1363.
102. "Today Tonight," June 10; Parliamentary Debates, Seanad Eireann,
May 23, 1758-59.
103. "Today Tonight," June 17.
104. Tras Honan, Parliamentary Debates, Seanad Eireann, May 22, 1610.
105. Irish Times, May 30, 9.
106. Somewhat indicative of this is the fact that in a 1987 poll conducted
in the Republic, only 33 percent of the respondents regarded the people of
Northern Ireland as Irish. The poll also found 67 percent expressing an aspi-
ration toward unification, while 56 percent regarded the Irish nation as con-
stituting thirty-two counties. Additionally, 49 percent agreed with the
statement that "northern Ireland will never be reunited with the South" (MRBI,
1987a, 47-51). Attitudes in the South toward the causes of the conflict in
Northern Ireland are discussed in Dillon, 1990.
107. This is the aim of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, from which the
IRA draws much of its support. The perceived support for the IRA in the Re-
public of Ireland tends to be exaggerated. It is true that in a 1981 general elec-
tion in the South two IRA H-Block candidates were elected: Kieran Doherty in
Cavan/Monaghan and Patrick Agnew in Louth, representing just over 2 percent
of the total votes cast. That result does not reflect enduring support for the IRA
but would appear to be more of an immediate demonstration of sympathy for
the plight of IRA H-Block prisoners in Long Kesh prison, who in the early
months of 1981 embarked on a long drawn out hunger strike in which several
prisoners, including Doherty, died. More indicative of the level of support for
the IRA in the South are the results from the most recent general elections in the
Republic of Ireland. Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, received in 1987
1.9 percent and in 1989 1.2 percent of electoral support (see Coakley, 1990, for
a discussion of minor parties in Ireland). Also indicative of lack of support for
the IRA are findings from an opinion poll conducted in November 1987 (MRBI,
1987b) regarding the Republic's Extradition Act. In the poll 40 percent agreed
that the act should be implemented; 23 percent that it should be postponed
until a future date; 20 percent that it should be scrapped completely; and 17
percent were undecided.
108. Various reports prepared for the New Ireland Forum documented
the economic costs of unification. See in particular, New Ireland Forum,
1984.
109. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1363.
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FOUR Women and the Divorce Campaign
1. Lovenduski, 1986, 22. For a historical analysis of the evolution of West-
ern divorce see, Phillips, 1988; and Stone, 1990.
2. Weitzman, 1985, 3.
3. Stone, 1990, 7.
4. Weitzman, 1985, 6-7.
5. Stone, 1989, 12.
6. Weitzman, 1985, 7.
7. Glendon, 1987, 66. See table 2, 68, and her discussion, 63-111.
8. See Arendell, 1986; and Weitzman, 1985. Importantly, however, Weitz-
man's much publicized contention that women suffer a 73 percent drop in
post-divorce income has been challenged by other, more comprehensive, re-
search data. See in particular, Duncan and Hoffman, 1985; and Hoffman and
Duncan, 1988. The authors argue that "the economic consequences are seri-
ous, and gender-based inequities exist; but that the magnitude of the problem
is not nearly as great as suggested by Weitzman" (641). Demonstrating in-
stead that women's economic status fell an average of about 30 percent in the
first year following divorce (Duncan and Hoffman, 1985), they "show that
Weitzman's findings are almost certainly in error" (Hoffman and Duncan,
1988, 641).
9. Weitzman, 1985, 365, commenting on the members of the California
Governor's Commission on divorce law reform.
10. Weitzman, 1985, 364.
11. Eisler, 1977, 11; Weitzman, 1985, 364.
12. Beckwith, 1985, 25.
13. For a review of the economic consequences of marital breakdown in Ire-
land, particularly the negative economic consequences for deserted women, see
Ward, 1990.
14. MRBI, June 1986, table 1A. (See table 1).
15. MRBI, 1983, table 4. See also Fogarty at al., 1984, table 21e.
16. Aims culled from organizational materials of the csw and advertise-
ments published in Women's Political Association (Dublin Branch) Journal,
1988, 6, and 1987, 10.
17. csw Press Statement, June 16. This was made available to me by the
csw.
18. Ibid.
19. Address by the economist Eithne FitzGerald to the csw public meeting,
June 24. This address was made available to me by the csw.
20. Letter from Liz Sherry, csw vice-chairwoman, Irish Times, June 26, 11.
21. The csw has issued a two page "Charter for Women's Rights: Setting
the Agenda for the '90s." Despite its title, however, it tends toward the de-
lineation of various general demands regarding women rather than articulat-
ing women's specific "rights." Significantly, there is no mention of divorce,
contraception, or abortion. See csw's Council News, Sept. 1989, 4-5, available
from csw, Dublin.
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22. "Today Tonight," Apr. 23 and 24.
23. The ADC stated, for example, "DIVORCED WIVES WOULD LOSE THEIR
RIGHTS UNDER THE SUCCESSION ACT" [emphasis in original], ADC press release,
May 9.
24. Bernadette Bonar, "Today Tonight," Apr. 24. See also William Binchy,
"Today Tonight," June 3.
25. Bernadette Bonar, "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
26. Support for this claim was provided by the formation of a new
women's group during the campaign, Women Against Divorce (WAD), esti-
mated to have the support of about four hundred women from around the
country. Commenting on its formation, journalist Mary Maher explained
that these separated women opposed divorce because they saw it as the judi-
cial system giving respectability to the husbands who had left them and set
up new unions. Maher stated that WAD basically conveyed three messages:
"men are rats; the Irish legal and judicial system cannot be trusted; and as sep-
arated women themselves they felt that they and their children had been de-
prived of a proper, good family life by the actions of irresponsible men" (Irish
Times, June 25, 8).
27. "Today Tonight," June 19.
28. "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
29. Mary McAleese, "Marriage still the best guarantee overall", Irish
Times, June 20, 10.
30. "Today Tonight," June 19.
31. See, for instance, Denis Foley, Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann,
May 14, 851, and Sean McCarthy, ibid., May 15, 1079-80.
32. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 16, 1371-79.
33. Parliamentary Debates, Seanad Eireann, May 22, 1607-15.
34. Alice Glenn, "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
35. Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 14, 843.
36. Ibid.
37. Family Solidarity, 1986, 3.
38. Family Solidarity, 1986, 2, 8; Bernadette Bonar, "Today Tonight,"
Apr. 24; Alice Glenn, Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 14, 843.
39. See particularly Ginsburg's (1989) discussion, 214-18.
40. Ibid., 11.
41. Ibid., 215-18. The divisiveness caused by the issue of gender roles is also
well illustrated by Rebecca Klatch's (1987) study, which draws attention to the
differences existing among women of the New Right regarding the proper roles
of women and men in society.
42. Barbara Ehrenreich, quoted by Mansbridge, 1986, 108. Emphasis in
original.
43. Mansbridge, 1986, 100.
44. Just as Irish anti-divorce campaigners argued that divorce would sanc-
tion men's repudiation of their wives and children, Ginsburg, 1989,216, points
out that right-to-life activists see abortion as liberating men from taking re-
sponsibility for their actions and making a commitment to women.
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well, 1989, table 3.8. It includes the population in private households only,
which makes the usually quoted Irish rate of 21 percent for 1986 (based on the
Irish Labour Force Survey that includes non-private households) increase to 26
percent. The EC average does not include Scandinavian countries, where the
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tistical Abstract of the United States: 1990, table 634.
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Quiet Man, starring Maureen O'Hara and John Wayne. In Gaelic literature,
the life of Peig Sayers (Sayers, 1936; 1974) embodies the courageous strength
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47. "Men and Women in Europe in 1987," Women of Europe (Brussels:
Commission of the European Communities), Supplement 26, 24.
48. See Chodorow, 1978, 93, 140, 169-70; and Gilligan, 1982, 151-74.
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participation than men (Weafer, 1986, 516-17; Nic Ghiolla Phadraig, 1986,
151), place greater value on religion, and express greater confidence in the
church. Sixty-seven percent of women compared to 55 percent of men see reli-
gion as a "very important" personal value (MRBI, 1987a, table 3B/3); 67 per-
cent of women in contrast to 52 percent of men say they would "definitely
miss" the Church (ibid., table 3 A/1), and 59 percent of women compared to 45
percent of men say that they have a "great deal" of confidence in the Church
(Fogarty et al., 1984, table 17b). Importantly, women also attribute greater in-
fluence than men to the Church's influence on their thinking and opinions
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MRBI, 1987a, table IB/2. Of interest here, significantly more women (75 per-
cent) than men (62 percent) supported the 1983 pro-life amendment, MRBI,
1983, table 1A.
50. Karen O'Connor of DAG, "Today Tonight," Apr. 24.
51. "Today Tonight," June 19.
52. Ibid.
53. Jean Tansey, ibid., June 3.
54. Ibid.
55. This was pointed out, for instance, by the minister for justice, Alan
Dukes, in his opening statement to the Dail on the divorce proposals (Parlia-
mentary Debates, Dail Eireann, May 14, 797). This was also stated by the
Workers' Party in their organizational literature and argued by one of their rep-
resentatives in the Dail, Proinsias de Rossa, Parliamentary Debates, Dail Eir-
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56. Reported in the Irish Times, June 26, 1, 8.
57. Reported in the Irish Press, June 12, 4.
58. Parliamentary Debates, Seanad Eireann, May 22, 1448-63.
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64. See, for example, an article by Nuala Fennell, "This change will be a
change for the better," Irish Times, June 13, 12, and remarks by her reported
in the Irish Press, May 22, 4; June 24, 4. See also report of remarks by Gemma
Hussey and Monica Barnes, Irish Press, June 12, 4; and Catherine McGuin-
ness, "Today Tonight," June 10.
65. Parliamentary Debates, May 15, 1117, 1122.
66. For instance, an outspoken supporter of divorce was history professor
John A. Murphy, University College Cork, and a small number of academic
sociologists collectively expressed public support for the amendment (see Irish
Press, June 25, 4).
67. As a senator and lawyer, Mary Robinson has championed women's
rights and family law reform for twenty years. During the divorce debate, con-
troversy surrounded Mary McAleese on account of her role as interviewer for
a video on divorce made by the Catholic hierarchy, for whom she was also a
delegate at the New Ireland Forum, DAG accused her of changing her mind on
divorce. See McAleese's response to the allegations in letters to the editor, Irish
Times, June 5, 11; Irish Independent, June 5, 8; and Irish Press, June 12, 16.
68. Mary Robinson, "No constitutional protections endangered," Irish
Times, June 2, 8.
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71. Nell McCafferty, "They want to abolish marriage," Irish Press, July 3,
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16,8.
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May 9, 10.
75.1 am using this in the Gramscian sense. Importantly, in Gramsci's (1971)
conceptualization, a historical bloc is not that of a homogeneous and unified
group but connotes the collaboration of various social classes or social frac-
tions that collaborate against external threats. As I mentioned in chapter 2, or-
ganized women do not constitute one of the national "social partners" in
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FIVE The Catholic Church and the Referendum
1. This is the figure for 1984, a decrease from 91 percent in 1974. Data
collected in 1988-1989 suggest that the proportion of Catholics attending
mass weekly is 82 percent. See Nic Ghiolla Phadraig, 1992. Ireland is 93 per-
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other/none/religion not stated. Only 52 percent of American Catholics report
weekly church attendance (Hout and Greeley, 1987, 326), while church-going
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(Fogarty et al., 1984, table l(ii)).
2. See especially, 108-36.
3. See McSweeney, 1980, for an excellent discussion of the revolutionary
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4. McSweeney, 1980, 135.
5. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 11:4:76. This
and other Vatican II documents I quote below are taken from The Sixteen Doc-
uments of Vatican II. See also Declaration on Religious Freedom, articles 6
and 1:4:4.
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also MacEoin, 1966, 174.
7. Declaration on Religious Freedom, article 6. Recall that until it was de-
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8. Initiated by the then Fine Gael/Labour coalition government led by Liam
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quently expressed the view that the State should not enact legislation that is
against moral law (Ryan, 1979, 120).
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15. Politicians participating in the forum such as Senator Mary Robinson of
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man of Limerick, Irish Times, Feb. 18, 1985, 7, and Bishop McDonnell of
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19. Irish Episcopal Conference, 1985, 56-57. In May 1986 the hierarchy re-
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29. Bishop Cassidy, ibid., June 17, 6.
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Al, A14; and New York Times, Feb. 5, 1990, Bl.
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abortion, Weakland has criticized the tactics of the pro-life movement. In pro-
hibiting Weakland from receiving the degree, the Vatican Congregation for
Catholic Education noted certain positions of Weakland's "relative to the ques-
tion of abortion which are not without doctrinal importance and which are
causing a great deal of confusion amongst the faithful in the U.S." (See Origins,
Nov. 22, 1990, 20:24, 387-89.
56. See a report on this by Peter Steinfels in the New York Times, June 27,
1990, Al, A6.
57. In 1944, for instance, the Archbishop of Dublin prohibited Catholics
from attending Trinity College and declared it a mortal sin (Whyte, 1980,
306).
58. Text of Archbishop McNamara's sermon printed in the Irish Times,
Feb. 8, 1985, 9.
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60. Irish Episcopal Conference, Aug. 22, 1983 (1983b); Irish Episcopal
Conference, Nov. 2, 1982; Irish Episcopal Conference, Mar. 29, 1983 (1983a).
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61. Bishop Cassidy, "Today Tonight," Apr. 24, 1986. See also Irish Episco-
pal Conference, 1986b, sections 19 and 24-26; 1985, 60-67; and June 11,1986
(1986c).
62. Irish Episcopal Conference, June 11, 1986 (1986c).
63. Ibid., 1986b, section 20; and 1985, 58.
64. Ibid., section 29. See also ibid., section 30; and 1986c; and Bishop Clif-
ford of Cashel, Irish Press, June 14, 4.
65. Irish Episcopal Conference, 1986b, section 32. See also sections 35 and
37; and 1986c.
66. Irish Episcopal Conference, 1986b, section 45.
67. Weafer (1986, 516) notes that Catholic orthodoxy and practice in Ire-
land decreases with educational qualifications and is lowest in areas of highest
population density.
68. Irish Episcopal Conference, 1986b, section 16.
69. Irish Episcopal Conference, 1975, 8.
70. See a report on Murphy's remarks in the Irish Times, June 10, 7.
71. John Bowman, "Today Tonight," asked Bishop Cassidy, "How good is
your sociology?" (Apr. 24); Dick Walsh, Irish Times, June 19, 10, commented
on the contradiction between the Church's opposition to civil divorce and its
own annulment procedures; and columns by Conor Cruise O'Brien, Irish In-
dependent (May 24, 8; June 21, 8) and editorials in the Sunday Tribune, (Apr.
27, 10; May 18, 10) challenged the right of the hierarchy to offer pastoral guid-
ance on divorce.
SIX Newspaper Editorial Opinion
1. This was also true of the Sunday papers: the Sunday Independent, the
Sunday Press, and the Sunday Tribune.
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2. Personal communication from Maev-Ann Wren, assistant editor, the
Irish Times. In 1974 after more than a decade of editorial change and expan-
sion, the directors of the Times established a nonprofit-oriented trust (Brady,
1985, 6). The articles of the trust require that no interest group or party or
sectional interest shall have or shall appear to have majority control. In ac-
cordance with this principle, a board of trustees or governors drawn from
academic, business, labor, and administrative fields was appointed. A very
large proportion of its readers live in Dublin, belong to the professional/
managerial occupational categories, and are in the 25 to 40 age group (Brady,
1985, 6-7). The Times has a daily circulation of 93,827 readers (Ireland: A Di-
rectory, 211).
3. The Independent was historically the voice of the old Irish Parliamen-
tary Party, which relayed the message of Charles Stewart Parnell throughout
Ireland. Today, it is owned and controlled by Tony O'Reilly, the international
businessman, and by business and professional associates of his (Brady, 1985,
6). It has a circulation of 149,620 readers (Ireland: A Directory, 211).
4. So strongly did the Independent support the divorce amendment that on
the. day before polling day it printed an editorial on the front page, entitled
"Why we feel it is necessary to say 'yes' tomorrow." Earlier in the campaign it
devoted a full half page to an editorial—"Why the amendment should pass"—
in which it echoed the sentiments of Garret FitzGerald that divorce would serve
the social good (May 23). The editor, Bruce Arnold, also wrote an especially
complimentary piece about Garret FitzGerald on June 21, 8.
5. In addition to the de Valera family, the Press is now half-owned by an
American-based trust. It has a circulation of 60,287 readers (Ireland: A Direc-
tory, 211).
6. Impressionistic evidence suggests, however, that in recent years there has
been a noticeable increase in the amount of sensationalist stories featured in the
Irish Independent.
7. Brady, 1985, 6. Conor Brady has held various editorial positions since
1969, most of them with the Irish Times.
8. John Whyte (1980, 269-70) reports that this observation was made by
a number of prominent Catholics in 1951-1952.
9. Catherine Rose, 1975, 79-80.
10. Between April 23 and June 26 inclusive, the Irish Times had seventeen
editorials and sixteen pieces by regular columnists on the amendment; the In-
dependent had six editorials and two pieces each by two of its regular colum-
nists in addition to an opinion piece by its political editor; the Press had five
editorials on the amendment, including one in Irish on June 6, a column piece
by its editor, and a piece in Irish by a regular columnist. I am happy to ac-
knowledge my mother, Peg Dillon, for translating the editorial and other arti-
cles written in Irish in the Press.
11. Irish Times, June 9.
12. Irish Press, Apr. 24.
13. Ibid., June 25; Apr. 24. Risteard O'Glaisne, writing in Irish, also
stressed the restrictiveness of the proposals in his column in the Press on
June 20.
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14. Tim Pat Coogan, June 21, 7. Coogan has been editor of the Irish Press
since 1968. He is also the author of a number of books on issues of modern
Irish history, including the IRA and the H-block prisoners' protests in North-
ern Ireland.
15. Apr. 24.
16. Apr. 24. See also Michael Finlan's column, Irish Times, Apr. 25, 10.
17. May 31; June 16. This line was also sounded by the Sunday Tribune.
One of its editorials (Apr. 27) stated: "If the referendum is carried it will be the
first clear signal that southern Irish society is not a mask for 'Rome Rule.' " On
the Sunday preceding polling day, in an editorial titled "The Duty to Vote
'Yes,' " The Tribune (June 22) noted further that: "The hard fact is that the
Protestant community in the North has believed—and not without some jus-
tification—that the Republic is a Catholic dominated State, which would not
respect their religious liberties and cultural identity. The manner in which
Catholic Church morality has been enshrined in the Constitution and laws of
the Republic is testimony to the validity of part of that perception."
18. May 23.
19. June 25. A column piece in Irish by Risteard O'Glaisne, "Daoine a
bhionn thios le scaradh" (Irish Press, June 20, 8), also commented on the rel-
evance of passing the amendment in order to deprive Unionists in Northern
Ireland from arguing that the Republic does not have the same civil freedoms
as the North.
20. Irish Times, June 9.
21. Irish Independent, May 19.
22. Irish Times, June 26.
23. Ibid., Apr. 23; June 23; June 26.
24. Irish Independent, May 19.
25. Ibid. May 14; May 19.
26. Ibid., May 23.
27. Irish Times, June 12; June 16.
28. Nuala O'Faolain, ibid., May 16, 8.
29. Dick Walsh, ibid., May 15, 10.
30. Mary Holland, ibid. May 7, 10.
31. See for example, ibid., Apr. 23. This was not true of the Sunday Tribune,
however, which was particularly critical of the Catholic hierarchy and the
power the bishops wield on account of their "divine authority". The editorials
in the Tribune (Apr. 17; May 18) emphasized that divorce was not a moral is-
sue but one of sociological and political judgement, and thus moral guidance
from the bishops was not required.
32. Irish Times, Apr. 24; May 14.
33. Irish Press, June 21.
34. Irish Independent, June 25.
35. Ibid. June 2, 8.
36. Ibid., June 23, 6.
37. Dick Walsh, Irish Times, May 1, 8.
38. June 9.
39. June 25.
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40. June 21.
41. June 25.
42. Irish Times June 19.
43. Ibid.
44. June 25.
45. May 23.
46. May 21.
47. Dick Walsh, June 12, 10.
48. May 23.
49. June 19.
50. June 26.
51. John Healy, Irish Times, June 14, 20.
52. See the editorials in the Cork Examiner, Apr. 24; May 14; May 16;
May 19; May 27; June 9; June 25. The Cork Examiner has a daily circulation
of 58,149 readers {Ireland: A Directory, 211).
53. In Longford/Westmeath, for instance, the electoral constituency of
Patrick Cooney, the dissenting cabinet member of FitzGerald's government,
and of two prominent anti-divorce Fianna Fail shadow ministers, Mary
O'Rourke and Albert Reynolds, and where 71 percent of the electorate voted
against the amendment, neither the Westmeath Examiner or the Longford Ex-
press took an editorial stance on divorce.
54. In the absence of exit polls, these observations are based on the MRBI/
Irish Times poll conducted on June 19 and 20, five days prior to polling day.
See table 1.
55. Here, when I refer to the media as a secular progressive voice I mean
this relatively; compared to traditional sources of authority such as the
Church, the mass media is a secular institution. This point, therefore, should
not be taken to indicate my support for the perspective adopted by Lichter
and Rothman (1981) that because those working in the media are an elite in
terms of social background, education, attitudes, etc., consequently media
content reflects these elitist liberal values. To the contrary, media content is
largely a product of various organizational, economic, sociological, and some-
times legal, constraints (see Gans, 1979; and Tuchman, 1978, among others,
for good examples of this type of analysis). This view was also maintained
by Michael O'Toole of the Evening Press in his interview with me. He
stated that the "deadlines and routines of news production as well as in-
ternal editorial controls militate against personal biases" being advocated
by journalists.
56. Conor Cruise O'Brien is an internationally known writer and author.
On Irish society, he is particularly critical of what he considers overly romantic
nationalist sentiments regarding aspirations toward a united Ireland. As La-
bour minister for posts and telegraphs in the 1973—1977 Fine Gael/Labour co-
alition government, he was the minister responsible for amending the
Broadcasting Act prohibiting interviews with or reports of interviews with
members of the IRA. See section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority (Amend-
ment) Act, 1976.
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57. Irish Independent, May 24, 8.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., June 21, 8.
60. Ibid.
SEVEN Television's Framing of the Debate
1. The Broadcasting Act in Ireland requires that: "in a matter of public
controversy or a matter which is a source of current public debate, information,
news or a feature presented about it, is presented by RTE (Radio Telefis Eireann)
objectively, impartially and without any expression of the Authority's own
views... . [and should be] fair to all interests concerned" (Broadcasting Au-
thority Act, 1960, section 18; Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act, 1976,
section 18). In the U.S. the Communications Act states that broadcasters must
serve the "public interest, convenience and necessity" (United States Commu-
nications Act, 1934). More specifically, the Fairness Doctrine, which was re-
pealed in August 1987, required broadcasters to cover controversial issues and
to do so fairly. Broadcasters maintain that such rules have a "chilling effect."
Afraid of offending certain sectors of the public by not presenting controversial
issues in a fair manner, broadcasters tend to refrain from presenting them al-
together or else do so in a superficial way. For a good overview of the American
experience of broadcast regulation see Powe, 1987; and of the Irish experience,
see Fisher, 1978; and Feeney, 1984.
2. The anchor/interviewers are: John Bowman, also a radio presenter and
a historian who has written a book on Eamon de Valera and the Ulster ques-
tion; Brian Farrell, associate professor of political science; Pat Kenny, also a
radio presenter, with economic and managerial interests in the communication
production industry; and Olivia O'Leary, a journalist who at the time of the
divorce campaign was on leave with Channel Four in England.
3. Kelly, 1984, 89.
4. RTE, Annual Report, 1986, 7.
5. Irish Television Audience Measurement (TAM) ratings, various weeks,
April, May, June, 1986.
6. TAM ratings indicate that this edition of "Today Tonight" was the sec-
ond most watched program on RTE for the week ending June 22.
7. Further evidence of the combative style program introduction of "Today
Tonight" was also evident, for example, in their second program. The lead-in
here stated; "Tonight the opening shots in the debate. The arguments for and
against" (Apr. 24).
8. May 22.
9. Apr. 23.
10. Apr. 24.
11. May 22; June 3.
12. June 24.
13. Apr. 23. This was suggested despite the fact that when the all-party par-
liamentary committee on marital breakdown issued their report in 1985, they
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did not call for the introduction of divorce precisely because Fianna Fail mem-
bers dissented from the rest of the committee on this recommendation.
14. May 22; June 3; June 10.
15. May 22.
16. A senior parliamentarian from Fianna Fail was featured on the panel in
the two audience participation programs (June 3; June 10) as well as in a final
campaign review program before polling day (June 19).
17. Reporter Una Claffey, "Today Tonight," June 19.
18. Apr. 23.
19. Ibid.
20. May 22; June 3; June 10.
21. Apr. 24. Similarly, at the DAG press conference, broadcast on Apr. 24, a
"Today Tonight" reporter asked, "Could you withstand pressure from the
Catholic Church?"
22. June 19.
23. See note 1 above.
24. Hallin (1983) uses this phrase in noting the difficulties broadcasters
have to confront in imposing balance on what is after all an unbalanced real-
ity. Although the broadcasting legislation does not specify the word "bal-
ance," and while all of the people whom I interviewed at RTE, both executives
and those working on "Today Tonight," stressed that the statutory require-
ments do not specify or mean "balance," I believe that Hallin's phrase captures
the complexity of the task involved in maintaining impartiality, objectivity,
and fairness.
25. One piece that came closest to approximating this kind of reporting was
one short segment featuring an interview with a community welfare officer
from the Southern Health Board about the increase in the numbers of people
applying for assistance in relation to problems of marital breakdown (Apr. 24).
A separate "Today Tonight" program produced prior to the announcement of
the referendum—"Marital breakdown: What happens when the dream of a
lifetime breaks down"—presented, without commentary, detailed interviews
with four people with broken marriages and was transmitted during the di-
vorce campaign, but it was not integrated with the issues raised by the amend-
ment. Apart from "Today Tonight," the ever-popular weekend live television
light entertainment/chat show, "The Late Late Show" hosted by Gay Byrne,
and which in over twenty-five years on the air has covered many controversial
topics, often provoking heated public discussion and outrage, also departed
from its customary format. Excluding its usual lively and engaged audience, the
one show devoted to the divorce referendum followed a sterile courtroom for-
mat. Simply introduced by Gay Byrne, the "program" featured a presiding re-
tired High Court judge, lawyers, and expert witnesses presenting the pro- and
anti-divorce cases.
26. In my interview with a senior management executive at RTE, he pointed
out that "you always have to include the politicians" in sensitive debates.
27. Apr. 23; May 22; June 17.
28. This point goes against Stuart Hall's argument, for instance, that de-
spite the legal obligations faced by the British television authorities: "Formu-
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lating the agenda for discussion, comment and debate, the right of selecting the
speakers and of chairing the debate, have been . . . in the hands of the broad-
caster" (Hall et al., 1981, 91).
29. The media's emphasis on dramatic conflict is well documented in stud-
ies of mass media. Esslin (1982, 6) emphasizes that "the language of television
is none other than that of drama; that television . . . is, in its essence, a dra-
matic medium" [emphasis in original]. Gouldner (1976, 124) summarizes:
"The press, in short, dramatizes violence and, more generally, features con-
flict" [emphasis in original]. Gitlin (1980, 27) also observes media frames of
polarization and emphasis on internal dissension.
EIGHT Values in Tension
1. On the negative effects of divorce Arendell, 1986, argues "One major
effect of the continued high divorce rate has been the dramatic growth of fam-
ilies headed by mothers. . . . Directly related to the increase in female-headed
households has been the impoverishment of women" (1).
2. See Mansbridge, 1986, particularly chapter 5, which she titles, "59
Cents."
3. Lakatos, 1970, argues that a scientific research "programme consists of
methodological rules: some tell us what paths of research to avoid (negative
heuristic), and others, what paths to pursue (positive heuristic).... All scien-
tific research programmes may be characterized by their 'hard core'. The neg-
ative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus tollens at this
'hard core'. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or even invent
'auxiliary hypotheses', [positive heuristic] which form a protective belt around
this core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to these" [emphasis in orig-
inal] (132-33).
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, lile.
5. The duality of opposing values is also clearly evident in other forms of
public discourse in Irish society where appeal is made simultaneously to the
values of tradition and to those of modernity. The discourse of corporate ad-
vertising is one arena that provides a good example. For instance, in adopting
as its new logo a Celtic representation of Noah's ark and the dove, Allied Irish
Bank (AIB), a major Irish-based, international bank explains: "The eighties
were a decade of unprecedented change. Over the period AIB has taken the lead
in change in the Financial Services Industry in Ireland and in the expansion of
Irish banks abroad, becoming a truly international bank . . . . As we start in the
1990s, we are signaling our readiness for the future and we are expressing this
readiness with a new identity.... It is a symbol that reflects security, recognises
our past while heralding a future" (AIB, 1990, 24). Many readers may be fa-
miliar with the advertisements of the Irish Industrial Development Authority
(IDA) in the United States, which feature historic images of Ireland juxtaposed
with photographs of the well-educated Irish young Europeans. Commenting
on this pattern, Luke Gibbons argues that "The most striking feature of IDA
promotional material is that it does not simply acknowledge but actively
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perpetuates the myth of romantic Ireland, incorporating both modernity and
tradition within its frame of reference" (1988, 211).
6. Ska, 1988, 139.
7. Weber, "Science as a Vocation", 143, quoting Tolstoy. See also 138-56.
Weber argues that none of the intellectual or scientific disciplines—natural sci-
ence, modern medicine, aesthetics, jurisprudence, sociology or the historical
and cultural sciences—can tell us what is worthwhile. They provide us with
technical means but do not ask whether the pursuit is worth the effort.
8. Bellah et al., 1985, 79.
9. See Payne (1984) for a historical overview of the Church in Spain.
10. Mujal-Leon, 1982, 32.
11. Lovenduski, 1986, 54-55. See also Matsell, 1981, for a review of the
status of women in Spain.
12. Lovenduski, 105-106.
13. See Wolchik's (1989) discussion of changes in Eastern Europe following
World War II. Elsewhere, she notes (1981, 253) that "in accordance with
Marxism-Leninism political elites in Eastern Europe have explicitly affirmed
their commitment to women's equality in all areas of life".
14. Bogdan Szajkowski (1983) argues that "even for those who were by no
means religious, the Church offered the only opportunity of openly expressing
their disapproval of the government by attending Sunday mass" (3). At the
same time as the Church and Catholicism constituted an oppositional culture
for the Poles, the Church hierarchy let itself be used by the Communist party in
order that Polish independence from Russia would be maintained. Szajkowski
notes that "The Church agreed to restrain Solidarity from making overtly po-
litical demands which could undermine the regime and disquiet the Soviet
Union.. . . The Catholic hierarchy saw a continuous threat to Polish indepen-
dence and regarded its preservation as paramount" (102, 125).
15. Weber, 1981, 184.
16. See Beckwith, 1985 and 1987.
17. Wertman, 1982, 89-105.
18. Kuhn, 1962.
19. William Ogburn, [1957] 1964, 92-93, argues that societal upheaval
brought about by revolution tends to cause cultural lags to crumble. Differen-
tiating revolutions from rebellions, Skocpol (1979, 4) argues: "Social revolu-
tions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures;
and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class based revolts
from below. Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and
transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the
coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coinci-
dence of political with social transformation. In contrast, rebellions, even when
successful,... do not eventuate in structural change."
20. Ogburn, [1957] 1964, 93-94, argues that war is another event that fa-
cilitates the dismantling of cultural lags.
21. Keogh, 1988, 98-196, discusses Ireland's neutrality and World War II.
22. See Carter, 1988, 10-24.
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23. Brown, 1985, 180.
24. For a general overview of the status of women in Swiss society, see Bau-
mann and Naf-Hoffman, 1978. The Cantons in which women were not al-
lowed to vote were Appenzell Ausser Rhoden and Appenzell Inner Rhoden.
25. For a report on this, see the New York Times, Apr. 5, 1990, A14. The
discussion here prompts me to speculate that the notion of a normative "cul-
ture clock" may be relevant to understanding societies in the same way as a
"social clock" applies to individuals. When an opportunity in which to enact
societal initiatives has gone by, for a variety of reasons, it becomes more dif-
ficult to embrace change at a later time. It may well have been easier for Ireland
to introduce divorce in the 1970s when most other Western countries were lib-
eralizing their divorce laws and when Irish society itself was undergoing eco-
nomic and social change. Similarly, because Swiss women did not receive the
right to vote when other European women did so, either in the first decades of
the century (as did the Irish and the British), or following the end of World War
II (when Italian and French women did so), their achievement of the franchise
at a later time became more difficult.
26. For a discussion of the Church in America see Deedy, 1987; and
O'Brien, 1989.
27. When asked about sources of personal influence on a range of issues, on
divorce, 40 percent of the Irish people said the church, compared to 14 percent
who stated the media. See MRBI, 1987a, table IB (ii), 13.
28. Bendix, 1964, 6. See Bendix, 1964; Smelser, 1968,126-27; and Smelser,
1976, 148-63, for a discussion of the process of economic development and
modernization. Importantly, Bendix, 1967, 329, notes that "modernization
in some sphere of life may occur without resulting in modernity" [emphasis
in original].
29. Smelser, 1976, 148.
30. Eisenstadt (1973, 25) emphasizes the centrality of social change to mod-
ernization. He states: "Modernization implies . . . the development of a social,
economic or political system which not only generates continuous change, but
unlike many other types of social or political systems, is also capable of ab-
sorbing changes beyond its own institutional premises."
31. Gerschenkron, 1962, 353.
32. Clark Kerr et al., 1960, 284-85, 296.
33. See Smelser, 1968, especially 140-44; Smelser, 1976, 148-62; Bendix,
1964, 10; and Inkeles and Smith, 1974, 311, for remarks on the uneven nature
of modernization.
34. See Ogburn's discussion, [1957] 1964, 86-95, of cultural lag. Citing the
greater death and crime rates in urban as opposed to rural areas, Ogburn in-
terprets this as indicative of a lag in adjustment to the modernized, urban
environment.
35. Inkeles and Smith, 1974, 29, argue that: "The modern man . . . has a
marked sense of personal efficacy; he is highly independent and autonomous in
his relations to traditional sources of influence, especially when he is making
basic decisions about how to conduct his personal affairs."
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36. Bendix, 1967, 328.
37. Black, 1966, 27, argues that modernization "is a process that is simul-
taneously creative and destructive, providing new opportunities and prospects
at a high price in human dislocation and suffering."
38. See Jackson Lears, 1981, for an interesting discussion of antimodernism
in America between 1810 and 1920; and Hunter, 1983, for an analysis of evan-
gelicalism as a response to modernity.
39. Bellah, 1970, 64.
40. Bellah et al. (1985) discuss various efforts by Americans to recreate
community values and a sense of societal belongingness in their private "indi-
vidualistic" lives.
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